


JAPAN UNMASKED



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By
HALLETT ABEND

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"Tortured China," "Can China Survive?,"
"Chaos in Asia"



I V E S W A S H B U R N, I N C.
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To
DOUGLAS ROBERTSON,
Friend and Loyal Co-worker
in
Far Places

FOREWORD

Some time before the outbreak of war in Europe in September, 1939, President Roosevelt excited the peoples of various nations with a declaration about the necessity for instituting a quarantine against aggressors. At another time there was lively and unseemly dispute as to whether he had actually said that the American frontier was on the Rhine.

Japan has been actively an aggressor nation since September, 1931, but unfortunately, up to the close of 1940 there has been no effective quarantine instituted against her. A quarantine is an active measure instituted to isolate and keep from outside contact a person or a community, and it is usually enforced when such a person or community has become a menace to the health or well-being of the rest of the community.

Wherever our frontiers in Europe may be today—the English Channel? the Pyrenees? the coast of Norway, Greece or Newfoundland?—it is certain that because no effective quarantine was instituted against Japan, the aggressor, we have today in the Far East a very perilous frontier in the South China Sea, the Sulu Sea and the Straits of Macassar.

It is astounding to review the rapidity with which our ideological frontier against Japan, the aggressor, has been shifted from the far north to an area lying close to and even south of the equator. And it is appalling to contemplate the extent and

FOREWORD

importance of the huge area of the globe that we have let *Japan overrun while we did little more than protest, meanwhile continuing to be her main source of many essential war materials and supplies.*

Nine years ago, late in 1931, when Japan was beginning the conquest of Manchuria, our frontier was probably along a line west of Mukden, running from the Nonni River on the north to Chinchow on the south. A year and a half later it was in Jehol province. On July 7th, 1937, it was near the Marco Polo Bridge, on the outskirts of Peking. By August 14th it had moved southward to Soochow Creek, which practically bisects Shanghai. Just before Christmas of that memorable year it was upriver beyond Nanking and ran straight across the decks of one of our river gunboats, the *U.S.S. Panay*.

This "frontier" has shifted far and rapidly since then—to Hankow, to Chungking, to Canton, to Hainan Island, to the Spratley Islands, to French Indo-China. And now the Netherlands East Indies are in danger.

Today few people in the United States ever consider the bondage of more than 30,000,000 people in Manchuria. Peking the magnificent? Tientsin the commercial? They have been in Japanese possession for roughly four years as 1941 gets under way. The outside world is "sorry" for the Chinese in the occupied areas. But their sufferings and humiliations seem distant and dim; some day they will be liberated, we tell ourselves.

So with the people of Czechoslovakia, the people of Poland, of Finland, of Holland, of Belgium, of France, of Rumania and Bulgaria.

We are gradually becoming accustomed to the idea that much of China and much of Europe are occupied by alien armies. We think of the peoples of those areas with lively or dim sympathy, we donate to relief funds, and with varying degrees of vigor or languor we hope for their eventual deliverance. Meanwhile the centers of interest have shifted. We think

of England, of Greece, of Libya, of Rumania and Turkey and Russia.

When the American public thinks of the Far East, attention no longer turns to Shanghai, and yet the probable fate of that city excited the whole world not long ago. Today we know instinctively that if or when the Japanese take over the International Settlement it will be what the newspapers call "a one-day story," and that after that one day Shanghai will be shrouded in the fog of Japanese censorship and be worth no more headlines until that distant day when, we hope, it will be liberated once more.

China? Chungking? We have come to take as a matter of course China's dogged and heroic continuation of resistance. We marvel that Chungking still carries on, after two years of air raids of savage destructiveness. But those things have lost their drama; the emotional crisis has been maintained too long; the plot must take a new turn. Our interest in China's long struggle and in Chungking's management of China's affairs will not flame high again until the tide begins to turn, until the Japanese are finally forced into retreat.

With the coming of the autumn of 1940, northern and coastal China lost their importance and their interest. Japan held them; no one was attempting to drive her out. The valiant sallies of Chinese guerrillas had become an old story.

But Japan was still on the move—southward. When the Low Countries of Europe were overrun by the German armies, when France surrendered, Japan was on the watch. Mussolini marched his armies into southern France, and Japan decided to emulate his political and military tactics and play the part of the jackal in the Far East. Indo-China was helpless, England was fighting with her back to the cliffs of Dover, France and Holland were helpless. So Japan decided to move, to take advantage of German victories in Europe. England, she said, must close the Burma Road; French Indo-China must close the

F O R E W O R D

Haiphong-Yunnan Railway, must permit Japan to land troops, must concede Japan the use of air fields; the Netherlands East Indies must give Japan oil and rubber and tin, and a preferred trade position.

England and Holland and France were in no position to offer real resistance, so Japan pressed southward—and called it “manifest destiny.”

Then England withstood the blitzkrieg, and reopened the Burma Road; the Dutch in the East Indies armed and prepared to defend their priceless heritage; the United States tightened anti-Japanese embargoes, poured more millions into Chungking’s treasury, and warned Japan against further progress. The British Empire’s strength grew; the garrison of Singapore and the Malay Peninsula was more than doubled. More and more long-range American bombers flew from Honolulu to Manila, additional submarines joined the American fleet in the far Pacific, the cruiser *Cincinnati* joined Admiral T. C. Hart’s forces.

Headlines, it seemed to me, would hereafter be made from Manila, from Singapore, from Batavia, from Saigon, from Bangkok. In the face of this situation I decided to go to the menaced areas of the Far East and see for myself the extent of their preparedness, the riches which made those areas tempting to an aggressor, and to try to measure the temper and morale of the peoples exposed to the perils of attack and possible conquest. The Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, Borneo, Celebes, Java and the Philippine Islands seemed to be the most promising areas for this kind of exploration, and there I spent the last two and a half months of 1940. In this book I have put a candid record of many of the things I learned and saw.

H. A.

Balik Papan, Borneo,

CONTENTS

1. JAPAN DECIDES	17
2. CHINA DECIDES	36
3. THAT DREARY LAND	49
4. HONGKONG	67
5. THE VICTIM AND THE DUPE	76
6. SINGAPORE	88
7. NAVAL BASE AND FORTRESS	100
8. TIN, RUBBER AND EXCHANGE	111
9. THE ISLES OF COURAGE	128
10. ONE IMMEDIATE PROBLEM	147
11. OUR PACIFIC BASTION	157
12. SINGAPORE'S CENSORS	174
13. PACK UP AND SAIL	202
14. RELIGION AND EDUCATION	222
15. THE ARMY DREAMS ON	235
16. FEELING THE PINCH	242
17. ANTI-AMERICAN CHORUS	260
18. CITY OF FEAR	278
19. "FROM THE HORSE'S MOUTH"	294
20. AND So—?	305
INDEX	319

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1.

JAPAN DECIDES

In the autumn and early winter of 1940 Japan made two momentous decisions, and then burned her bridges. She chose not to attempt a graceful and tactful retreat from her impossible position in China, but instead first joined the Berlin-Rome Axis and then extended recognition to her puppet government headed by Wang Ching-wei at Nanking. By these acts she outlawed herself in the eyes of the great and little democracies of the world and also made it impossible ever to conclude an honorable peace with the Chungking Government headed by General Chiang Kai-shek.

Japan deliberately chose to gamble on her own ability to continue a campaign of aggression and conquest, to gamble on the defeat and dissolution of the British Empire, and to gamble on the continuing patience and forbearance of the United States. All or nothing—the dictator of East Asia and the East Indies, or defeat and disarmament and reduction to the place of a third class power—those are now Tokyo's alternatives.

The choice was deliberately made. Japan's fate is no longer in her own hands. The wheel spins: the gamble is on. Japan's future will not be decided in Tokyo, but by the outcome of the war in Europe, and by decisions for war or peace to be made in Washington. If Germany and Italy go down to defeat, Japan crashes too.

Japan had long been ideologically sympathetic to Germany and to Italy, as was shown by the enthusiasm with which she supported the Anti-Comintern Pact signed with those nations before the outbreak of the war in Europe. It seems practically certain that Japan was ready and even eager to go to war on the side of the totalitarian states as long ago as the Munich Pact signing in September of 1938. This readiness to fight side by side with Hitler and Mussolini continued through the summer of 1939, and there is no doubt that Japan would have struck against Britain at Hongkong and against France in Indo-China in September, 1939, except for the shock of surprise with which she received news of the Berlin-Moscow agreement concluded in August.

That Hitler-Stalin agreement produced a violent but brief emotional reaction in Japan. German flags were torn down, and hundreds of German nationals left Tokyo and Yokohama in haste, some going to Shanghai and some to Manila. The British in Japan, who had been highly unpopular all summer while their fellow nationals were being kicked and cuffed around the Japanese barriers at Tientsin, suddenly found themselves being courted by the Japanese. Japan felt betrayed and friendless, and was a little afraid.

As a result, the Japanese did not attack Hongkong, and the British, instead of having to keep a large portion of their fleet at Singapore, and to guard the sea lanes to Australia, were able to withdraw most of their warships from that base to the Red Sea and to the Mediterranean. Whether Hitler gained more from his pact with Russia than he lost by this freedom of

action accorded to the British fleet by Japan's remaining quiet will not be known until after the war has ended.

For a year Japan hesitated. Most of the Army influence was in favor of joining the Axis, but the more powerful of the Navy chiefs counseled a wait-and-see policy. Two developments determined the final decision to formally join the world's other two great aggressor nations—first, the collapse of France and the overwhelming of Holland, and, second, the clear line of American policy to accord every possible form of assistance to the democracies short of actual participation in hostilities.

The helpless position of France and Holland gave Japan her chance for expansion into Indo-China and into the East Indies, and America's attitude toward the basic issues involved in the war in Europe convinced Tokyo that reconciliation with Washington was impossible unless Japan was prepared to relinquish all the gains brought to her by aggression on the Asiatic mainland since the summer of 1937.

Accordingly, on September 27th Japan signed the new Tripartite Pact at Berlin and bound herself to triumph or to fall with Germany and Italy. The official terms of that treaty of alliance apparently do not give Japan any advantages at all, but there is good authority for believing that the treaty contains three "confidential provisions" that have never been officially acknowledged:

First: In case of victory, Germany and Italy agree to use their influence to assist Japan in acquiring complete control of French Indo-China and of the Netherlands East Indies.

Second: Germany and Italy pledge themselves to mediate between China and Japan after the close of the war in Europe.

Third: Germany alone agrees to use her "fullest political and diplomatic good offices" to help effect the conclusion of a binding nonaggression pact between Soviet Russia and Japan.

These three provisions promise Japan substantial rewards if the aggressor nations are victorious. In return, Japan is bound to go to war against any neutral nation that goes to war against either Germany or Italy after the date of the signing of the pact. This provision, of course, is directed against the United States and is a crafty arrangement designed to keep us from transferring part of our fleet from the Pacific to the Atlantic to help England, lest Japan take advantage of the division of our sea strength to attack what would then be a numerically inferior American fleet left to guard the Philippine Islands, Hawaii, Alaska and our own Pacific shoreline.

These unpublished provisions of the Tripartite Pact will, naturally, not be published unless or until England is successfully invaded or the major portion of the British fleet destroyed, and at the beginning of 1941 there seemed little likelihood of either of these things coming to pass. When Japan signed in September, the prospects were vastly different, for at that time England seemed to be fighting a hopeless battle of defense.

Germany and Italy would cut a foolish figure if they "awarded" Pacific territories that are inaccessible to them so long as the British fleet continues in being.

Another deterrent to a formal announcement of these secret treaty provisions is the continued presence in the Pacific of most of the United States fleet. Only if England is defeated and her navy at least partly destroyed could the three aggressor nations begin to mark the world off into "spheres of influence" and to try to squeeze the United States out of its position in the Far East. And even then such a course would have to have at least the silent acquiescence of Soviet Russia.

The Japanese pact with Germany and Italy is not popular with the Japanese people, but was entered into largely at the insistence of the extremist or "radical" group in the Army. The word "radical" as used pertaining to Japan's militarists has nothing to do with political liberalism. In fact, liberalism

is now classed as treason under the new form of totalitarian state evolved in Japan, which has included the abolition of all political parties.

Japan's "radical" group in the Army are politically reactionaries of the most virulent type and are "radical" only in the sense that they sponsor radical challenges to all the rest of the world that opposes Japan's policy of expansion by violence and conquest. They are the hotheads and jingoes who have imperiled the whole future of the Empire by following their own ingrained conviction that might makes right.

Japan is now governed by a group of about a score of fanatical militaristic visionaries, many of them dangerously ignorant of the rest of the world. One of their leaders is that sinister Colonel Kingoro Hashimoto who was involved in the Tokyo mutiny of 1936, when several Cabinet members were assassinated and actual fighting continued in Japan's capital for several days.

Hashimoto was then cashiered from the Army, but he was recalled in 1937 and sent to China. He it was who ordered the bombing of the *U.S.S. Panay*, and the shelling of the British river gunboats *Ladybird* and *Bee* on the Yangtsze. Again retired, Colonel Hashimoto began organizing the Japan Young Men's Federation, a body of extreme reactionaries said now to have about 5,000,000 members. He is also said to have been involved in a plot under which in early July of 1940 the then Premier, Admiral Yonai, and other leading Government figures were to have been assassinated. Thirty-eight of the ring leaders were arrested, and so far their fate is unknown, but Colonel Hashimoto escaped official implication and is now one of Japan's "inner circle" of dictators.

Tokyo, so dominated, finally signed a treaty with the Wang Ching-wei regime in Nanking, after negotiations that had been protracted for about eight months, instead of having been speedily concluded when a special mission was sent to Nanking

If China finds it necessary to control foreign trade, she is not to be permitted to infringe the principle of economic co-operation with Japan.

Two clauses specifically provide for the closest co-operation for mutual defense against Communist activities and for the elimination of Communist organizations and elements in both countries.

The Wang Ching-wei regime is pledged to follow closely the example set by Japan in all matters of foreign policy and all relations with third Powers.

This extraordinary document, which gives a not yet successful conqueror the theoretical right to keep army and navy forces in China as long as it chooses, which gives Japan control of Nanking's foreign and economic policies, and which throws the occupied areas of China open to uncontrolled Japanese exploitation, is hailed as "incredibly moderate and generous to the Chinese" by one of the Chinese publicity boosters attached to Wang Ching-wei. He defends the treaty as a "liberal settlement" because, as he says, Nanking is not required to pay "a single cent of indemnity to Japan" or to make any territorial concessions.

Having, so far as possible, handed over the whole country to Japanese military occupation, having granted Japan control of coastal and river waters for an undetermined period, and having given Japan control of foreign and economic policies as well as the right to develop the country's resources unhindered, it would seem that any cession of specific territories or any allocation of specific monies would have been both futile and foolish. Why specify any particular parts as gifts when you have already given away the whole?

The surrender of extraterritoriality by Japan is a meaningless gesture. No Chinese court will dare to give judgment against a Japanese while Japanese soldiers garrison and control the country. The proposed surrender of Japanese concession areas is likewise without significance. Why should Japan want

small concessions in various coastal cities when her soldiers occupy the surrounding countryside and when Japanese appointees control the Customs, the railways and the postal and telegraph facilities?

Japan knows very well that the United States and Britain will never acquiesce in these new arrangements she is making in China, nor in similar arrangements she hopes to make in the additional portions of the Far East that she hopes to overrun. So Japanese spokesmen say and shout in varying tones and with various degrees of emphasis that their Empire will fight any nation that attempts to interfere, directly or indirectly, with Japan's "manifest destiny." Japan has deliberately chosen the path of defiance and of violence, or rather Japan's leaders have chosen that path, and the people are blindly and submissively following their leaders to irretrievable disaster.

The Japanese Foreign Minister, Mr. Yosuke Matsuoka, has made it unmistakably clear that Japan will fight the United States if we become involved in the war in Europe in aid of the democracies. On December 9th, 1940, Mr. Matsuoka, during a ninety-minute interview with foreign newspapermen in Tokyo, made several striking and binding statements that show clearly the Japanese attitude. Among other things he said:

"Japan will certainly have to fight if the United States goes to war with Germany. Japan's foreign policy will henceforth revolve around the Three-Power Pact just as it used to revolve around the alliance with Great Britain. . . . If the United States becomes involved in the European war, the signatories to the Pact will be called upon to consult together as to whether the case comes under Article III. I hope such an eventuality will never occur. . . . Differences between Japan and the United States should never precipitate the catastrophe of war, if only both of us mind our own business."

Asked whether Japan was prepared to modify her own policy toward China as a step toward improving her relations

with the United States, the Foreign Minister replied emphatically: "No, sir! Japan firmly believes she is doing right."

Then came the old familiar platitudes and pretences. Entirely ignoring the contents of the treaty so recently made with the puppet regime at Nanking, which would reduce China to vassalage, Mr. Matsuoka said: "Japan has no territorial ambitions. She is helping her neighbors in the Greater Asia so that all the peoples of this part of the world shall be free to determine their own destinies. We are against conquest and exploitation of East Asiatic countries whether by Japan or any other nation."

Strange how China has fought for three and a half years against accepting this "help" to "determine her own destiny." And equally strange how the Netherlands East Indies are arming and preparing feverishly to resist this same kind of "help."

On this same occasion Mr. Matsuoka reiterated that Japan has no territorial ambitions in the East Indies, saying: "Our ultimate aim is to establish sound understanding with the Netherlands East Indies Government so as to enable us to participate in the peaceful economic development of the Dutch possessions."

Reminded, then, that his predecessor in the Foreign Office had declared that Japan was vitally interested in the maintenance of the status quo in the "South Seas region," Mr. Matsuoka remarked sententiously that changes are constantly taking place in this troubled world. Then, with seemingly sinister implications, so far as the East Indies are concerned, he added:

"Some of these changes are so sudden that Japan certainly has no intention of impeding them."

Mr. Matsuoka offers an interesting example of how even the best men and best minds of a nation can become infected with jingoism and abandon reason and settled convictions when caught in the tide of an emotional nationalistic movement.

His background is largely American. He was brought to the

United States as a small boy, lived in our Far West, worked his way through a western university. He thinks in American English. When he was in the United States, after leading his country's delegation out of the League of Nations following a condemnatory vote on the Manchurian affair, he visited the cemetery in the West where an Oregon woman who was his benefactor when he was a penniless youth is buried. He also ordered a fine marble monument for her grave. "Press agent stunt," the cynics sniffed, but I have always absolved him of this charge of insincerity.

Mr. Matsuoka was at one time vice-president of the powerful South Manchuria Railway, and at another time he was president of that benevolent instrument of Japanese imperialism. Besides being a shrewd financier and an able administrator, he seemed always to be a farsighted statesman with little of the professional politician in his make-up.

I have known Yosuke Matsuoka intimately for about a dozen years. We have talked together hours on end about the great problem that China's far future presents to any thinking mind; about Japan's future, how she is to live, how to maintain her precarious position in the world, about the maintenance of peace in the Far East, and the dangerous balance of power in the Pacific.

Mr. Matsuoka has believed firmly for many years that close Japanese-American friendship would, in the end, be essential to the prosperity of both his people and ours. His agile mind sought incessantly, but vainly, for some method by which the two countries, his and ours, could develop a genuine community of interest and a mutual liking and respect that would forever bar the possibility of strain or war. He was convinced that genuine Japanese-American co-operation could assure the peace of the whole Pacific area for generations to come.

And yet today this man, as Minister for Foreign Affairs, has negotiated Japan's adherence to a pact with Hitler and Mus-

solini, which solemnly pledges Japan to war against us in certain conditions, and has brought about the culmination of folly by recognizing the Wang Ching-wei puppet group as the government of China.

Some of his harsh critics suggest that selfish ambition has led him to do the dictates of the military clique, that he wants to be Prime Minister and feels that during his lifetime the militarist clique will be in control and that he had to compromise with them or sacrifice a lifelong ambition. I decline to believe these surmises. Instead, it seems to me, he has caught the contagion of the militaristic mania and has let it warp his judgment and cloud his foresight. It would be the height of irony if under his direction Japan's foreign policy leads to a disastrous outbreak of hostilities with the United States. His Government's present foreign policy seems to be one of grab and bluff, and he knows America and Americans well enough to realize that we disapprove of the grab and that we cannot be bluffed.

Near the close of 1940, on December 19th, it was, Mr. Matsuoka chose to make some astonishing remarks at a farewell luncheon being given in Tokyo in honor of Admiral Kishisaburo Nomura, newly appointed Japanese Ambassador to Washington. The affair was given by the American Japan Society, and the Foreign Minister's remarks were of such a surprising nature that they drew a sharp rejoinder from the American Ambassador, Mr. Joseph C. Grew.

In his address, which dwelt largely on China problems and their relationship to the United States, Mr. Matsuoka said, amazingly, that "after all, the fate of China is largely a question of sentiment to Americans, but to us it constitutes a truly vital issue affecting, as it does, the very existence of our Empire."

Referring to those persons who believe that war between the United States and Japan is inevitable, Mr. Matsuoka said: "That

would surely spell mankind's downfall. Do we not owe it to humanity, to both Japan and America, to unite our efforts to avert such a calamity?"

He then disclaimed any intention on Japan's part to antagonize the United States, and disavowed a hostile attitude toward this country in connection with the signing of the pact with Germany and Italy.

"Nothing can be more absurd or untrue, for Japan has no desire whatsoever to antagonize America," he said. . . . "Japan's only desire is to be left alone to carry on her constructive work. . . . In our program we shut the door nowhere and to none. . . . Japan will not countenance conquest or oppression."

Those last two statements brought Mr. Grew to his feet. "Americans," he said, "are interested primarily in facts and in actions, regardless of the persuasive garb in which they may be dressed." Commenting on Mr. Matsuoka's statement about "we shut the door nowhere," Mr. Grew dryly remarked: "Let us say of nations as well as of individuals: 'By their fruits ye shall know them.' "

The carefully censored and always officially inspired press of Japan immediately became intensely excited over this exchange of plain statements between their Foreign Minister and the American Ambassador. The question of Japan's program of southward expansion, which had not been mentioned by either speaker, was dragged into the foreground, and strong editorial warnings were published to the effect that Japan would continue her southward policy in defiance of American objections.

The *Kokumin Shimbun* said that a southward advance is Japan's "historical necessity," not a matter of possibility or impossibility, and that "America's contemptuous attitude" in seeking to block this advance is a comedy "which might well prove to be a Pacific tragedy for the United States." The

Kokumin's headline said: "AMERICA'S ATTITUDE TOWARD JAPAN IS LAUGHABLE; JAPAN'S SOUTHERN POLICY IS INEVITABLE."

The American Chamber of Commerce of Tientsin was quick to dispute and deny Mr. Matsuoka's declaration that Japan closes the door nowhere and to no one. In a lengthy official statement sent to the American Department of State, in Washington, the Tientsin Chamber gave facts, figures and dates showing how Japanese trade barriers, monopolies, embargoes and licensing restrictions are being used "with the obvious aim of forcing out Americans and the American business firms from North China. These are 'the facts and actions' that count, as stated by Ambassador Grew," the Chamber's document concludes.

A similar indictment might, with equal truth and justice, have been drawn up by American interests in Shanghai, in Canton, or wherever Japanese military conquest has obtained control in China or in French Indo-China.

The public in Japan has become uneasy and suspicious, and original latent hostility to the Tripartite Pact was beginning to make itself felt as 1940 drew to a close. In fact, just before Christmas Prince Konoye partially reorganized his Cabinet. The Japanese public (and the Government, too) had been startled at the first American reaction to the signing of the Tripartite Pact, which was to send special ships to the Far East and to officially advise all Americans to leave Japan, occupied China, Manchoukuo, Korea, Formosa, Hongkong and French Indo-China.

The public had been told that when Japan signed with Germany and Italy the United States would modify its policies in Japan's favor. Instead, following the evacuation order, Washington loaned Chungking another US \$100,000,000 as soon as Tokyo granted recognition to the puppet Nanking regime. Germany had also failed to overwhelm or invade England, as the Japanese public had been promised she would do

in September, and in addition the signing of the Tripartite Pact had not scared Soviet Russia into a more amicable attitude toward Japan.

The reaction to these combined disappointments was so bitter that some of the extremists openly advised an immediate breach with the United States. Hideicho Noyori, editor of the *Teto Nichi Nichi*, for instance, in a signed editorial declared:

“Washington’s attitude is that of an enemy to Japan. Why Japan attempts to avert war and readjust relations with such a country by sending Admiral Nomura as Ambassador there is beyond my comprehension. Such a policy is certain to subject Japan to many insults. . . . The United States and Britain are the sources of the China conflagration, and unless we dash water onto them we will never be able to extinguish the fire.”

Japan continues to insist that manifest destiny calls upon her to institute a new order in Greater East Asia and persists in rationalizing her policies of conquest and violence by comparing them with the American Monroe Doctrine.

This “New Order” means Japanese military and political domination of the whole of the eastern part of the mainland of Asia, except that belonging to Soviet Russia, and similar domination of as many of the colonies and islands southward of China as Japan may be able to grab from nations enfeebled by the war in Europe. It means economic monopolies favoring Japan, and it means the end of possibilities for freedom or autonomy for any of the aspiring peoples of the Far East. Japan may reiterate her intentions to bring “independence” and the end of “the white man’s domination” in East Asia, but no one will believe in the sincerity of these announced intentions when the cases of Korea and of Manchoukuo are considered.

Prince Fumimaro Konoye, in December, 1938, during his first term as Premier, defined this “New Order” in a statement that, previous to being made public, had been approved at a

secret meeting of the Imperial Conference. He began by announcing a firm resolve to carry on the war until the "complete extermination" of the "anti-Japanese Kuomintang," and then to found a New Order "together with those farsighted Chinese who share our ideals and aspirations."

Japan, China and Manchoukuo, the Premier said, would be united by the common aim of neighborly amity, economic co-operation and a common defense against communism. China, he said, must join with Japan, Germany and Italy in the Anti-Comintern Pact. In order to make the proposed alliance secure, Japanese troops must be "stationed at specific points," and Inner Mongolia must be designated as "a special anti-communist area."

As to economic relations, China, said the Prince, would be "asked to limit her interests" with those third Powers "who grasp the meaning of the new East Asia and are willing to act accordingly."

A dark prospect, apparently, for the economic future in the Far East of those who do not accept Japanese definitions!

Not until after Germany had conquered much of Scandinavia, overwhelmed the Low Countries and forced France to a surrender did the Japanese "New Order in East Asia" plan broaden to include more than Japan, Manchoukuo and occupied China. On June 29th, 1940, however, Mr. Hachiro Arita, then Foreign Minister, broadcast a statement envisioning Japan as heading and controlling an enormous aggregation of satellite states in East Asia AND the South Seas. Mr. Arita, by implication framing a new Monroe Doctrine for the Far East, said with reference to the eastern Asiatic mainland and the South Seas: "The uniting of all these regions in a single sphere is a natural conclusion."

Mr. Arita assumed that the world of the future would see Germany and Italy similarly dominant in Europe and Africa, and graciously conceded to the United States a similar position

on the two American continents. Japan, Mr. Arita piously avowed, was engaged in wielding "a life-giving sword that destroys evil and makes justice manifest."

On July 5th the American Secretary of State, Mr. Cordell Hull, obviously warning Germany to keep hands off of British and French and Dutch possessions in the Western Hemisphere, and at the same time indirectly replying to Mr. Arita, pointed out the following self-evident facts:

The Monroe Doctrine is solely a policy of self-defense, which is intended to preserve the independence and integrity of the Americas. It was, and is, designed to prevent aggression in this hemisphere on the part of any non-American power, and likewise to make impossible any further extension to this hemisphere of any non-American system of government imposed from without.

It contains within it not the slightest vestige of any implication, much less assumption, of hegemony on the part of the United States.

It never has resembled, and it does not today resemble, policies that appear to be arising in other geographical areas of the world, which are alleged to be similar to the Monroe Doctrine, but which instead of resting on the sole policies of self-defense and of respect for existing sovereignties, as does the Monroe Doctrine, would in reality seem to be only the pretext for the carrying out of conquest by the sword, of military occupation, and of complete economic and political domination by certain powers of other free and independent peoples.

Historically the American Monroe Doctrine was enunciated in order to protect the weaker American states from precisely what Japan is trying to do to China and hopes to do elsewhere in the Far East and the South Seas. It was solely directed against outside attempts to overthrow then existing political conditions and to destroy the independence of weak nations.

The Monroe Doctrine of the United States has never been

used as a pretext for conquests or annexations, for destroying the liberties of other nations on the American continent, or for creating monopolies in neighboring countries that would exclude all except citizens of the United States from economic activities in those countries. Japan, under the cloak of her "New Order" and "Monroe Doctrine for East Asia," is doing and hopes to continue doing all those things.

The subterfuges, fallacies and hypocrisies that have become the earmarks of Japanese foreign policies during the last few years seem abundantly, even painfully, obvious to the American mind. We, as a people, marvel that the Japanese people, whose qualities and abilities had been given a high rating in this country, can be so woefully misled. This is because we credit the Japanese people with a degree of logic and a fund of information that they do not have and because we do not remotely begin to understand their deeply emotional loyalty to the Throne or the intensity of their pride and patriotism.

It must not be forgotten that the Japanese Emperor—practically, to the Japanese, a living deity because he is held to be a direct descendant of the Sun Goddess—has often and publicly blessed the war in China and has given his unqualified assent to all those policies and methods that Japan classes as following her "manifest destiny."

The Japanese people have been told repeatedly that their Empire is engaged in a "Holy War." American opposition to this "Holy War" is therefore interpreted as an insupportable national affront, and any Japanese Government that hopes to remain in power must frame its American policy with the fact constantly in mind that the public at home, and particularly the Japanese Army, will not tolerate a "weak-kneed" policy toward the United States.

To those who hope to avoid war between America and Japan, the present situation despairingly resembles the old

problem of what will happen when an irresistible force collides with an immovable object. Japan refuses to brook resistance or interference, and we refuse to change our position by a single inch.

2.

CHINA DECIDES

IN striking contrast to Japan's policies, and to Japan's motives as they are interpreted in the world's democracies, are China's policies and the motives that prompt the Chinese people in the unoccupied areas to staunchly uphold the decision of their leaders to continue the struggle against the invader.

China is not fighting for more territory, is not seeking or hoping to direct the destinies of other peoples in the Far East, is not attempting by force to create economic monopolies. She is and has been for more than three and a half years defending her own soil and fighting not only for survival but for the right to work out her own destiny in her own way.

Despite the fact that she has lost almost her entire coastline and all of her great cities that were centers of commerce, industry, wealth and learning, China has persisted in the struggle although she has lacked factories to manufacture many war essentials and, since the Japanese entered French Indo-China, has had to depend only upon two long highways for connec-

tion with the outside world. One of these highways traverses precipitous mountains and tropical jungles for hundreds of miles, and the other crosses waterless deserts and a territory that in winter is one of the coldest in the world short of the polar regions.

For more than a year and a half Japan avoided according direct recognition to the Wang Ching-wei puppet regime at Nanking, hoping that General Chiang Kai-shek and the Chungking Government would give some sign of being willing to reach a compromise settlement. But Chungking would not compromise, even when tentative feelers were put out by the Japanese.

Instead, in November of 1940, General Chiang Kai-shek and his Government at Chungking reached and announced the momentous decision never to make any kind of a peace with Japan until the war in Europe comes to an end. It was decided that even if Japan, hard pressed by the trend of international affairs, were to offer China an honorable peace, including unqualified and immediate withdrawal of all Japanese armies from China's soil, Chungking's reply would be an emphatic "No."

"Partly enlightened self-interest, and partly an ethical attitude," was the way in which a spokesman for General Chiang revealed to me in Singapore the motives that were behind this decision.

China's leaders, he said, had come to the realization that if they made even an honorable peace with Japan while the war in Europe still continues, they would thereby actually be releasing Japan's mired-down armies from China for use elsewhere. Japan, free of her huge China commitments, would then proceed, they believed, to seize all the islands and territories she could get in East Asia and in the South Seas, and in the end China would find herself a virtual prisoner behind a chain of Japanese-dominated islands. She would be at Japan's

mercy once again, militarily and economically. So much for the "enlightened self-interest" motive.

In addition to these very practical considerations, the Chungking leaders decided that their country is morally bound to continue fighting with the democracies as a group against the aggressor nations as a group.

"General Chiang Kai-shek is convinced," my authorized informant said to me, "that if China were to make peace with Japan, the task of the democracies would become vastly more difficult. The Japanese Navy and the Japanese Army would be released for attacks upon outlying portions of the British Empire, and Japan could then even willfully attack the Philippine Islands and provoke a war with the United States, and thus greatly aid Germany and Italy by reducing the percentage of the output of American factories that is reaching England."

China has chosen to fight on, and hopes to be given a seat at the peace table where the future of the world will be arranged —a seat as a full and honored partner, with equal voice in all deliberations and decisions.

It is extremely significant that soon after the foregoing decision was announced, Japan belatedly signed the treaty with Nanking that accorded recognition to the Wang Ching-wei regime. Tokyo finally realized that the Chinese Government could not be tricked or bribed or cajoled into any kind of a peace, and that the bombing of Chungking had not terrorized China's leaders to the point where they would accept any kind of compromise.

The fortitude of London under the raids of German bombers is now the wonder and admiration of the world. But Chungking has shown fortitude, too, and has endured raids for two years. The heroism of China's continued resistance must not be forgotten just because it is now an old and familiarly continuing story, or because more spectacular events have attracted attention elsewhere.

The close of 1940 brought overoptimistic reports from official circles in Chungking to the effect that China had a total of 3,500,000 men in uniform and in training, and would "soon be ready to launch a wide-scale and effective counterattack" with the objective of driving the Japanese into the sea.

These reports must be accepted with the utmost reserve. Even conceding the practical correctness of this estimate, China's mobilized man power, mere weight of numbers cannot win modern wars against an enemy with control of the skies, with better, heavier and longer range artillery, and with a marked supremacy of all kinds of transport and mechanical equipment.

China has the power and the will to inflict grave and mounting losses upon the Japanese, to keep Japan bleeding heavily upon half a hundred indecisive fields of battle, but China has not yet the power to drive the Japanese into the sea. Given a thousand modern American bombers and pursuit planes, with pilots more able and more courageous than has been the average in China's air force since the beginning of the war in the summer of 1937, and something decisive might be accomplished. But before we waste any great numbers of airplanes by sending them to China, we should be certain that she has the proper trained personnel to make the best use of them.

There have been individual Chinese pilots of great skill and exceptional valor, but candor forces the admission of the fact that China's air force has been a serious disappointment to China herself and to her friends.

The war effort of the Chinese people, in addition to raising and equipping enormous armies, has been something in the nature of an epic. And that it has continued well into the fourth year of hostilities without any serious consideration of compromise or surrender is something of a miracle, particularly in view of the factionalism and sectionalism which, before the outbreak of the struggle with Japan, kept the country con-

stantly on the verge of civil war. This unity, this tenacity, this long-enduring courage must be credited in large measure to one person—General Chiang Kai-shek.

I do not know of any great battles in which he has participated; I have no knowledge as to the extent to which he, individually, decides important points of general strategy. But his political sagacity and administrative ability have been of incalculable value to China's cause, and today he is the living personification of leadership, courage and unity to the Chinese people. For China he is the personification of resistance.

Whether the plain truth is palatable or not, it must be clearly stated that under present conditions, a continuation of the war is good for China. It is too soon for peace. Once the alien enemy is disposed of, the forces at present urging unity and compromise on all domestic affairs will slacken off, and the dangers of sectionalism will arise again.

The Generalissimo has many personal and political enemies; the basic and final relationship of the Chinese Communist Party to the Kuomintang Party is not yet determined. There are difficult questions concerning the when and the how of the Kuomintang putting an end to the "period of tutelage" and, in theory at least, surrendering the control of the Government to the people.

If the war were to end tomorrow China would soon be in a sad plight, for the days of reconstruction and rehabilitation will try the forbearance and patriotism of the country's leaders. It will be well if the Government has a definite program worked out for offering to the people before the fighting stops, before the pressure of an alien invader is entirely removed. The lesson of teamwork and co-operation, so difficult for the Chinese to learn, must be more thoroughly understood than now before the welfare of the long future can be considered assured.

While the pressure of an attempted conquest and subjugation continues, China is accomplishing marvelous things. The

spread of co-operatives is enormously helpful to the continuation of the war. Tens of thousands of coolies labor uncomplainingly building new strategic highways—highways that will also be of incalculable economic value in the future days of peace. New railways are being graded and tunneled.

One two-hundred-mile stretch of a new narrow-gauge railway has actually been completed and opened to traffic. It is the first leg out of Kunming of a line that will eventually connect Kunming, the capital of Yunnan Province, with Suifu, on the Yangtsze River above Chungking. The line is narrow gauge, and the rails and bridge materials as well as locomotives and coaches were imported into China before Japan forced the closing of the Haiphong-Kunming Railway by invading French Indo-China. An extension of the line is being graded out of Suifu, to connect with a line that will later be built from Chungking inland to the city of Chengtu, in the heart of Szechuan Province. When peace is finally restored, it is hoped to build on eastward to connect with the existing Chekiang-Kiangsi Province railway, and then to build west from Kunming to the Burma border, and thus give a rail link between the Pacific and Indian oceans.

While great projects of this kind continue to be developed in spite of the drain and strain of war, tens of thousands of coolies labor day and night as human transport, carrying war supplies into China in order to supplement the insufficient trickle of imports that come in over the Burma Road and over the long northwest route through Turkestan and on into Siberia.

The war has brought exploration and discovery to China's far West, and new coal and mineral deposits of great prospective value are constantly being found. Even more important for the long future of the nation, the forced migration westward of the colleges and universities formerly located mostly in the coastal cities is bringing enlightenment and gen-

eral educational facilities to China's hinterland and forcing history almost half a century ahead of its time.

Chungking continues to receive very important financial and other support from Chinese living abroad, particularly those in Singapore, Malaya, Java and other islands of the Netherlands East Indies. In all these parts of East Asia Chinese have prospered greatly for many decades. Instead of having been weaned away from their homeland, they remain intensely loyal to China, and there is a steady flow of gifts, large cash contributions, donations for Red Cross work, and substantial subscriptions to Chungking's bond issues going to free China every month. In all these areas Wang Ching-wei is execrated, and the Chinese share an almost unanimous contempt for the puppet regime that Japan has set up at Nanking.

American, British and other missionaries continue to carry on their work in the interior of China, and the Chungking Government and General Chiang Kai-shek desire that their activities should be increased. Early in December of 1940, when many American missionaries in Japanese-occupied China were preparing to evacuate and go home, following Washington's sensational advice, a proposal was made that all those who wished to leave Japanese-occupied areas should migrate into areas under Chungking's control. At General Chiang Kai-shek's suggestion, a Committee on Transportation and Placement of Missionaries was appointed in Chungking, and the Chinese Government offered to pay all expenses of travel from China's borders into the interior to those missionaries who wished to go west. Assistance in obtaining and maintaining proper housing accommodations, proper protection and other substantial aids were also offered.

At that time, however, the United States Department of State was technically unable to differentiate between "free" and "occupied" China, and under existing rulings could not stamp passports for missionaries to get into free China by way

of British territory. The only feasible routes were to fly in from Hongkong or to go to Rangoon, and then journey into China over the Burma Road.

Some of the more hardy missionaries may go into the interior by dangerously infiltrating through the Japanese lines into Chinese-controlled territory, while some may go to Ningpo, Wenchow or other unimportant seaports not yet actually occupied by the Japanese but blockaded by them. From these points they could reach the interior by hazardous journeys along rivers and highways that are often bombed. Some mountain stretches of the long journey would have to be made on horseback, in sedan chairs or on foot.

When China's credit column is being made up at the end of the war, one important entry will have to be made to the effect that in spite of the always-urgent need for funds for the Government, the war against opium using and against poppy planting has gone on without intermission. A limited permit system for poppy growing could have brought immense annual revenues to Chungking's chronically depleted treasury, but the temptation to raise money in this way was rigorously resisted.

So strict is the control of the drug traffic in interior China today that in large cities like Chungking and Chengtu, confirmed addicts who can no longer obtain the drug at any price frequently commit suicide publicly in the streets. This situation offers a striking contrast to that in the great coastal cities controlled by the Japanese. There the drug traffic is not only open and unashamed, but much of the opium and cocaine revenue goes into Army and Gendarmerie pockets.

The Chungking Government is also making determined and largely effective efforts to limit profiteering and to prevent the hoarding of rice and other foods and essential commodities. Exceedingly strict laws have been enacted to curb such abuses, and not infrequently some general or some prominent politician is publicly executed by shooting after being found

guilty of profiteering at the expense of the national emergency or of the people's needs.

Although Japanese sources have repeatedly manufactured rumors and so-called "reliable reports" about the supposed growing willingness of Chungking to agree on peace terms, there has never been any real chance of peace since the fall of Nanking in December, 1937.

After Prince Konoye made his famous "New Order" statement to the world, General Chiang Kai-shek, on December 26th, 1938, made known China's reaction and response. Four paragraphs from this history-making speech by the Generalissimo are of special importance. He said:

The Konoye statement may be called a complete exposure of the fantastic Japanese scheme to annex China, dominate Asia, and further even to subdue the world. It is also a complete revelation of the enemy plan to destroy our country and exterminate our race.

Let all observe that what he [Konoye] meant by a China reborn was that independent China was to perish and in its place an enslaved China created, which would abide by Japan's word from generation to generation. The so-called "New Order" would be based on intimate relations to tie an enslaved China to Japanese-created Manchoukuo and to Japan herself. . . . Under the pretext of opposition to the "Red Peril," Japan seeks to control China's military affairs. . . . By urging the elimination of economic barriers, Japan aspires to exclude American and European influence and to dominate the Pacific.

Again, the so-called "economic unity" of Japan, Manchoukuo and China is the instrument she intends to use for obtaining a stranglehold on China's economic arteries. Let us try to realize the immense evils with which the words "creation of a New Order in East Asia" are pregnant. In a word, it is a term for the overthrow of international order in East Asia and the enslavement of China. . . .

Our object in prosecuting this war of resistance is to complete the task of national revolution and secure for China independence,

liberty and equality. Internationally, our object is to support righteousness and justice, restore the prestige of treaties, and re-establish peace and order. This is a war between justice and force, and a war between an abider by the law and a breaker of it. It is also a war between righteousness and brute force.

Three days after General Chiang Kai-shek's address and eight days after Prince Konoye's announcement of the "New Order," the United States Department of State, through our Embassy at Tokyo, sent to the Japanese Ministry for Foreign Affairs a note that marks another important stage in the development of worsening relations between Japan and the United States. Two paragraphs of this note said:

The people and the Government of the United States could not assent to the establishment, at the instance of and for the purposes of any third country, of a regime which would arbitrarily deprive them of the long-established rights of equal opportunity and fair treatment which are legally and justly theirs along with those of other nations. . . .

This Government does not admit, however, that there is need or warrant for any one power to take upon itself to prescribe what shall be the terms and conditions of a "New Order" in areas not under its sovereignty and to constitute itself the repository of authority and the agent of destiny in regard thereto.

This note made the Japanese choke with fury. Here again was "insolent America" trying to interfere with "manifest destiny" and daring to impugn the aims and motives behind the "Holy War" that had been given the Imperial sanction and blessing.

But Chungking was delighted.

Japan has attempted to give this so-called "Holy War" something of an odor of sanctity by proclaiming that the major Japanese effort is to eliminate the threat of communism in China.

In the Japanese mind there is probably considerable confusion of thought on this subject. What Japan is probably really afraid of is not so much the possibility of the spread of communism in China as the spread of Russian influence on the eastern Asiatic mainland. These two "perils" are by no means necessarily one and the same thing.

The truth of the position is that when Japan struck at China in the summer of 1937, there was less real danger of the spread of communism there than there had been at any time in the immediately preceding decade. After General Chiang Kai-shek was kidnaped and detained at Sian, in December of 1936, an important truce was arranged between the Kuomintang Party and Government at Nanking and the Chinese Communist Government and Army with headquarters in northern Shensi Province. The danger to Japan in this agreement was not the spread of the Chinese brand of so-called communism but the early development of a genuinely united and democratic China upon somewhat socialistic lines.

In the spring and summer of 1937, effective co-operation had not yet been achieved, but when the Japanese attack began in July of that year, both the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists buried their long-brandished and very bloody hatchets. Japan had, by her ill-advised and ill-timed action, brought about, at least temporarily, what she had long feared —effective unity between China's Central Government army and political party, between the Chinese Communist army and political workers, and between the divergent provincial military forces and politicians.

Just as Japanese thinking has been confused about the Chinese Communists and the military power of Soviet Russia, so has American and European thinking been confused about the Chinese Communists. It is difficult to determine the present actual degree of Russian influence and assistance insofar as the Chinese Communist area is concerned, but it is surely much

less than is generally supposed. Actually the most important development in the so-called Communist area in the Northwest of China has been the development of a basic practical democracy that in no way resembles anything that Russia experienced in her communist period before the development of State Dictatorship under Stalin.

China is clever at diplomacy—clever, and when the need arises, even crafty. Japan is lacking in understanding of that particular kind of guile. Because of this, China's position is very strong diplomatically, and Japan stands self-condemned by some of the treaties to which she has affixed her signature and pledged her national honor.

In Chungking, great comfort is taken from the unchanged American position of upholding the sanctity of the Nine-Power Pacific Treaty, and from the declaration made by Mr. Stimson, then Secretary of State, on January 7th, 1932, when the Japanese were invading Manchuria. This Stimson note told both China and Japan that the United States would not admit the legality of any new situation or arrangement that impaired the Nine-Power Treaty, and then went on to say that the American Government "does not intend to recognize any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the covenants and declarations of the Pact of Paris of August 27th, 1928."

This Pact of Paris, which was signed by the United States, Japan, China and many other Powers, is the so-called "Kellogg Peace Pact," a brief international declaration of purpose and intention in which the signatories declare that they "condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another." The signatories further pledged to use only peaceful means for the settlements of conflicts or disputes "of whatever nature or of whatever origin."

The Pact of Paris is not actually a contract or a commit-

ment, but the Nine-Power Treaty was meant to be a solemn and binding agreement. It was framed at the Washington Naval Disarmament Conference early in 1922 by the United States, the British Empire, Japan, France, China, Italy, The Netherlands, Belgium and Portugal. In Article 1 the contracting Powers (all except China, in this case) agreed to:

- (a) Respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial and administrative integrity of China.
- (b) Provide the fullest, most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government.
- (c) Use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China.
- (d) Refrain from taking advantage of disturbed conditions in China to obtain special rights or privileges.

In other articles later in the treaty the signatories bound themselves not to, and disavowed any intentions to, seek any special privileges, monopolies or preferences in China, and not to seek to establish any spheres of influence.

China rejoices because the United States still insists that Japan is bound by this treaty and has clearly and shamelessly violated all of its provisions. Japan says that "changed conditions" automatically released her from her obligations, but the Nine-Power Treaty remains the basis of our Far East policy in so far as it pertains to China.

So long as we maintain this position, we can never acquiesce in any of the measures involved in Japan's "New Order," and could never grant recognition either to the Government of Manchoukuo or to the Wang Ching-wei regime at Nanking unless China legalized the positions of those Japanese-created puppet states by recognizing them first. And that, of course, the Chinese Government at Chungking will never do.

3.

THAT DREARY LAND

WHAT could be drearier than a land long occupied by a hated and arrogant enemy, a land with half-ruined cities, with farms laid waste, with sullen men and thousands of shamefaced women? A conquered land, with trade throttled, with insecurity on all sides, with hope not for the immediate future but for an ultimate deliverance—that was occupied China as the fourth winter of alien domination began to close in—the winter of 1940-41.

There are many other conquered lands just now—Czechoslovakia, Poland, Denmark, Norway, Holland, Belgium and parts of France, but with the exception of Abyssinia and Manchoukuo none have endured the ordeal as long as have the coastal and some of the interior provinces of China.

From Harbin and Manchouli in the far North to Canton in the far South the story is the same, except that the far North is a frozen land in winter. Manchoukuo has been almost ruined by the drains occasioned by Japan's war needs. The currency

is shaky, the shops are denuded of all foreign-made goods. In Harbin taxi drivers are rationed with one gallon of gasoline a day. They save up their rations for a week, drive for one day, and then get drunk on home-made potato vodka. That is, when they can get the potatoes. Even bread and flour are rationed in Harbin, and long are the queues that wait in the pale northern sunshine, which is powerless to warm the winds that blow at zero temperature.

In Hsinking, the great, soulless modern city that Japan has made the capital of Manchoukuo, the powerless Emperor, Kang Teh, one-time Pu-yi, "Boy Emperor of China," sits in the shoddy, ugly gray-brick building that does not merit the name of palace. In magnificent modern buildings sit the Japanese administrators, and in the grandest building of them all sits the General commanding all the Japanese forces in Manchoukuo, worrying about the Russians and the northern and western borders. Japan's finest soldiers and best equipment, sorely needed elsewhere, continue mobilized in Manchoukuo because of uncertainty about Soviet Russia and her obscure policies.

The winter of 1940-41 is the worst Peking and Tientsin have known for decades. In Peking, Japanese-appointed puppets pretend to administer an autonomous North China. Their Federal Reserve Bank has issued hundreds of millions of dollars worth of unsecured paper money. The walls of the majestic old imperial city are strung with live wire—anyone seen trying to get over them is shot on sight. Political assassinations have brought retaliative measures of incredible severity. There are now more than 70,000 Japanese civilians in Peking, most of them disappointed because they have been unable to make quick and easy fortunes.

Dust and sand from the Gobi Desert are whirled across the empty courtyards of the one-time Forbidden City by winds of cutting chill. In great mat-shed structures thousands of beg-

gars and homeless Chinese are given one bowl of millet gruel a day, but scores die of hunger and cold on the streets every night. The Legation Quarter, deserted by diplomats of higher rank than secretaries, waits, powerless and unimportant. About 500 American Marines, divided half-and-half between Peking and Tientsin, are the only remaining symbols of the power of the Western World.

In Tientsin the foreigners still remember how their men and women were stripped naked by scowling Japanese sentries, remember how their clothing was thrown contemptuously into the mud or dust of the streets, where they had to dress while Japanese soldiers and crowds of grinning Chinese coolies looked on. Foreign business is dead. The Japanese Army monopolizes the trade in the exports of Tientsin's hinterland, whether it be sausage casings, furs or wool from Inner Mongolia.

Inland from these cities the picture becomes drearier and drearier. Charhar and Suiyuan provinces, dominated by the Japanese, are yet infiltrated with Chinese guerrillas. They raid the railroads, pull up the tracks, dynamite the bridges. In the snow-covered mountains of Shansi the grim struggle continues indecisively as it has continued for more than three years.

Further southward, along the northern section of the Peking-Hankow railway, the guerrillas are even more active. Japanese patrols venture from the walled towns and cities in daylight, and return to their strongholds before dusk. The villagers and country people have to pay tribute both to the invaders and to the Chinese irregulars who harry the Japanese. Food supplies are running low, for the stubborn peasants, hating their conquerors, and resenting having their crops taken from them by force and at less than cost prices, make a practice of planting only enough food crops for their own use.

Along the coast, at Chefoo and Tsingtao in Shantung Province, the tale is much the same. The Chinese have to sell to the

Japanese for whatever the latter will pay. The Japanese military refuse foreign firms the permits necessary for the shipment or export of their goods. Foreign ships are denied the use of wharves and docks, must wait hours and often days for health and passport examinations, while ships under the Rising Sun flag are accorded every accommodation and courtesy. Obstructionism has driven most foreign business firms out of Shantung—a single great province with a market of about 36,000,000 people. Here, too, the guerrillas raid the railways and highways. The struggle goes on grimly, with no sign of remission.

The Japanese have never been able to close two great gaps that prevent them from controlling the whole of the great inland railway system, which, before the war, linked Peking and Tientsin with Canton in the far South. On the northern, or Peking-Hankow section, they hold the line from Peking to the north bank of the Yellow River. They also hold a stretch of the line northward from Hankow. So in the South, they hold a couple of hundred miles stretching northward from Canton, and a shorter mileage stretching southward from Hankow, but the Chinese armies cling tenaciously to the central portion of the line.

The invaders have a firm hold upon the Peking-Mukden railway, and a less firm but adequate control of the Peking-Suiyuan line, running northwestward from Peking into Inner Mongolia. They also hold the Tientsin-Pukow and Shanghai-Nanking trackage, which affords rail connections between Shanghai and Peking and Tientsin. And from Tsingtao, the great seaport of Shantung Province, inland to Tsinan on the Tientsin-Pukow they control the railway built long ago by the Germans.

It is in this area that they have carried out their one really important development plan. They have completed an east-

west railway 125 miles in length linking the northern section of the Tientsin-Pukow railway with the northern section of the Peking-Hankow system. The new link runs from Tehchow on the east (a small town just north of the Yellow River), to Shihchiachuang on the west. From Shihchiachuang a narrow-gauge line runs on farther westward to Taiyuan, the capital of Shansi Province. This line has minor commercial importance, but is of vital strategic value to the Japanese Army. It gives them a second rail approach to Inner Mongolia, for a railway already runs northward through Shansi Province toward the plains of Charhar and Suiyuan. Hitherto they had only one rail line from tidewater pointing toward the Inner Mongolian borders, that leading from Tientsin through Peking to Suiyuan. And Soviet Russia holds Outer Mongolia, and thereby menaces the whole Japanese position in North China.

Japanese control of all these vast regions is extremely shaky. They hold the towns along the railways and along the few but important highways. At bridges they have erected concrete pillboxes. But railways and highways and bridges are subjected to frequent night attacks by Chinese guerrillas, for Japanese control of the territory on either side of these main arteries extends, literally, no farther than their guns can shoot. In scores and hundreds of these northern provinces, "hsien" or local governments exist only a score of miles from Japanese garrison towns, and these "hsien" governments take their orders from Chungking and even remit tax money to the Chiang Kai-shek government there.

Japanese spokesmen aver that their armies are in occupation of about 16 per cent of the whole area of China, an area nearly two and half times larger than Japan, Korea and Formosa combined, and that their loosely held front lines are strung out for 2,850 miles. This mileage estimate includes only the lines fronting the Chinese armies and does not include the more

than 6,000 miles of frontier facing Outer Mongolia and Siberia—the outer frontiers of Inner Mongolia, Jehol and Manchoukuo.

In the Yangtsze River valley conditions are a little less cheerless, but the Japanese hold is no stronger there than it is in the North, except for the fact that Japanese warships and gunboats patrol and control the river inland for about 1,000 miles from the mouth, clear to the city of Ichang, at the lower end of the Yangtsze gorges.

Ichang itself, once a bustling and prosperous river port, at the eastern entrance into fabulous Szechuan Province, is today merely a dreary military outpost. It was bombed and ruined and partly burned before it fell into Japanese hands, and there has been little reconstruction; indeed in some of the streets the debris from the bombings has not even been cleared away.

Hankow, 400 miles downriver, was once called "the Chicago of China." Much of Hankow is still in ruins, as is much of Wuchang, the sister city just across the river on the south bank. Formerly about 1,500,000 people lived in these two great river cities. Today the combined populations are hardly more than a third of the former total. Hankow cannot prosper with fighting continuing in most of its hinterland. Most foreigners have evacuated, most foreign business firms have closed down. Japanese continue to keep the Yangtsze River closed to foreign shipping, and what little trade there is does not profit them very much.

Nanking, new China's capital from 1929 until December of 1937, when it was captured by the Japanese, has made vastly more progress toward reconstruction than has Hankow, but the population is still less than half of what it was before the undeclared war was begun, and many of the ruins have still not been cleared away. Here, under Japanese guard and watchful Japanese dictation, Wang Ching-wei's puppet regime sustains the melancholy pretension of being the legal government

of China. But the whole personnel of this regime knows full well that if the Japanese Army were to withdraw tomorrow, by dawn of the next day the enraged Chinese populace would have torn them to pieces with their bare hands (unless they could succeed in fleeing to the somewhat shaky protection of the International Settlement at Shanghai, of course).

During the first week of January, 1941, the Nanking regime followed the example set by the Japanese-sponsored North China authorities, and opened a new Central Reserve Bank. The new institution is issuing its own (unsecured) notes, which must now be used for the payment of all Customs dues in Central China. It is expected that Nanking will soon follow further the Peking example and force the Chinese public to accept Nanking bank notes in exchange for Chungking currency. They will then sell the Chungking money and thereby obtain foreign exchange.

This is a form of indirect warfare between Japan and the United States, with Japan supporting the worthless Peking and Nanking currency, and the United States loaning China tens and tens of millions of American dollars in order to help stabilize Chungking banknote issues.

The currency system in Central China is further demoralized by the fact that an unknown number of hundreds of millions of paper money in totally unsecured Japanese "military yen" have been forced upon the populace of the Yangtsze Valley provinces. The Chinese have to take them in exchange for the foods and commodities they produce. The Japanese Army and Navy in those parts, and even the Japanese Embassy and Consular officials are paid in nothing else.

In the summer of 1940, in Shanghai, I obtained three of these notes, one for ten yen and two for five yen each. At that time the official Japanese exchange rate was about 4.20 yen for US \$1.00. The Chinese or Chungking dollar was about \$17 to US \$1.00, but this \$17 of Chinese money would then pur-

chase 14.35 in military yen and about 13.10 in official Japanese yen.

Taking my twenty yen in hand I went from one Japanese bank to another and tried to exchange it. Could I buy Chinese dollars? Could I buy American dollars? Could I buy real Japanese yen? I could not. I was laughed at. The Japanese banks would not give me any sum at all in any other kind of currency for my military notes. So I crossed over into Hongkew, the section of Shanghai where about eighty thousand Japanese now live and make a living "taking in each other's washing." There I bought a fine silk kimono and two washable cotton kimonos with my twenty dubious yen.

So, too, the multitudes of Chinese in Central China, who have the yen forced upon them, buy with those otherwise valueless notes the manufactured goods that Japan sends to the Yangtsze Valley areas. Who in Japan really profits from these transactions except the printing houses that put out the yen and the mills that make the paper upon which the printing is done? No Japanese economist can answer this question, and the militarists, desperate because they are bogged down in China, do not care.

The problem of reconstruction in China, when the war is finally concluded, will be so gigantic that it staggers the imagination. Japan has neither the wisdom nor the resources to restore what she has ruined. Presumably, American credits will be called upon again and again to help foot the bill for the orgy that Japan's jingoes have indulged in and enjoyed.

Now we come to Shanghai, which four years ago was one of the world's great cities and one of the world's greatest seaports. In size Shanghai is probably little changed, although there has been no accurate census since the hostilities began. But there has been an enormous shift of population. Most of the Chapei area, where formerly about 600,000 Chinese resided, is still in ruins. Nantao, the old "native city," adjoining

the French Concession on the upriver boundary, is even more depopulated, and on all sides are heaps of debris left from the bombing, shelling and conflagrations of the autumn of 1937. But the French Concession and the International Settlement are so crammed with Chinese that a fictitious period of high rentals and housing shortages continues unabated. In the Hong-kew district, northward of Soochow Creek, there are now more than eighty thousand Japanese civilians, where formerly the average was about thirty thousand.

Business continues, as business must, in a great city of nearly four million people that is at the gateway of a river valley with more than two hundred million inhabitants. But the few blocks of The Bund of the International Settlement, and to a lesser degree The Bund of the French Concession, afford today the only "Open Door" left to China. Everywhere else up and down the coast, and only to a lesser degree on these Bunds, Japanese restrictions, permit systems, dilatory tactics against foreign business firms and outright discrimination make business almost impossible except for the handful of renegade firms who openly side with the invaders and abet the founders of the "New Order" for their own profit and safety.

The British troops have evacuated the International Settlement, and only about twelve hundred American Marines and a couple of American river gunboats remain to protect the foreign areas. They are now a danger rather than a protection, and like our Marines in Peking and Tientsin may at any time involuntarily become involved in some "incident" that could easily lead to war. Except as a symbol of America's might they could exercise no deterrent effect if the Japanese, in sheer baffled exasperation, ever decide to take the Settlement by force. Less than thirteen hundred officers and men, without artillery, without airplanes, without anti-aircraft guns, would be pitted against twenty or thirty times their own number, and the enemy has at his disposal every modern weapon of war.

besides having destroyers and cruisers in the river in the heart of the city.

At the turn of the year the Japanese organized a Ratepayer's Association and demanded greater representation on the Municipal Council of the International Settlement. Comparing their eighty thousand civilian residents with about seven thousand Britishers and about thirty-two hundred Americans living there, the Japanese said the old ratio of Council members—five Britons, two Americans, two Japanese—was bitterly unfair.

If they do not gain control of the Council at the spring elections of 1941, they will probably secretly encourage the Nanking regime to try to take the Settlement by force. Japan would then stand by, declare herself guiltless in the case, and say that violence was caused by "Chinese resentment at having foreigners in control of a city on Chinese soil."

Nanking, of course, does not dare to resent Japanese being in control of the rest of the cities in the lower Yangtsze Valley, for Japan pays Nanking's salaries and expenses. What the Chinese call "running dogs of imperialism" are less prone, in China, to bite the hand that feeds them than most "running dogs," even if that hand is the imperialistic hand of Japan, pretending to be the benevolent hand of a deliverer from "domination of the East by the greedy white man."

The once proud French Concession in Shanghai presents a sorry aspect. The French are divided among themselves, powerless and afraid. Probably a majority of the Frenchmen in Shanghai secretly favor De Gaulle's party rather than Petain and Vichy. But when France collapsed, the officials of the French Concession first looked to Vichy for salaries and maintenance expenses. For a time Hanoi helped to pay the bills; then the Japanese moved into Hanoi. Saigon could do little, Vichy could do less—and the Concession administration was already committed. Besides, to formally declare for De Gaulle, who was headquartering in England and receiving British help,

is too dangerous. If Japan and Britain go to war, the Shanghai supporters of De Gaulle will either face firing squads or go into internment camps.

So the French Concession has tried to "play safe." Various sectors have been given to the Japanese without warning the Americans and British that such action was impending, although the French word had been pledged that such warnings would be given. The Chinese courts in the French Concession have been surrendered to Japan, through the medium of Nanking appointees. Japanese gendarmes have been given the right to search Chinese homes in the French Concession, to make arrests and to drag their victims out into Japanese-controlled territory.

French Municipal and Consular employees, the Concession's thousands of French and Chinese police, even the French and Annamite troops were warned early in the autumn of 1940 that "hereafter, as regards salary and pay, you are on a week-to-week basis." All pension accumulations and sick benefit funds have already been distributed in their entirety to legal claimants. All's finished, except surrender and dissolution.

The French in Shanghai are to be pitied, not greatly blamed. In many cases their families are in occupied France, at the mercy of the German invaders. If Shanghai French defy the Japanese, who are allied with Germany, reprisals in France might become terrific. The French feel this situation so keenly that they rarely appear at public entertainments, and it is a grim but true jest in Shanghai that almost the only persons now being seen in the magnificent, huge rooms of the French Club are Americans, American Marine officers and Naval officers of our Yangtsze Patrol, with now and then a few Britons.

Since the evacuation of the British troops, and of hundreds of American men, women and children from Shanghai, the gaiety of the metropolis has become more restricted but more hectic than before. Scores of bars and cabarets have had to

close, particularly those catering to service men, but the better-class hotels, the higher-class amusement places and the clubs probably serve as much liquor as ever before—but they serve it to fewer people. The men, without their wives and families, share houses and apartments. Business demands less and less of their time as restrictions increase and the depression spreads, and there is more time to fill with drinking and gambling.

It is the Germans who are having high times in Shanghai these days. In October of 1940 there were more than five hundred newly arrived Nazis there, mostly without obvious employment or businesses, but all with ample money. They fill the better-class hotels and apartment houses; they buy the homes of evacuating Americans and Britons. Most of them are clever and richly financed Nazi propagandists, all trying to argue the Japanese into attacking the United States before our factories attain a peak output.

“War with America is inevitable,” they tell the Japanese, and when their dupes agree, the next argument is logical enough: “Since you must fight the United States, your best chance of success is to make an early and a surprise attack. Don’t wait until they are fully prepared.” Their endeavor, of course, is to have us involved in hostilities, in order that the measure of our aid to England will be sharply reduced. But most of the Japanese are not astute enough to analyze the German motive.

It is an interesting, but not pleasurable, experience to attend in Shanghai a showing of one of the official German “blitzkrieg films.” These showings are usually held at the Kaiser Wilhelm School, which has a fine large auditorium and an ample stage. At the back of the auditorium there is always a long row of tables loaded with good food: “kalte aufschnit,” cold meats of various kinds, head cheese, various cheeses, white and rye bread, great mounds of butter, dishes of delicious dill pickles, German cakes and puddings. On the floor are giant tubs filled

with bottles of beer covered with cracked ice. Whisky, wine, brandy, liqueurs—drinks for all tastes are lavishly served.

After about an hour of eating and drinking, the showing of the film begins. The photography and especially the cutting are magnificent. Reel after reel builds up in the mind the conviction of irresistible German might. Most of the guests are Japanese Army and Navy officers, with here and there a few members of the puppet government down from Nanking.

The Japanese are visibly impressed, but Anglo-Saxons are usually revolted, for the Germans are no masters of foreign psychology. A close-up of a ruined street, littered with the bodies of shrapnel-torn women and children, Poles, Hollanders, Belgians or French, with stiff-legged dead horses here and there, is bad enough. But when an exultant voice with a German accent shouts from the screen: "Well, Mr. Churchill, what do you think of this?" the non-Oriental who is neither German nor Italian is apt to feel himself near the verge of nausea from sheer disgust.

There are other Germans in Shanghai who are not busy with pro-Nazi propaganda but who are instrumental in making China's great seaport a source of much-needed supplies for the German military machine. The British Navy worries about Vladivostok as a source of supplies for Hitler's armies, but seems to pay no attention to Shanghai; yet every week large cargoes arrive there, consigned to neutral and sometimes even to British, Belgian, Danish or Norwegian firms, which are not destined for consumption in China or by the Japanese Army. Instead, these cargoes of important manufactured goods or essential raw materials are loaded into freight cars—and are shipped to Berlin by the all-land route. Britain's sea patrol is then powerless to intercept them. They go from Shanghai to Nanking, to Tientsin, to Mukden, to Harbin, westward across northern Manchoukuo to Manchouli on the border, and are there transshipped onto the broad-gauge Soviet-owned Trans-

Siberian railway. The annual total of shipments of this kind is far from being unimportant; in fact, it probably greatly exceeds the total of similar purchases transshipped to Germany through Japan, either via Dairen or via Vladivostok.

The so-called "Shanghai badlands" deserve a chapter to themselves, for there, and at Tientsin, are found the two main headquarters from which the Japanese Army and Gendarmes are seeking to debauch the Chinese people with cheap opium, much of which is raised in the Japanese-controlled Manchurian province of Jehol.

In Shanghai and most other cities and towns in the occupied zones opium is now so cheap that even ricksha coolies and dock laborers can smoke it at will. It is sold openly in places varying from dingy, dirty dens to dives of such elegance that only the opulent can afford to patronize them. These places all operate under licenses or permits obtained directly from one or another branch of the Japanese military, and are given protection. The license fees are very high, of course, and crooked gambling usually adds to the revenues of the opium hongs, most of which, at least ostensibly, are owned by underworld Chinese. Of late, the Nanking military and civilian officials have been permitted to participate in the profits to a limited degree. Cocaine, heroin, morphine and various combinations of narcotic drugs are also sold for a song.

The Shanghai badlands, and cocaine factories on the outskirts of Shanghai, are now the sources of most of the narcotic drugs being smuggled into the United States—as our Federal officials well know.

Japan cannot be cleared of the charge of using narcotic drugs as an instrument of national policy. The indictment will stand in any unprejudiced court. But the Japanese Navy, I think, has had no hand in the selling of opium or other drugs, although evidence points to some naval vessels having occasionally transported cargoes of it for the military.

The Shanghai badlands have other bad features, in addition to licensed and openly protected gambling and drug selling. There is prostitution on a terrifying scale, kidnaping, armed robbery, official corruption on every hand, and the badlands afford hiding places for well-known bands of assassins who can be hired to "do a job" for as little as \$50 in Chinese money —about US \$3.20, that was, in October, 1940.

There is a startling difference between Hongkew, which is in charge of the Japanese Naval Landing Party, and the western areas and badlands, which are in charge of the Army and Gendarmes. The opium traffic and gambling are rigorously suppressed in Hongkew, and the brothels there are relatively few and conducted on the relatively sanitary and decorous lines that prevail in Japan itself. Crime is kept at a respectable minimum.

Most of the credit for this contrast must be given to the Japanese Navy, although in Hongkew they probably have a double motive urging to decency, for it is in Hongkew that most of the eighty thousand Japanese civilians in Shanghai live and have their shops. Japan has always sharply punished gambling and the use of drugs—by Japanese.

Shanghai is still a great and a wealthy city, but during the first eleven and a half months of 1940 the Public Benevolent Cemetery, a Chinese-financed philanthropic association, gathered from the streets, alleys and vacant lots 29,020 dead bodies, of which 20,804 were children—many of the latter newborn and unwanted girl babies. This organization sends wagons and several score of searchers all over the city every day at dawn to gather up the bodies of those who have perished, homeless, during the night before. In justice to the Japanese, however, it must be said that the annual total for years before their capture of most of the city was around 26,000 or 27,000, so the blame for this horror is not all theirs.

South of Shanghai are three formerly unimportant seaports

that the Japanese have never captured, but which they blockade half-heartedly off and on. These ports are Wenchow, Ningpo and Foochow, and they could easily have been captured long ago, but it is distinctly to the profit of certain Japanese (and Chinese) interests to leave their status unchanged.

From these three ports there now come various Chinese raw materials that Japan needs. And into the interior of China, through these three ports, go astonishingly large quantities of Japanese-manufactured goods that the Chinese are glad to buy, in spite of the boycott. To be sure, these goods are marked "Made in Germany," "Made in England" or even occasionally "Made in U.S.A.," but this deceives no one.

Now and then there is a sharp dispute about the division of the swag. The blockade tightens, and in Shanghai there are frantic negotiations by either the Wenchow Guild, the Foochow Guild or the Ningpo Guild, as the case may be. If the negotiations fail, Japanese ships hurl a few dozen shells ashore, or Japanese planes drop a few bombs. Then the Chinese members of the particular guild concerned hold an emergency meeting and levy an assessment. A lump sum of \$100,000, \$200,000, sometimes even \$500,000, is handed over to somebody. The bombardment ceases, the blockade lifts conveniently, and the illegal trade is resumed.

Amoy, Swatow and Canton, the three southernmost ports and cities of consequence controlled by the Japanese, are also melancholy ruins. At Amoy and Swatow the invaders control the surrounding territory only within a radius of twenty to twenty-five miles. From Canton they have penetrated farther, but the cities as places for business or residence are only depressing shells today. In the hinterland back of Swatow, cannibalism is frequently reported, for this portion of Kwangtung Province, densely overpopulated, never grew enough rice for self-support, and now the rice-laden steamers no longer arrive from Thailand or from French Indo-China, or if they do come

they carry only enough cargo to feed the Japanese garrisons.

Nanning, a once great inland city in southern Kwangsi Province, was long held by the Japanese and then abandoned. Today it is a fire-blackened and shell-shattered ruin. Hainan Island is entirely under Japanese domination and has been converted into an important base for the Japanese Army's projected next southward push. It is closed to foreigners.

The Japanese budget and national debt announcements reveal the billions of yen that it has cost the Japanese militarists to become thus bogged down in China. Those figures, of course, do not include the losses of foreign trade due to concentrating on the manufacture of munitions and war supplies, nor the enormous losses occasioned by boycotts in countries that condemn Japan's war of aggression. The great intangible, the loss of the confidence and respect of the world's democracies and the incurring of the lasting hatred of the Chinese people, cannot be weighed or estimated.

Official estimates have it that forty million Chinese civilians fled before the Japanese advance, abandoning their lands, their homes, their businesses. Uncounted tens of thousands of Chinese civilians have been killed by bombs, by shellfire, and by mass execution by the Japanese. More tens of thousands of civilians have died from exposure, from malnutrition, from dysentery, from malaria and from typhoid and smallpox contracted during these mass migrations.

The cost in military casualties on either side is not known. Official Japanese sources say 83,800 uniformed Japanese have been killed but decline to estimate the Japanese wounded. Chinese official circles in Chungking place Japanese casualties at 1,172,000, and say that about 350,000 of these were killed in the rear by guerrillas. Careful neutral foreign military observers think the Japanese losses must have totaled 1,100,000, of which about 225,000 were killed. It is probable that the truth about Japanese losses will never be known until after the

war, not until the last names of the last dead are reported to the great shrine in Tokyo where the souls of all who have died in the service of the Empire are permanently enshrined.

The Chinese say their own uniformed losses, including the invalidated, have amounted to 1,900,000. The Japanese snort in derision at this figure and place the Chinese total losses, dead, wounded, invalidated and deserted, at 4,600,000. They claim that Japanese soldiers have burned or buried the bodies of 1,600,000 Chinese dead abandoned on the many fields of battle.

Neutral foreign military observers, however, place Chinese casualties at a total of 3,050,000, of whom about 1,000,000 are believed to have been killed in action or died of wounds.

The blood of all these dead, of all these millions of wounded, does seem to cry aloud against being shed in vain. It will have to be a new order of a resplendent and beneficent kind that must arise from the ruins of the old if this squandering of human lives is ever to be justified. And it cannot, surely, be the kind of "New Order" that prevails today in the dreary lands that make up the Japanese-occupied areas of China.

4.

HONGKONG

If Japan decides to embark upon open hostilities against Great Britain as part of her contribution to the struggle of her European partners in the Tripartite Axis Pact, Hongkong will probably be the first place to be subjected to attack. The British authorities there are confident they can hold out for six weeks—maybe longer. And that, they say, will be long enough to receive aid from the British fleet, all now well west of Singapore.

They do not say so for publication, but they also hope for help from the United States Navy from Hawaii, knowing full well that our small Asiatic Fleet would have to remain in Philippine waters, and that it would require at least six weeks for help to come from our great naval base at Pearl Harbor.

Because of Japanese control of many mandated South Sea Islands, and because Japan holds the Mariana Islands, strung along from north to south like an ocean fortress guarding the seas along China's coast, the big Fleet at Hawaii, or any part

of it, would have to sail far southward and then come through the Straits of Macassar in order to avoid the main Japanese Fleet.

During the last year and a half the British have accomplished wonders in the strengthening of the defenses of Hongkong. Most of the fleet is gone—the Japanese know that—and the couple of light cruisers, the few destroyers and submarines still basing there would be no match against a Japanese naval attack.

But with the British fleet needed elsewhere Hongkong has, like Singapore, been made into a formidable land fortress. Any attackers who come by sea, by air or by land will have to pay a terrific price for victory.

Hongkong is a little island not more than twelve miles across its widest span, but it has a land frontier too, because in addition to the island, which is ceded to Great Britain, there is also what is known as "the Kowloon side," directly across the narrow channel, where Britain holds the tip of the mainland inland for a distance of nearly thirty miles under a ninety-nine-year lease. Kowloon, before the Chino-Japanese hostilities spread to the South, was a great shipping port, and the salt-water terminus of a railway leading to Canton and thence northward to Hankow and Peking. Any enemy holding Kowloon or the heights behind it could shell Hongkong mercilessly and at extremely short range.

The Japanese Army today holds all Chinese territory adjoining the borders of the Kowloon territory that is leased to Britain. It is believed that an assault upon Hongkong would begin with a naval blockade, continual bombardments from the air and a concerted land attack—supported on both flanks by the navy—upon the Kowloon borders.

The whole British military defense force at Hongkong is known to be less than ten thousand men, who in a time of emergency will be ably aided by well-drilled volunteers. "We couldn't use more men if we had them," one British officer said

to me. "The Kowloon peninsula is narrow and more men would simply be getting in one another's way."

Facing the Japanese, clear across the whole Kowloon land border, the British have constructed concrete defense works in successions of lines and zigzags to a depth of more than five miles. These concrete works are a combination of artillery emplacements, machine-gun pillboxes and air-raid shelters. They are strong enough to hold up for a long time under heavy shelling by artillery. And there are ample coastal defenses on either side of the peninsula to make a landing and a flank attack upon the fortified lines almost an impossibility. In addition, not only have all approaches to Hongkong's harbor been heavily mined far out to sea, but all possible approaches to the shore on the Kowloon side have also been mined, and guns are in place to give a murderous raking to any possible landing place an enemy might select.

Hongkong is a rough and mountainous little island, and within the last two years the green of the steep slopes has become marred in many, many places with gashes and dumps of the clay-colored soil. Most of these places are heavily ringed with barbed wire, and the new roads leading to them are posted with forbidding sentries day and night. From many of these cuts, however, heavy coast defense guns openly poke their noses in twos and threes for all to see, and the authorities make no secret of the fact that the number of hidden anti-aircraft batteries has grown to a dangerous total.

Air attack would constitute Hongkong's chief danger, because the city, with more than a million inhabitants (most of whom are Chinese), depends upon small reservoirs in the hills for its water supply. These reservoirs are filled with water run off from the slopes during the rainy season. All are sustained by large concrete dams. Well-placed bombs could destroy those dams in short order, and in two or three days Hongkong would face the double problem of thirst and of having no

water with which to fight fires that incendiary bombs might start. Under conditions of that kind, with about a million panicky Chinese to cope with, the city's plight would be desperate.

Hongkong, like Singapore and Manila, was long neglectful of the problem of providing air-raid shelters, although Hongkong's problem was greatly simplified by the fact that the Peak, a small mountain of rather soft granite, rises steeply right from the edge of the main business section. In October of 1940, however, contracts were belatedly let to an American firm of mining engineers with headquarters in Manila, and work was begun with dispatch upon a series of immense U-shaped tunnels under the Peak. By use of the U shape each shelter is assured of two exits, in case one exit becomes blocked by a direct hit or by a slide from higher up the hillside. Later a long gallery will be run to connect the curving back portions of the different tunnels. This will give excellent ventilation. And by the end of the year, as the work progressed, several fine springs of pure water had already been tapped. These springs will help to meet the problem of drinking water.

Even if they were laggard about beginning work on air-raid shelters, the British authorities at Hongkong were certainly forehanded about evacuating their women and children. In the early summer of 1940 the evacuation order was sprung as a surprise, and shiploads of women and children, thousands of them, were rushed down to Manila, where they had to disembark and await ships to take them on to Australia. American Army and civilian authorities at Manila did their best to house and care for this sudden influx of refugees, and their kindness was appreciated.

But this evacuation from Hongkong, actuated by no one knows what secret crisis or alarms, was badly managed so far as transport was concerned, and criticisms and complaints continued for months afterwards. Many British women even at

the end of 1940 continued to write letters to newspapers in Singapore, Manila and Shanghai, charging favoritism concerning some women who were permitted to remain, although the evacuation order was supposed to apply to all British women except trained nurses.

Many critics thought the evacuation was useless at the time it was ordered, but in justice to the officials it must be admitted that the city could be blockaded at only a few hours' notice—and once blockaded, escape would be impossible. Japan has two naval bases and a large concentration of troops on the island of Formosa, and Formosa is only about two hundred miles away.

A Japanese attack upon Hongkong was feared in October of 1940, in retaliation for the British decision to reopen the Burma Road to shipments of war supplies for Chungking, but Japan did not make a move. It is believed that Washington's emphatic approval of the British decision, and Washington's increased assistance to Chungking, coupled with Germany's failure to invade England, combined to force the Japanese militarists to adopt a wait-and-see policy at that time.

Japan's occupation of Hainan Island, south of Hongkong, her grabbing of the Spratley group further southward, and her occupation of the northern part of French Indo-China have combined to rob Hongkong of much of its strength. From Hainan and from the Spratleys the Japanese can cut Hongkong's sea lanes to Singapore, and her position in Indo-China robs British planes from Singapore or from Burma of landing and fueling bases if they elect to try to fly to Hongkong's defense. The loss of France as an ally greatly weakened Britain's position in this part of the world.

Hongkong with the women and children gone is a dreary place. But it is also marked by the same quality of hectic attempts at gaiety that now distinguish life in Shanghai since the American evacuation of that metropolis. Many of the

notorious White Russian cabaret girls migrated from Shanghai to Hongkong to dance and drink with tired homeless Britons—and this feature is not overlooked in the bitter diatribes that the wives, exiled in Australia, pen for the newspapers.

Hongkong is also an important outlet for Chungking, and a daily air service is maintained between the two cities. The planes leave and arrive at night, or in the dark hours of the early morning, in order to avoid Japanese war planes that have already wantonly shot down two of these passenger planes in flight. Many Chinese Government officials shuttle back and forth between Chungking and Hongkong by air and transact important Government business in the British crown colony, and others who are wealthy fly down periodically just for a surcease from Chungking's continuing bombing raids and to savor metropolitan life once more.

Hongkong became great and important and very rich because it has the only good harbor along that part of the China coast. Only the smallest of ocean-going freighters can go up the Pearl River to Canton, and thus Hongkong became the great transshipping point for South China's enormous import and export trade. Cargo was taken from the great ocean-going ships and sent inland either by river steamers, by launches and junks, or over the Canton-Kowloon Railway.

Twice within less than fifteen years, however, Hongkong has had its prosperity shattered by violence. In 1925 and 1926 the port was paralyzed by a great anti-British strike and boycott, which was an aftermath of a street shooting ordered against Chinese demonstrators by a British police official in Shanghai, and by a subsequent shooting from the British and French Concessions on the island of Shameen at Canton upon a hostile demonstration parade in Canton itself.

Hundreds of thousands of Chinese left Hongkong at that time. No one was left to unload the ships. No ship, regardless of nationality, was permitted to unload any cargo in South

China if it had even put into Hongkong for fresh water, and the boycott of British goods was nationwide and complete.

The strike and boycott were largely inspired and directed by Michael Borodin and other Soviet Russians who were employed as advisors by the Chinese revolutionary Kuomintang regime then using Canton as its capital, and the move was part of Moscow's war then being waged in many parts of the world against British imperialism.

After a time, however, the boycott subsided and the strikers gradually returned to work. Prosperity returned to Hongkong, only to be interrupted again by the Chino-Japanese hostilities. At first Hongkong profited enormously from this undeclared war. With the Japanese in possession of Shanghai and Nanking, and controlling the lower reaches of the Yangtsze River, the Chinese Government, then located at Hankow, depended upon Hongkong and upon the Canton-Hankow Railway for the import of most of its war supplies and as the channel along which most of free China's exports reached the outside world.

Then the Japanese began to bomb the Canton-Kowloon and Canton-Hankow Railways, and finally they effected a landing and captured Canton late in 1938, about a month after Mr. Chamberlain had proclaimed "peace in our time" following the betrayal of Czechoslovakia at Munich. With the fall of Canton and the closing of the Pearl River by the Japanese Navy, Hongkong's prosperity again came to an abrupt end. Finally, under Japanese threats and pressure, the British agreed to put an end to a more or less secret traffic under which war supplies were smuggled out of Hongkong and Kowloon and smuggled into free China by junks using insignificant small South China ports, or going inland along disregarded canals or small streams.

For a time there were inconsiderable shipments in and out through the Portuguese colony of Macao, on the Chinese mainland, which is only two hours by ship from Hongkong, but the Japanese made a drive from Canton and now control

all the territory inland from and around Macao, and so that last trade channel, too, was cut off.

Early in 1940 the Japanese pretended to "open the Pearl River," but for a long time they permitted only one British river steamer to make the round trip to Canton each week. Now, technically, two are permitted, but the permit and licensing system is so rigorous and so costly that the traffic and trade amount to almost nothing. Japanese river ships and small coastal steamers enjoy a monopoly of the trade of Canton and of the rich Pearl River delta region.

Most of the Japanese women and children have left Hongkong. There was no evacuation order from Tokyo—they just slipped away by twos and threes. Several score of Japanese curio stores, silk shops and small grocery stores and beer shops are still kept open, but they do almost no business. Nevertheless, the Japanese Consulate-General continues to function and has a very large staff in Hongkong.

It is known that Japanese espionage agents operate in the colony in considerable number. In fact, one of the less astute of their number was arrested in August of 1940 on a charge of having tried to bribe a British soldier into giving him a map showing the Army's ammunition dumps and stores on the island. This particular soldier drove a truck for the supply department and should have been well informed. It could not be determined whether the map was ever delivered, but nevertheless most of the secret munition stores were moved in October—just to be on the safe side.

When, during that same October, all Americans were advised to leave Japan, Manchoukuo, China, Hongkong and French Indo-China, it was a surprise to find a total of 2,032 residents of Hongkong registering at the American Consulate-General there. Of this total, 709 were occidental Americans, 231 were Filipinos, and 1,092 were Chinese Americans, most

of them persons born of Chinese parentage in San Francisco or other West Coast cities.

American trade in South China, most of which centered at Hongkong, has suffered in equal degree with the decline of prosperity of the port. Japan, by the close of 1940, had held Canton and the Pearl River delta for more than two years, but was still pleading "military necessity" as the excuse for barring all except Japanese from participating in business activities in that area.

Hongkong, like all of East Asia and the Netherlands East Indies, was prepared for and expecting an early crisis as 1940 drew to a close. If Japan attacks Hongkong she will not have a duplication of the relatively cheap and easy victories she has gained in many parts of China. And there will be no quick capitulation, as there was in French Indo-China. An attack upon Hongkong will bring Japan into conflict with a first-class power for the first time since she battled Russia in 1904-05, for her capture of Tsingtao from the Germans in the early part of the first World War was a relatively simple task—although it took the Japanese Army and Navy nearly two months to finish up that little job.

In the Far East the opinion is generally held that a Japanese attack upon Hongkong will force America's hand and that the first shot fired there will set off an explosion that will rock the whole of East Asia.

5.

THE VICTIM AND THE DUPE

THE success obtained by Japan in French Indo-China and in adjoining Siam, by combining military pressure with political intrigue, has measurably increased the vulnerability of the American position in the Philippine Islands, has placed the British position in Malay and Burma in new jeopardy, and has caused alarm and feverish war preparations in the Dutch East Indies.

Early summer of 1940 found the Japanese Army and Navy advantageously placed for further southward pressures and advances. Hainan Island and the Spratley Islands were securely occupied, Japanese forces were in southern Kwangsi Province and near the northern borders of French Indo-China. They held the important walled city of Nanning.

Tokyo watched Europe, hoping for an early and decisive German victory. That would have meant the transference of at least half of the American fleet to the Atlantic Ocean, and Japan felt that she could then take Hongkong, wrest Indo-

China from the French, probably capture Singapore, and take her pick of the rich islands of the Netherlands East Indies. The dream of the "New Order in Greater East Asia" broadened in scope and took on the bright colors of hope.

Then came the collapse of Holland and Belgium, the surrender of France—a magnificent chance for "manifest destiny" to manifest itself in all its rapacious aggressiveness.

The moves were swift and the pressure was strong. Britain, intent after Dunkirk on preparations to repel an expected German attempt at invasion of England, agreed to close the Burma Road, and Japan thought that with this source of supplies cut off she could soon force Chungking to come to terms.

The closing of this highway, upon which China relied for most of her imported war supplies and over which she exported much of her produce that brought her essential foreign exchange, actually profited Japan scarcely at all and did China very little harm. "Those deceitful English," as the Japanese now paraphrase "perfidious Albion," agreed to close the road for only three months. As it happened, or was calculated, those months were the rainy months of the year, when mire and landslides reduced the usefulness of this artery of supply to a minimum. Britain expressed the pious hope that during those ninety days China and Japan might find a way to peace, but this fooled nobody.

On the Burma section of the highway great improvements were made; at Rangoon enormous reserves of gasoline and war supplies were accumulated at the docks for China and then hauled inland to the terminus of the railway. On the Chinese section of the highway, in spite of the rains, more than one hundred thousand workmen were employed. Grades were reduced, dangerous curves were improved, bridges were strengthened, detours were completed around strategic points most likely to be bombed by Japanese planes. China bought several thousand new American trucks. Great accumulations of tin,

of tungsten, of antimony, of wood oil were made ready for export. Then, in mid-October, by which time Germany was being successfully held off from England, the Burma Road was opened once more, and Britain gave China additional credits.

The outcome of this Burma Road affair would have been a serious political and strategic setback for Japan, but the Japanese had meanwhile been making compensating gains elsewhere. With France prostrate, French Indo-China was in no position to resist Japanese pressure and soon became an easy victim of Japan's demands. These demands had first to do with the narrow-gauge railway running from the port of Haiphong, in northern Indo-China, and from Hanoi, its capital, into the southern Chinese province of Yunnan and on to its capital city, Kunming.

This railway was never of prime commercial or strategic importance, for at a maximum it could transport only a little more than eighteen thousand tons of freight a month, and three thousand tons of this total was usually maintenance tonnage. But for China, cut off from her own seacoasts by Japanese occupation and blockade, any avenue of import and export, however limited, was of value. Enormous accumulations of American-made motor trucks, tires, barbed wire, drugs and chemicals belonging to the Chinese Government littered the waterfront at Haiphong. To appease Japan, the French had limited the number of Chinese trucks going north by highway to twenty a day. The French also agreed to ban the hauling of anything in the nature of war supplies over the railway.

But these limitations did not satisfy Japan. She demanded and was given the right to station Japanese inspectors along the railway, along the two highways, and at the Indo-China-Yunnan borders. These inspectors were Army and Navy men, in uniform, with a few civilians for the sake of "face."

Then began charges of bad faith; Japan said she had to have

troops along the railway and highway. The Chinese, on their side, dynamited bridges and tore up trackage; frontier fortifications were hastily thrown up, and Chinese troops began to move toward the Indo-China borders. Then Japan, for "self-protection," said she had to have the use of airfields in Indo-China—at Haiphong, at Hanoi and three others along the northern borders.

Then began two parallel tragi-comedies. Tokyo made demands upon Hanoi, Hanoi referred them to Vichy, Vichy referred them to the Armistice Commission at Wiesbaden, Wiesbaden referred them to Berlin. The replies came back through the same circuitous channels—and Berlin was meanwhile beginning pressure to have Japan formally join the Rome-Berlin Axis.

The Japanese authorities negotiating with Hanoi reiterated that they wanted a "peaceful settlement," but meanwhile General Ando, commanding the Japanese Army in Kwangsi, based on Nanning, wanted his share of glory. He moved toward the border, then attacked French positions, and there was a lot of disgraceful and particularly gory fighting. Tokyo and the Japanese negotiating at Haiphong said General Ando's move was "all a mistake."

A lone Japanese aviator at Haiphong bombed the native section of that port city, killing a score of men, women and children, and wounding twice that number. Japan was "very sorry" for this of course. Another mistake. The young aviator, it was explained, acted entirely without orders and solely because of "personal enthusiasm." The wounded and the relatives of the dead were given a handful of piasters, and meanwhile military trains from the northern front hauled into hushed Hanoi trainloads of French wounded soldiers and flatcars loaded with encoffined dead. All just a mistake!

The Japanese had their way in the end. They moved about twelve thousand soldiers into northern French Indo-China.

Later they took about six thousand away again, when it became evident that the Chinese forces were not going to attack. They got the use of Haiphong harbor, of the Haiphong and Hanoi airdromes, and of the three airfields along the northern border. They occupied the railway and the strategic highways and sent surveying and exploring parties out through the mountains.

This success had several results of important value to Japan. It gave them their desired military and economic foothold in French Indo-China. It put them into position to throttle all third-Power trade with the French colony. It put Saigon and the southern part of Indo-China at their mercy. It gave them five landing fields within direct air-line distances of between nine hundred and a thousand miles of Singapore. It gave them a threatening position as regards Burma and Rangoon. From their new air bases they could bomb Kunming and the Burma Road with only short and economical flights. And it enabled them to withdraw their stalemated divisions from southern Kwangsi for use elsewhere. The Chinese made a great to-do over retaking Nanning, but since the Japanese had their air-fields in northern Indo-China, Nanning was unimportant to them. From these fields they could at will bomb Nanning and the river traffic there, which had once been important to General Chiang Kai-shek.

While all this was going on, Japanese agents had been unusually busy in Bangkok. The Siamese southern border, where Thailand joins Malaya, is only four hundred air-line miles from Singapore.

The Thai Government in Bangkok soon began making demands upon prostrate French Indo-China. Thailand demanded redressing of "historical wrongs," insisted upon a rectification of frontiers, the ceding of islands in the Mekong River. Border skirmishes began to be increasingly frequent, then artillery was

brought into play by both the French and the Thai forces; both sides began using airplanes for border bombing raids.

By the end of 1940 Japan's intrigues began to unfold into a discernible pattern. It was more than the usual old oriental game of spurring on both sides and then "fishing in troubled waters." If conditions became serious enough Japan would intervene in southern Indo-China, would seize control of all the territory, in the "interests of preserving law and order," and set up a puppet administration of her own. This administration would grant all Thailand's territorial demands, and in return Thailand would join the Berlin-Rome Tokyo Axis and also grant Japan the use of existing airfields and the right to locate new ones.

In this way Japan, if she succeeds in her designs, will have successfully effected another jump of nearly six hundred miles southward and will be able to have airfields within four hundred miles of Singapore and considerably less distance than that from Penang. Also, Burma would be threatened anew from another flank.

Japanese influence has been gaining in Thailand for the last four or five years. Japanese goods imported into the country now exceed imports from all other countries put together. Since 1934 imports of Japanese cotton goods have more than tripled. Missions have frequently been exchanged between the two countries—naval missions, trade missions, good-will missions. At Bangkok, Japan maintains both naval and military attachés to her Legation, and both have what seem to be needlessly large staffs. Some quarters charge that these staffs actually are unpaid naval and military advisors to the Thai Government. Several of the vessels of the Thai Navy have been built in Japanese shipyards.

In the autumn of 1940 the United States Government aroused Bangkok's ire by stopping at Manila, ostensibly for our

own urgent use, a shipment of ten powerful aerial bombers—the last of an order for one hundred war planes placed with American factories. Tokyo made a great show of sympathy over this affair, said Thailand had been discriminated against and affronted, and then made a crafty and practical gesture by sending to Bangkok, as a gift, ten of her own new bombers.

A special Thai mission visited Japan late in 1940, and as a rule the Japanese press makes a great to-do over such visits. This particular party was, however, practically neglected by the newspapers of Japan and was apparently entertained less lavishly than is usual. This was probably because affairs of such far-reaching importance were proposed by Japan that no publicity was desired. Manila, Hongkong and Singapore heard that Japan was selling Thailand forty more powerful bombers, and also a portion of the war supplies taken to Hainan Island from Nanning and Kwangsi province in southern China.

On December 5th both Tokyo and Bangkok admitted the secret conclusion of a treaty of amity under which each is pledged for five years to respect the other nation's territorial integrity and to consult together on all questions of common interest.

Soon after this the spokesman of the Tokyo Foreign Office sighed sadly and said that Japan feared that the dispute between Thailand and Indo-China had reached such a pass that there was no possible solution except open and large-scale war. On December 24th the Premier of Thailand, Luang Bipul Songgram, who is also Minister of Defense, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Navy and Air Force, said he had regretfully decided that "our grievances against the French will not end even with a successful readjustment of the Mekong River frontiers," and added, with tactics typical of Axis statesmen, that the French authorities in Indo-China "persist in torturing our brethren who live on their side of the border." He added that officially instructed acts of

suppression and injustice against subjects of Thailand were widespread and had long been continued as part of the French policy.

The Japanese Government, after hush-hushing its controlled press concerning the visit of the Thai mission, suddenly announced that when Thailand began a five-day celebration of its national holiday early in December, a special Thailand radio broadcast would be celebrated in Tokyo, and that at least two Japanese Cabinet Ministers would speak to the people of Thailand.

This gave the Japanese press its cue, and immediately there began long editorial outpourings supporting Bangkok's territorial demands against Indo-China, coupled with jingoistic declarations to the effect that Japan will never permit any outside or Western Power to obtain any position of influence in Bangkok.

There is no doubt but that Japanese counselors have been giving the strongest encouragement and support to Thailand's ingrained anti-foreignism. In particular the Thailanders dislike and fear the Chinese. This is because there are nearly four million Chinese in their country and because the Chinese, with superior business ability and an industry that even the torrid climate does not discourage, had gradually obtained control of nearly all of the country's merchandising and of a large part of its financial structure.

The only way Thailand could oust the Chinese was by creating a series of government monopolies. In many cases they did not stop at unrecompensed confiscation of Chinese businesses and properties. In spite of these measures, however, the Chinese in the country continue to prosper. They bitterly resent the growth of Japanese influence and continue to make regular and very large cash donations to help support General Chiang Kai-shek's government at Chungking. This Chinese element of the population will be able to hamper seriously

Japan's making any great commercial profit out of her attempted domination of Thailand's foreign policies.

The anti-Chinese attitude of official Thailand is bitter and undisguised. One Cabinet officer publicly declared in Bangkok that Thailand should treat the Chinese element of its population in precisely the same manner as Hitler treated the Jews in Germany.

It appeared probable at the end of 1940 that actual large-scale hostilities will finally be avoided. The Japanese do not wish to have Thai bombers and artillery lay waste the southern portion of Indo-China, which they hope to occupy, and Thailand does not wish to ruin those border territories which she hopes to annex.

Thailand's navy is considered a joke, even in the Far East. "The ships would probably turn over before they got to Saigon," one foreign neutral naval observer said to me. The army is large and rates about second class, according to oriental standards. It could probably defeat the Annamite troops in Indo-China, but would, it is thought, be useless against French forces or against that portion of the Foreign Legion still in Indo-China. The air force, although not large, is said to be far better than either the army or the navy and would probably give a good account of itself.

Thailand happens to have on hand very large reserves of high octane aviation gasoline, most of which was purchased from British, American and Dutch companies before the outbreak of war in Europe. Japan would like to get her hands on this very important reserve.

A few years ago, acting under Japanese inspiration, the Thailand Government drove American and British oil companies out of the country but gave Japan the right to erect a large oil refinery near Bangkok. Japan, in her turn, agreed to keep the refinery always well supplied with crude oil. This she has been unable to do, largely because of the American

and Mexican embargo rulings, and in spite of augmented purchases from the Netherlands East Indies. At the close of 1940 the refinery was not operating and had not operated for months. More than two hundred Japanese employees were idle, waiting for loaded tankers that failed to arrive. Critical gossip in Bangkok said that these two hundred Japanese were "spies and military instructors," but in this case there appears to be no evidence at all to support the suspicions and the charges.

Luang Bipul Songgram, the Premier, is a vivid personality. He has twice escaped unscathed when attempts have been made to assassinate him. When he receives foreign callers, other than high ranking diplomats, he stands under a huge, life-sized and autographed photograph of Italy's Mussolini. His skin is very dark, he is compactly built, and he speaks a little English but prefers to use an interpreter. The territorial demands he makes against the French are considered quite just and well founded by neutral observers who are well acquainted with the tangled history of the many states of the Malay Peninsula.

On some points the Premier is non-communicative. As to Japan, he merely says that he is "studying with interest the Japanese plans for a new order in East Asia."

While Thailand is a well-knit political unit, in spite of the diverse racial elements of the population, French Indo-China is a loosely jointed arrangement of four protectorates. Japanese sources—and Japanese sources only—have been reporting a "widespread demand for independence in French Indo-China." Actually nothing of the kind exists, even though the French have not been benign as colonial administrators and have run the colony solely for the support and enriching of France and the French. There is little doubt, however, that Japan will be able to find some sultan or princeling somewhere to head an "independence" movement, when the time comes to set up a new puppet to appease the demands of Thailand.

The French have ruled Indo-China largely through Resi-

dents-General, who have been agents of the Governor-General. In the main, native courts and native laws have been permitted to function without interference, except when French interests were involved in legal disputes. A show of great respect has been maintained for the personages who rule as native sovereigns, and theoretically they have been allies rather than subjects of the French Empire. There is jealousy, of course, among these native sovereigns—and here Japan may find or make her great opportunity.

In March of 1940, feeling that Indo-China was a "soft spot" in the Far East, I spent some time there investigating the situation. Even then it seemed to me that whether France won or lost the war in Europe, her day as a great Colonial Empire in East Asia was about at an end. In all of Indo-China there were then not more than twenty-five thousand Frenchmen, and army officers themselves reluctantly admitted that the Annamite troops would be useless against the Japanese unless they had a French corporal to every eight native soldiers. In the first World War, they said, the Annamites ran away from shell fire and finally were used only for cleaning up the battle-fields. French naval and aerial preparedness in the colony was even then as inadequate as was her land military force. Here was another weakness of the kind that Tokyo has learned to spell m-a-n-i-f-e-s-t d-e-s-t-i-n-y!

Thailand and Indo-China are not inconsiderable portions of the globe. Indo-China has an area of 283,000 square miles—in other words, is considerably larger than Texas—and has a population of about 23,000,000. Thailand is a little more than 200,000 square miles in extent, and has 13,500,000 population. Both of these countries are rich. Rice, rubber, tin, spices, hardwoods, copra, coal and iron ore are amongst the exports. Both countries have inadequate railway systems and a fair development of modern highways. And both have enormous unex-

plored and unsettled areas of jungle-covered mountains that are believed to contain a wide range of mineral riches.

One comic aspect of the half-hearted border hostilities that were increasing in intensity as 1941 opened was the forthright and violent language in which each side unhesitatingly but officially branded the other side a liar. Exactly that term was used time after time in official radio broadcasts, while the newspapers coupled "liar" with shockingly uncomplimentary adjectives.

Thailand's official broadcast overstepped all bounds of decency one day in early December when the radio announcer at Bangkok declared that the French consider Saigon equivalent to heaven because, owing to the raping ability of French troops, there was not a single virgin left in southern Indo-China. And then, as an afterthought, he threw in the observation that it was believed that none of the half-caste children in Saigon and vicinity had any idea as to the names or identities of their fathers.

Sedate official British circles in Singapore gasped when they read translations of this particular broadcast. The men made haste to lock their copies in their desks, lest blushing British or Malay or Chinese female stenographers learn any of the facts of life as viewed in Bangkok.

6.

SINGAPORE

SINGAPORE was a great city, an important trading point and a heavily fortified seat of power centuries before the British first came into possession of the island early in the last century. Old bricks, carved stones and ancient manuscripts record the founding of Singhapura about 1250 A. D., and the conquest and utter destruction of the place by the Javanese in 1365. In the century-long interval it was ruled over by a succession of five powerful kings.

Early Singhapura, although the population was predominantly Malayan, was really an Indian kingdom, with a Sri-Vijaya dynasty and a predominantly Indian culture, branched from Sumatra. The name Singhapura is Sanscrit and means "City of the Lion"—and not originally the British lion, either.

At the time Singhapura was conquered and laid waste, the Annamites conquered Champa and the Siamese overwhelmed the Khmers and later drove them from their great city of Angkor, which was in turn conquered by the jungle and re-

discovered and revealed to a wondering world only comparatively recently. In the fourteenth century the Siamese overran most of the Malay Peninsula and even attacked Singhapura, but unsuccessfully, before it was captured by the Javanese.

The five great kings of Singhapura built their palace and citadel on the hill now right in the heart of modern Singapore, which is now called Fort Canning. In those far-off days it was called the Forbidden Hill, and the clear stream behind it was the Forbidden Stream, because it was there that the women of the court went to bathe. After the British arrived in 1819 they cleared this hill and found the old walls and foundations, made of baked brick of splendid quality.

Brick walls about ten feet high and sixteen feet broad at the base ran from the Forbidden Hill to the Singapore River on one side, and from the Hill to what today is Stamford Canal on the other. Albuquerque, the great Portuguese Viceroy who in 1511 captured Malacca, farther up the western coast of the Peninsula, wrote in his "Commentaries" that "Singapore was a big town with a large population, as is evidenced by the large ruins which one sees there today."

Barros was official historian of the Albuquerque expedition, and he in turn wrote as follows: "Singapore was an emporium where all the ships went as to a general emporium, to a world fair. For some of them it was the end of the eastern sea, for others of the western." Other Portuguese historians believed Singhapura was the port of Zaba of Ptolemy's time. Certain it is that long before 1250, when Singhapura was founded, the straits and the island and the products of Malaya were known to the Persians, the Indians, the Greeks and the Chinese. For centuries the straits were held by pirates, and many an ancient Chinese chronicle tells of the perils of the passage. During a part of the rule of the Ming Dynasty, China looked upon the Malay Peninsula as a distant protectorate and expected—but rarely received—annual tribute.

For several centuries history is clouded, although for a time there seem to have been Malay harbor masters of some authority, and at other times the Sultans of Malacca seem to have maintained small garrisons where Singhapura once flourished.

In 1811 a powerful group of Johore Malays appear to have crossed the Straits of Johore, about where the great Singapore naval base is now situated, and to have settled on Singapore Island near the mouth of the Singapore River. Their chieftain was named Temenggong, and Stamford Raffles found their village and stockade at the river's mouth when he landed on January 28th, 1819. Raffles had a convoy of six ships. Farsightedly he envisioned Singapore as a great emporium for the ships of the world, as had the founders of ancient Singhapura. He dickered with Temenggong and with the then Sultan of Johore, leased part of the island in the name of the East India Company, and began to clear the Forbidden Hill. In 1824 the island was bought outright and quickly became of prime importance. It first enjoyed real boom days from 1839 to 1842, when it was the British base for the Opium War with China. That war led to the acquisition of another famous island: Hongkong.

The modern city of Singapore is only seventy-three miles north of the equator, and although it is on Singapore Island, it is generally considered to be on the southernmost tip of the mainland of Asia, for the straits separating the island from the state of Johore are so narrow that they are now spanned by a wide stone causeway. The island is 217 square miles in area, and the city today has a population of about seven hundred thousand.

For all the wealth of Malaya, the total populations living on the Peninsula and adjacent islands under many different governments comprise a little less than five million, and some of these governments support Sultans in real oriental splendor.

Actually the portion of Malaya belonging to His Majesty the King Emperor, and really technically a part of the British Empire, is the Colony of the Straits Settlements. The Colony consists of Singapore, Penang and Malacca, and for administrative purposes the Settlement of Singapore includes distant Christmas Island, which produces vast shipments of phosphate of lime, and the also distant Cocos-Keeling Islands. Penang, also an island city, for administrative purposes includes Province Wellesley on the mainland.

This great keypoint of strategy and commerce was obtained without bloodshed, and the beginnings of it go back to 1786, when the island of Penang was purchased from the Rajah of Kedah by the East India Company. Great Britain needed a safe harbor thereabouts, as had been demonstrated during the recent war with the French, and the Bay of Bengal offered no adequate anchorage for ships of war. Officially Penang Island is still Prince of Wales' Island, and the city of Penang is officially named Georgetown, after the fat royal personage who was later England's ruler under the title George IV. Actually the name Penang is derived from the Malay word *pinang*, or betel nut, for the betel nut palm thrives there.

History seems to be repeating itself so far as Holland is concerned. The Dutch captured Malaca from the Portuguese in 1641, but in 1795 it was turned over to Britain, acting as the protector of Dutch rights, for Holland, then as now, had been invaded. But at that time the French, under Napoleon, were the invaders—not the Germans.

Under the Treaty of 1814 the British agreed to restore Malacca to the Dutch and also to restore Java, which had been captured by the French. It was this prospective relinquishment of Malacca which set Raffles, later Sir Stamford, in quest of a commanding position in the Malacca Straits, and which resulted in the purchase of Singapore. Malacca was given over


to the Dutch in 1818, but by a treaty signed in 1824 Holland and England ended all territorial disputes, England taking the Malay Peninsula as her "sphere of influence" and the Dutch annexing Java, Sumatra and the rest of that vast archipelago now known as the Netherlands East Indies.

Johore, one of the "nonfederated" Malay states, is just across the narrow straits north of Singapore Island. By highway the distance is eighteen miles from the heart of Singapore city. Johore is ruled by a sultan, His Highness Sir Ibrahim, a constitutional monarch, is under British protection, and has a written constitution. The area of Johore, about 7,500 square miles, is not quite equal to that of New Jersey.

Northward of Johore lie the four Federated Malay States, usually referred to as the F. M. S. These are Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan and Pahang. There was considerable bloodshed in these states before peace was restored under the Treaty of Pangkor, signed in 1874. This was followed by formal "federation," achieved in 1896. Each of these five Federated States has its own sultan, each is under British protection, and theoretically the sultans are independent rulers with absolute power. But this is one of those charming fictions that help to hold together the British Empire.

Perak, the wealthiest of these Federated States, has an area of 7,800 square miles. Selangor has an area of only 3,150 square miles, but just now is rolling in wealth because of the yield of its enormous areas of rubber plantations. Negri Sembilan is almost entirely an agricultural state, only 2,550 miles in extent. The most undeveloped of these five states is Pahang, with an area of 14,000 square miles.

Northward of the Federated Malay States are Kedah, with 3,648 square miles of territory; Perlis, with only 316 square miles; Trengganu, with an estimated 5,000 square miles; and Kelantan, with 5,713 square miles. Each of these states is "owned" by its own sultan, each is protected by the British.



Suzerainty over them was ceded by Siam in 1906. These four, together with Johore, comprise the Nonfederated Malay States.

The Governor of the Colony, who lives at Singapore, is also the High Commissioner of the King for all of the Malay states. Each and every one of these states, federated and nonfederated, is bound by treaty to follow his advice. This loose governmental structure, bolstered with Residents and advisors and by the Malay Civil Service, accomplishes a remarkable and creditable job of administration.

British Malaya, for its size and population, is probably the richest place in the world, even under normal conditions. The various states produce tin, rubber, copra, pineapples, spices, tungsten, wolfram, some gold and some precious stones, including rubies and emeralds. Today, with tin and rubber prices at top levels because of the war, the prosperity is phenomenal.

The combined area of all the British territories in Malaya is only 52,000 square miles. Our own state of Michigan is 5,000 square miles larger than this.

Singapore is more than the political and financial capital of Malaya. It is more than the strongest outpost of the British Empire in Asia. It is the greatest of all southeastern Asiatic seaports, and in peacetime clears an average of more than 16,000,000 tons, or about 6,000 ships a year. It is the key shipping point for the control of the world's rubber and tin and controls the world's market for both of these essentials.

In peacetime more than a third of the East Indies exports are cleared or transshipped through Singapore, and the products of Burma and Thailand go to Singapore before being distributed to the world's markets. The areas directly tributary to Singapore control not only rubber and tin but also quinine, tungsten, antimony, copra and coconut oil. Malaya and the Indies, Thailand and Indo-China are the world's greatest exporters of rice.

In the harbor—which, though not beautiful itself except at night, has one of the most beautiful entrances of any harbor in the world—lie great liners, huge freighters, hundreds of slender Malay schooners, more hundreds of chubby Chinese junks and scores of the little coastal steamers that chug up and down the coasts to Java, to Sumatra, to Sarawak, to Borneo, to Burma and to Thailand.

Much of the business section of the city has been reclaimed from the sea or from the swamps, which formerly afforded some of the best crocodile hunting in the world except for the rivers of Borneo. The business heart of the city is Raffles Square; it was a swamp until a nearby hill was leveled and spread around. Nearly all the long drive from the dockyard area to the Raffles Hotel is over reclaimed ground, and even the great new airport is on a site from which the tides were literally pushed away by the ingenuity of man.

More than two thirds of the population of Singapore is made up of Chinese. Street signs are in three languages: English, Chinese and Malay characters. The Chinese quarter is so thickly built up that the population exceeds 14,000 to the square mile. Except for the Army and Navy, there are only about eight thousand white residents, of whom about two hundred are Americans.

Next in number to the Chinese come the Malays, with about eighty thousand population, and this general classification includes Javanese, Bugis, Dyaks, Sumatrans and half a dozen lesser divisions. Classed loosely as "Klings" are the coal-black, handsome Tamils, the Malabarlis and the Telugus. The heading "Bengalis" embraces such widely differing types as Rajputs, Parsees, Punjabis, Pathans, Hindustanis, Sikhs and half a dozen other Indian races. In addition to this mixture there are hundreds of Filipinos, Siamese, Arabs, Japanese, Armenians, Annamites, Persians and many Oriental Jews. Surely Singapore may challenge New York or Honolulu for the title of the

World's Melting Pot. Except for the fact that the British emphatically don't melt.

Singapore's climate comes in for an unjust share of abuse. Since it is almost on the equator, newcomers arrive with the preconceived notion that it must be terribly hot. The truth is that Shanghai's summers are much worse than anything Singapore suffers and that Manila, the year through, is much hotter. Singapore can also look with benevolent sympathy on the kind of summer months endured in Washington, D. C. It is rare that the mercury ever registers more than ninety degrees fahrenheit in the shade, and the lowest daytime shade heat is rarely less than seventy-three.

Singapore itself talks less about the heat than it does about the monsoons, those great seasonal winds named from the Arabic word *mausim*, which means season. The monsoons, experts say, are caused by the heating of Asia's land masses in summer and the cooling of those masses in winter. The southwest monsoon blows from May to October and brings little except a drier heat. The northeast monsoon blows from November to April and brings cool nights and more rain.

As sultry as the weather is the feeling in a large portion of the community concerning various forms of racial prejudice and discrimination pronouncedly existing in Singapore. The *Malaya Tribune*, an English-language daily newspaper of large circulation, which is said to be almost entirely owned by wealthy Chinese, is particularly bitter on this topic and says that "the racial harmony, amity and accord, so comfortably and soothingly blazoned forth to the world by clever and influential propagandists is, to a large extent, a hollow myth."

On November 18th, 1940, the *Tribune* editorially commented that: "Except for a measure of superficial cordiality manifest at Rotary meetings once a week, and in one or two small clubs, the segregation of the races in every sphere of life and activity in this country is complete."

Indeed, this seems astonishingly true, particularly to an observer who has lived long in Peking or in Shanghai. In those two cities a foreigner is apt to have just as many Chinese as American or European friends, and until the last few years there were usually Japanese friends, too.

The *Tribune* editorial then continued: "The apparent communal harmony in Malaya is largely superficial. Deep down there is no little bitterness. How can it be otherwise, when there is so much discrimination? This is no secret, and we know that cunning and clever enemy propagandists are hard at work behind the scenes making capital out of it all, and sowing the seeds of discord and disaffection."

These racial discriminations probably have much to do with the fact that most of the immense number of Chinese long resident in British Malaya still consider themselves more Chinese than British. True, they subscribe heartily to British war funds, but undoubtedly their contributions to Chungking are even larger, and their interests are more closely concerned with China's struggle against Japan than with England's defense against the Germans.

Chinese capital ranks second on a list of foreign investments in Malaya, so this Chinese attitude is of great importance. Oddly enough, of the thirteen billion Straits dollars worth of foreign investments in British Malaya, the Hollanders come first, with 39.9 per cent; the Chinese second, with 29.4; the British make a poor third with 18.9 per cent; France comes fourth with a rating of 9.4; the United States fifth with 3.3 per cent of the total; and Japan sixth with only 1.6 per cent.

The Chinese of British Malaya claim dual nationality—even those born under the British flag and who have never been to China. During the first two and a half years of the Chino-Japanese struggle these Chinese were not restricted in making contributions to aid General Chiang Kai-shek's government, but with the outbreak of the European war and the application

of exchange restrictions, such contributions have been made difficult. The Chinese resent this impeding of their efforts at helping the struggle against Japan and argue that the system is faulty, since Britain and China are jointly engaged in fighting against allied aggressor nations.

Singapore is rather excessively polite and proper and is culturally still in the stage when it pretends to derive vast amusement from over-frequent revivals of the Gilbert and Sullivan operas. This being true, it never talks about and publicly ignores grave social, moral and public health problems occasioned by the steady inflow of troops of various colors and races and by the shockingly great ratio at which men outnumber women on the little island. But the Army, Navy and local law-enforcement authorities worry more than a little. Some say the men outnumber the women more than seven-to-one; others put the ratio at nearly double that figure.

During the first World War all brothels were closed, and they have never been reopened. Moral enthusiasts in England have continued to force upon the Singapore authorities a rigid campaign of suppression. The result is sly and scattered vice and a terrifyingly large incidence of so-called social diseases. There is apparently a shortage of reputable foreign-trained physicians, and quacks abound and flourish. Sex crimes are increasing to an alarming extent.

Another thing Singapore does not like to discuss, or even to consider, is the possibility of trouble there due to the very large numbers of troops of Indian soldiers that make up the garrison of the island. With Indian politicians fomenting discontent and even disloyalty in India, and with German and probably Japanese agents trying to stir up trouble for Britain wherever possible, the situation might become disquieting.

There was a frightful mutiny of Indian troops in Singapore in 1915, and more than forty white people were massacred when on February 15th of that year the Rajput wing of the

Fifth Light Infantry broke out murderously. The Pathan wing of the same regiment did nothing to check the Rajputs, but voluntarily surrendered themselves and their rifles and revolvers. Many of the mutineers were publicly executed by firing squads after trial by court martial, as was a rich Indian merchant who acted as go-between for the German instigators of that useless and bloody affair.

Such is the history, the population and the background of the city where the British Empire has built the world's greatest naval base. A few years ago Singapore had no interest for Americans, except for the fact that round-the-world tourist ships stopped there and that Hollywood often chose it as the setting for fabulous dramas about international spies, black-browed crooks and platinum-haired ladies concerning whose virtue there was no room for any doubt at all.

If Washington concludes a new agreement with London under which our fleet may use the Singapore Naval Base, this great city may become another of those new American frontiers to which our public is being introduced with such bewildering frequency.

7.

NAVAL BASE AND FORTRESS

THE mere existence of Singapore's great naval base, and the land fortifications on Singapore island, which make it nearly impregnable, have undoubtedly been a deterrent to Japan's aspirations for quick southward expansion. And the fact that in a crisis, or if the United States becomes involved in war against Germany, the Singapore base would probably be made available for the use of the American Navy affords Japan the most difficult strategical problem with which she is faced in her struggle for complete mastery of East Asia and the East Indies.

Because of the uncertainty concerning the future political status of the Philippine Islands, the United States Government has not seen fit to pour into Manila Bay the tens of millions of dollars which the preparation of a naval base large enough to serve our whole fleet would cost. Consequently, in any first-class war in the Far East, our fleet would still have to base mainly on Pearl Harbor, which by the shortest direct route is about

4,700 miles from Manila. Without fueling, supply and repair services of adequate size in the Far East, the Navy's scope of operation would be greatly circumscribed, but with Singapore and Pearl Harbor, North Australian and Philippine ports jointly available to both the American and British fleets against Japan as the single Far Eastern representative of a hostile Axis group, the advantages and preponderance of striking power would swing sharply in favor of the democracies.

As the Japanese well know, there was almost nothing in the way of British naval strength in or around Singapore at the close of 1940, but in case of an emergency there is no doubt but that ample naval strength would come steaming up from "somewhere." Meanwhile the base itself, with its magnificent equipment and its trained personnel, is ready at an hour's notice to fulfill the part it was designed to play and to justify the investment of millions of pounds made therein by the British Empire.

It was at the Imperial Conference in 1921 that the project of the Singapore base was first officially proposed in order to insure the mobility of the Grand Fleet in waters east of Suez, but not until 1923 did the scheme actually appear in naval estimates. At that time the four square miles of territory where the base is now located was a dreary district of malarial mangrove swamps, secondary jungle and occasional coconut or rubber plantations on the low hills. The Straits Government bought up the land and presented it as a free site for the great project.

Today the great naval base, with five miles of waterfront, fronts on a deep water anchorage in the Straits of Johore, an anchorage of more than twenty square miles of water suitable for naval use and large enough to shelter the entire combined British and American fleets. This anchorage not only includes the Straits but also the mouth of the Johore River, and the entrance to the anchorage is protected by the heavily fortified islands of Palau Ubin and Palau Tekong.

A wide stone causeway, for highway use, now connects Singapore Island with Johore Bahru, the capital of the State of Johore, at a point where the Straits are only a mile and a ~~quarter~~ wide. But this causeway is admittedly mined, and a thumb pressed upon any one of certain scattered and concealed buttons would blow it to nothingness if an enemy ever approached the northern shores of the Straits from overland.

Engineers quickly transformed the wild and swampy area. They cleared off unwanted vegetation, cut down hills and filled the malarial swamps, drove concrete piles ninety feet into the soft ground. Then they built a big dam, excavated a huge storage basin behind the dam, and then removed the dam and let in the waters of the ocean. The result was a great harbor basin, 1,600 feet in length and 400 feet across. Around this has been built what looks like a sizeable manufacturing town. There are acres and acres of power plants, storage sheds, machine shops, repair shops. More than seventeen miles of railway tracks were laid, connecting all important centers.

Half a mile away is a graving dock, named after King George VI, which is 1,000 feet in length, 130 feet in width, and with a depth of 35 feet. The world's largest battleship could be accommodated there, the water pumped out in short order, and then the whole underwater structure would be exposed for repairs.

There is also a huge floating dock, towed out from England, and a floating crane that can lift two hundred tons. When a battleship is inside, nothing can be seen except small top parts of the masts and turrets. Ashore are other giant cranes. One of them is 168 feet in height, about equal to a fourteen-story building, and it can lift 250 tons. Singapore, sixteen miles away from the center of administration, but only fourteen miles from the southern edge of the base site, is accessible not only by rail but by two fine paved highways.

The armament depot, much of which is deep underground, can supply anything needed in the way of ammunition or explosives, from shells for a 15-inch gun to machine-gun ammunition, mines, torpedoes and flares. There are also immense vital workshops and repair depots underground and so protected that even a direct hit from a 2,000-pound bomb would not halt operations, and provision is now being made to provide many underground fuel tanks. Although the richly productive oil fields of Sumatra and Borneo are only a few hundred miles away by sea, a six months' supply of all fuel oils and gasolines for naval and naval air arm use is always kept in storage at the base.

Even the surface workshops are so constructed as to be safe from blast and bomb splinters, and there, under European engineers and overseers, thousands of skilled Malay, Indian and Chinese workmen are regularly employed. Two huge separate mains assure the naval base of an ample fresh water supply, but as insurance against disruption of these mains two large reservoirs are always kept constantly filled with a reserve of water enough to last for several weeks.

Ashore are hospitals and barracks that can house more than two thousand men who might be given leave while ships are under repair. For their amusement there are eighteen tennis courts, seven football fields, two cricket grounds, two squash courts, a large swimming pool, a gymnasium and two motion picture theaters where films are shown without charge. There are also cantonments, blocks and blocks of one-story buildings used for offices, a large and imposing building for base Headquarters, officers' messes, messes for sappers and gunners—all surrounded by fine tropical gardens—and scores of spacious homes for officers and their families.

Fine wide roads wind over the hilly site connecting all sections and departments, but there are also many "No Admit-

tance" signs and many barbed-wired spaces said to be sites of innumerable batteries of heavy coast artillery—but these are not shown to visitors.

Naturally a large and elaborate military establishment is maintained on Singapore Island to protect this immensely important and costly naval base, which protects Britain's sea lanes from Suez and South Africa to India, to the Indies, to Australia and New Zealand and to Hongkong and the China Seas. Many of the islands commanding the approaches to Singapore harbor are heavily fortified, and great mine fields, the entrances to which are carefully swept every morning before sunrise, guard all possible channels of approach.

The island and city of Penang, on the west coast of the Malay Peninsula, are also heavily fortified, as is Rangoon, in Burma. At times of emergency, air patrols, overlapping from bases at Singapore, Penang and Rangoon, would patrol the seas out for a distance of at least four hundred miles to make impossible the surprise approach of any enemy naval vessels. The same precautions would also be taken along the seas lapping the eastern coasts of British Malaya in the vicinity of all harbors that might afford an enemy landing points.

The authorities at Singapore, wisely and naturally, refuse to give out a list of the names of the regiments on the island and stationed at strategic points northward on the Malay Peninsula, but Singapore's streets literally swarm with soldiers of many colors and races, and all day great military lorries rumble through the streets and out along the highways leading to airfields and coast artillery defense posts. Among the famous and distinctive uniforms seen there daily are those of the East Surreys, Seaforth Highlanders, Argyles, Gordon Highlanders, Australian airmen, New Zealand flyers, Royal Air Force, a new Malay regiment, the Hongkong-Singapore Royal Artillery and other British regiments of the line as well as Sikhs, Punjabis and other famous Indian regiments.

The authorities will give no indication of the total number of soldiers maintained in British Malaya. Popular guesses, however, in late November ranged between 85,000 and 100,000 men, but this is probably an underestimate. One week in late November at least forty thousand troops disembarked from large gray transports, bringing with them complete equipment. On December 23rd it was officially announced that more reinforcements had arrived, including aircraft, air force personnel, "numerous Indian infantry, artillery, engineers and auxiliary units, besides more Australian and New Zealand air force units." And in February another great convoy arrived from Australia.

Considering the magnitude of England's task in fighting off the Germans, their wide-scale operations in northern Africa, and their participation in the campaign in Greece, it is magnificent testimony to the strength and resources of the British Empire that such large re-enforcements can be spared for Singapore. It is also highly significant of the seriousness with which official quarters regard Japan's threats of renewed advances southward. This tremendous effort to make Singapore impregnable, like our own preparedness effort in Hawaii, is being made solely because a clash with Japan seems probable. "Certain" is the word many military and political experts prefer to use. In fact, in November of 1940 Mr. L. S. Amery, British Secretary of State for India, made a public statement in London in which he declared that the "second great design of the Axis Powers extends to Gibraltar and Singapore."

Even if Japan does not attack, her threats have aided the Axis by immobilizing at Singapore men and planes needed elsewhere.

The Empire is certainly doing enough for Singapore. But is Singapore doing enough for the Empire? That question is openly and bitterly debated in the Singapore newspapers, in which a violent dispute is maintained concerning the advisa-

bility of an income tax, of establishing an official State Lottery to raise war funds and of other projects. Many hostile critics (British) maintain that Malaya is getting very rich through the boom in the demand for rubber and tin, and that even the contributions and funds already raised are totally inadequate as proper support of the Empire's war effort.

Perhaps that is the official view. Early in December, Sir Shenton Thomas, the able Governor of the Straits Settlements and High Commissioner for the Malay States, returned to Singapore after a trip to England. Soon after he landed, the Governor made the following highly significant statement:

This is my special message to everybody in Malaya. The people of England are fighting this war for you. If it were not for them, not one of you would have a cent today. You would be under the Nazi heel. It is up to every one of you to do your absolute utmost so that at the end of the war we can say: "We did not get through the war by the effort of other people. We acted worthily ourselves."

Another arrival at about the same time was a man of extraordinary ability and vivid personality—Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, the new Commander-in-Chief of the Far East Command, who was to make Singapore his headquarters. Sir Robert is in supreme command of Empire forces in Burma, British Malaya and Hongkong, and admits he will consult freely with and possibly make flying visits to the chiefs of command in Australia and New Zealand. On his way out from England to the Far East he stayed for a time with Lord Linlithgow, Viceroy of India, and conferred with General Sir Robert Cassels, Commander-in-Chief for India.

After India, the Air Chief Marshal entered his own zone

of command, flying first to Rangoon, where he conferred with the Governor of Burma, Sir Archibald Cochrane. After a few days in Singapore, Sir Robert made a detailed inspection of the defense arrangements of the Federated and Non-federated Malay States on the Peninsula, visiting places little known and seldom heard of in the United States—places like Ipoh, Alor Star and Kota Bahru. If the Japanese should attempt a land drive upon Singapore, those names will appear as frequently in our newspapers as the hitherto strange names of Albanian towns that the Greeks were capturing in December and January.

Later the Air Chief Marshal visited Hongkong, Australia and New Zealand. It is known that he would like to have visited Admiral T. C. Hart, commander of the American Asiatic Fleet at Manila, and also the Dutch Admirals and Generals in Batavia. But Tokyo would probably have labeled such visits as “unmistakable signs of criminal collusion.”

Under the general command of the new Air Chief Marshal at Singapore, Lieutenant General Bond remains in direct command of army defense forces in Malaya, and Admiral Sir Geoffrey Layton remains in direct command of what was formerly the China Fleet of the British Navy, which until midsummer of 1940 based upon Hongkong, Sir Robert Brooke-Popham announced that he would be in frequent and direct communication with the British Ambassadors at Chungking and at Tokyo, with the British Minister to Thailand, and with Consuls General at all strategic points in the Far East.

“And,” he added, with a smile, “if I feel it would be useful, I shall certainly communicate direct with Lord Halifax in Washington, or with our Air Attaché there.”

The day before Sir Robert left London for his new post he had lunch with Winston Churchill, the British Prime Min-

ister. Also present were General Sir John Dill, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and Air Chief Marshal Sir Cyril Newhall.

"Mr. Churchill knew all about Singapore," Sir Robert announced when he arrived in that city. "He told me that we would hold Singapore, no matter what happened. He also said that I could rest assured that there would be a steady and continuous flow of men and munitions to the countries within the area of my command, and that no effort would be spared to make the Malay Peninsula and other British countries in East Asia as strong and as well defended as is humanly possible."

The Australian and New Zealand airmen at Singapore are a fine looking lot of men, but one light-minded person once referred to them in print as "the glamor boys of the island." They resented that, and "glamor boys" are fighting words in any cabaret or bar. The Australians, because of their independence of spirit, afford the basis for many of the jokes that help to keep Singapore gay. Probably some of these tales are entirely untrue, and others may have a basis of fact. I heard two of these jokes myself, from an Australian flying officer when I visited their airfield, and was courteously shown around as I listened with pleasure to their praise of their American-built bombers and fighters.

One joke was to the effect that when a high British Army officer made an inspection of the field he came across a mechanic in greasy overalls working on a plane engine. The General is reputed to have suggested an easier method of making the repairs, whereupon the jesters have it that the young Australian stood up, did not salute, but threw his monkey wrench to the ground and stalked away, angrily shouting over his shoulder: "If you know so damn' much about the job, suppose you do it yourself."

Apoplexy, and an ambulance!

Another tale has to do with the Australians grousing because they did not approve of the British Army butter ration. They are all volunteers, these young flyers, and in Australia there had been no rationing, but great mounds of butter appeared on all the tables at the mess at every meal. My informant neglected to say that in Australia the men had the cost of the mess deducted from their pay.

I thought these were human-interest touches and included these stories in an article I prepared to send to my newspaper in New York by Clipper via Java and New Zealand. In all innocence I took the offending article to a censor at Fort Canning. He nearly choked. He telephoned to the commander at the Australian airfield. The commander immediately attained a state of high tension. Who was my informant? I said I'd forgotten. Would I please make the twelve-mile trip out to his headquarters so that he might question me? No, I was much too busy.

"You see," it was explained, "if the Germans ever saw these two dangerous items, they would say our troops in Singapore are mutinous, or they would spread harmful reports among the British troops that the Australians are shown favoritism in the matter of food."

Well, here are the stories for the Germans to read—utterly harmless stories, both of them. The Australians are not mutinous, I know of no body of men more ardent in their patriotism or more amenable to all necessary discipline. And there is no favoritism about butter or anything else. In Singapore they get no more butter than do the troops from England, and when they did get more, back home in Australia, they paid for it out of their own pockets.

Let's hope the Singapore censors won't think I'm an enemy of the Empire because I have, after all, written these stories for publication. The agitation of the censors was much funnier than the stories themselves.

Japan has taken unkindly to the idea of the existence of a naval base at Singapore since the day the plan for the great establishment was first broached. The actual work of construction was not begun until after the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which was ended during the Washington Naval Conference. Japanese espionage agents have been busy on Singapore Island for the last fifteen years—increasingly busy since 1938. One of them, caught and convicted, actually had an office and lived in a room in the building of the Japanese Consulate General.

Just across the narrow Straits of Johore, and immediately opposite the naval base, there is a small settlement known as a Japanese fishing village. The Japanese there catch few and sell even fewer fish. But they live well and cruise around a lot—always under the watchful eyes of the British naval authorities.

8.

TIN RUBBER AND EXCHANGE

THE grim business of war and destruction has resulted in the making of a romantic chapter in the history of Singapore and Malaya. A chapter of unprecedented profits, huge dividends and the opening of new tin mines all up and down the peninsula.

Tin, so far, is an essential metal in the manufacture of many of the machines and agents of destruction used in modern warfare. Malaya is one of the world's chief and richest sources of tin. Thus it follows that while the war lasts, the silk-hatted directors of tin companies and the humblest of the Malayan or Chinese women, who wash tin from the alluvial sands, much as the pioneer gold prospectors of California "panned" nuggets, will all continue to prosper.

Historians have it that about the time Ptolemy was sending Egyptian galleys to bring tin from the Cornish mines, the enterprising Phoenicians had already discovered the tin deposits of Malaya. This may be subject to dispute and serious ques-

tioning, but historical records show that the Arabs came to Malaya in the ninth century for tin ores, and that when the Portuguese found tin in the hinterlands of Malacca in 1511 there were already large Chinese junks braving the perils of the pirates of Singapore in order to secure profitable tin cargoes to take back to the Flowery Kingdom.

The pirates of the straits at Singapore have, indeed, borne an evil reputation for many centuries, but if a visitor suggests that their ideological descendants survive today in the offices of Singapore tin brokers, he is likely to be shunned in the club bars at the tiffin hour.

When it comes to the question of an equitable price for tin, statistics are, for a change, really interesting. Particularly so in view of the fact that the United States buys from 55 to 80 per cent of Malaya's tin production.

Expressed in terms of sterling, the main aim has been to keep the price of tin around £220 a long ton of 2,240 pounds. Company returns show that the cost of producing tin in Malaya varies from about £25 a ton to £80 a ton, depending upon the richness of the deposit, the methods of mining and the efficiency of the management. These figures, of course, reveal the certainty of enormous profits when prices are high, but these profits are defended on the grounds that tin is "a wasting asset." To which a skeptic may retort that some districts show reserves good for more than a century at present rates of production, and that vast areas of unexplored jungle undoubtedly contain ~~undiscovered~~ reserves.

During the last twelve years there have been tremendous swings in price variations from a low of £118 a ton to a high of £291 a ton.

Put into terms of Straits dollars, the prices of tin for 1938 averaged 95¢ a pound, in 1939 averaged \$1.14 a pound, and for the first eight months of 1940 averaged \$1.28 a pound. Today the price is fixed, so far as American purchases are

concerned, at 50¢ a pound, American money. From January 1st, 1940, to September 30th the American markets and the United States Government bought 74,747 tons of tin from Malaya, of which Singapore and Penang each shipped a little more than 37,000 tons. What the war has meant to Malayan tin producers is shown by the fact that during the year preceding August 31st, 1939, the tin mines of the Peninsula produced 33,013 tons, whereas during the year from September 1st, 1939, to August 31st, 1940, the production jumped to 82,911 tons. Market values for those two periods were, first, in Straits dollars, \$52,496,000, and for the latter period \$171,410,000.

The International Tin Committee, which by mutual agreement regulates the annual production in most of the important tin-mining areas of the world, has fixed a quota of 130 per cent production for the year ending June 30th, 1941. This was done to enable the United States Government to make desired purchases of 75,000 tons over and above the country's consumptive requirements for that twelve-month period. In order to protect the market, in case the war ends abruptly, the United States Government will release this tin only in case of a national emergency. Otherwise it may not be sold until the end of 1943, after which, according to the agreement, there would be only a well-defined and orderly release of this reserve upon the American markets.

Since the United States neither produces nor smelts any tin, the building up of this reserve was considered a vital national defense measure.

Under the 130 per cent quota, Malaya, theoretically, is permitted to produce about 103,000 tons of tin during the year ending June 30th, 1941. Actually, however, production as in December, 1940, already practically at the peak of possibility, and the total is expected to range between 85,000 and 90,000 tons.

The world's total tin production in the calendar year 1939

was about 184,000 tons, of which 55,150 came from Malaya, 31,281 from the Netherlands East Indies, 16,998 from Thailand, only 1,392 from French Indo-China, 10,895 from China, 5,750 from Burma, 27,215 from Bolivia and small tonnages from nearly two score other countries and colonies including even Alaska, Nigeria and the Belgian Congo.

As an example of the profits now being made by the tin mines, the year 1937 may be cited, when the quota was 105 per cent. Then some companies paid dividends of as much as 80 per cent, and those which earned only 18 and 20 per cent were ranked as "piker organizations."

I have before me the annual statements of two companies, published in Singapore in November, 1940. Both are capitalized in Straits dollars.

One of these organizations declared dividends of 25 per cent for the year ending July 1st, 1940, as against 7½ per cent for the preceding year. Earnings for those two years were, respectively, \$712,566 against only \$135,911. Out of the \$712,566, however, only \$362,000 was declared in dividends, \$180,000 was transferred to the general reserve, \$97,000 was charged to depreciation, and a donation of \$17,500 was made to Malaya's War Fund.

The other company under review made a profit of only \$84,763 during the year ending July 1st, 1939, but piled up profits of \$422,123 during the year ending July 1st, 1940. Dividends were at the rate of 20 per cent.

The relatively small dividends, in relation to actual profits, indicate a general tendency among the tin companies of Malaya to lay up substantial reserves in years of prosperity so that they will be able to pay some dividends, however small, when the war ends and, as is generally expected, the price of tin then takes an abrupt drop.

The companies incorporated in England with pound sterling capitalization are not so fortunately placed. The British

profits tax is exceedingly high. The report of one such company shows earnings of 50 per cent, but the annual report laments that the Government will take all except 10 per cent of this total. The closing words run to this effect:

"Our reserve dredging areas will be exhausted in seven years. At this rate, unless we slow down production, we shall earn 350 per cent, but the shareholders will receive, over seven years, a combined total of only 70 per cent on their capital, and then will own nothing but a large area of valueless gravel heaps and some useless machinery."

Because of this situation, some of the biggest producers may curtail their output by the simple expedient of moving their dredges to the low-yielding areas of their holdings. This will be good for the shareholders, who will not be mulcted of excess profits taxes at the source of their incomes, but will not help the United States to build up tin reserves essential for national defense.

There has been a curious shift in the ownership of Malayan tin mines during the last score of years, and the number of producing mines always fluctuates according to the price of the metal. In 1920, Chinese owned 61 per cent of all the producing mines. Today, Europeans (and two American companies) own 66 per cent of the mines and Chinese only 34 per cent.

The maximum number of mines producing tin in Malaya in 1939, before the war boom began, was 894. In September of 1940 this number had risen to 978. During past booms there have been as many as 1,286 mines working at one time, but 707 of these were small sluicing properties without any machinery at all. The revolution in operation methods is shown by the fact that in September of 1940 there were only 155 mines without machinery.

So far there is very little lode mining for tin in Malaya, the main production being from vast alluvial deposits, and

the favorite methods of securing the concentrates are dredging, hydraulic mining, sluicing, placering—as in gold mines in the American West—and churning the deposits into mud in deep pits from which the liquid mud is raised in baskets and then run through sluice baskets. In some of the smaller and more primitive mines, Malay or Chinese women stand all day knee deep in water and pan the ore out, as did the original prospectors in California's gold rush nearly a century ago.

In 1939, mines with dredges produced 21,407 tons, hydraulic and sluicing processes 16,270, and all the hand-panning properties together a total of only 853 tons. Before smelting, the tin is a brownish-black coarse sand, some grains of which are occasionally as large as garden peas. Mines with modern machinery now recover this sand even when it is ground as fine as flour. Since many of the mines are in remote parts of the jungles, the transportation of the ores to railways or barges, for shipment to the Penang or Singapore smelters, varies widely. In some cases elephants carry loads up to eight hundred pounds, sometimes coolies carry fifty-pound sacks and many of the companies have motor trucks.

Few veins or lodes have been located as yet, and most of the production comes from alluvial deposits, some of which so far have been cut away by hydraulic mining to a depth of two hundred feet. That these deposits were made only yesterday, in a geological sense, is proved by the fact that occasionally at a depth of thirty or forty feet Chinese coins, fragments of Chinese pottery made about nine hundred years ago, elephant tusks, bronze buddhas and even crudely smelted ingots of tin are found in place.

The mountains of the Malay Peninsula rise to a maximum height of about 7,000 feet, and all are covered with dense jungle. The tropical rains are torrential, and the erosion in the stream beds is very heavy. When the cheap and easy mining of the alluvial deposits is completed, it is confidently pre-

dicted that large and very rich lodes of tin ores will be located and exploited, probably providing reserves of potential wealth that will last for centuries.

The virtual monopoly of tin smelting, held by interlocking companies with smelters in Singapore, Penang and England, is adroitly maintained by a prohibitively high export tax on unsmelted tin ores. Singapore and Penang smelt tin ores from forty-five countries and colonies. Formerly the tin from the Netherlands East Indies went mainly to smelters in Holland, but since Germany invaded the Low Countries, most of the East Indies ores now also go to Singapore. The independent Dutch, however, are rapidly developing smelting facilities of their own in their own islands.

In 1936 and 1937, Japanese freighters carried between 30 and 40 per cent of all tin shipped from Malaya to the United States, but since relations between Washington and Tokyo have become strained, American buyers and the United States Government as a buyer specify that all shipments must be made in American ships. In case of the sudden outbreak of war between Japan and the United States, Japanese ships at sea will no longer have cargoes of essential American-owned tin aboard.

Since the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939, Japan has tried in vain to greatly increase her purchases of tin but has been unable to secure more than enough for her normal needs. Every care is taken to make sure that Japan gets no excess of the metal for re-sale and shipment to Germany via Vladivostok and the Trans-Siberian Railway.

Great Britain has, of course, first call upon all the tin produced or smelted in Malaya. The United States then is given preferential consideration for what Britain does not take. Of late there has been a careful scrutiny of growing orders from various South American countries, where consumption has been low in the past. Remembering the exploits of the sub-

marine *Deutschland* during the first World War, when cargoes of dyestuffs were successfully taken to United States ports and cargoes of essential nickel taken back to Germany, these demands from South America are being carefully scrutinized.

Baldly but factually stated, the United States Government during much of 1940 was busily engaged endeavoring to get an adequate reserve supply of rubber out of Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies before the sea lanes across the Pacific Ocean could be interrupted by hostilities with Japan, and this endeavor is scheduled to continue during much of 1941.

The problem has not been that of a shortage of ships but of obtaining a sufficient supply of crude rubber from the trees. The United States is determined to build up a reserve supply of 400,000 tons of rubber, above the normal annual demands of domestic trade for any one year.

While the country is at peace with the Axis Powers, the transit across the Pacific can be accomplished in about thirty days. If we became involved with Japan, we would also automatically become involved with Italy and Germany. The Pacific sea lanes would become extra hazardous, and the longer route via Capetown would have to be adopted, which normally requires forty-five to fifty days. There would also then be the risk of German or Italian raiders and submarines in the North Atlantic.

The rubber producers of Malaya are making enormous fortunes out of this war demand. They know it may be their last chance for prosperity on a gigantic scale, for they fear that war's stimulus may result in the perfection of cheap methods of making synthetic rubber, that huge plants may be built that will be able to supply adequately the demands of industry in times of peace. So, reversing the old saying,

while the war clouds hang low, and before the sun shines again, they are making hay with all possible endeavor.

November of 1940 found the rubber markets of Malaya practically swept clean, and there is always a time lag of about six weeks from the time the sap leaves the trees until the raw rubber reaches the docks. This is consumed in processing, cleaning, sorting, packing and shipment from the interior plantations to the harbors of Singapore or Penang. Moreover, in December and January the trees are at a low level of production. The climate changes little in temperature throughout the year, Singapore being less than eighty miles from the equator, but nevertheless the trees go through a season of "wintering," with a greatly lessened flow of sap.

In 1940 the aim of the U. S. A. Rubber Reserve Company was to buy 150,000 tons of Malayan rubber. In 1941 the goal has been set at 180,000, which would be a total of 330,000 tons in reserve. The other 70,000 tons is to come largely from Java. We also traded cotton to Britain for 85,000 tons. In 1940 the United States Government was paying from 18¢ to 20¢ a pound, American money. In 1941 it is hoped to keep prices between 17¢ and 19¢. We want production as rapid as possible, and do not want to be gouged for too high a price; the planters of Malaya want to have prices as high as possible, naturally.

Here, in brief, is what the war has meant in the way of prosperity for the Malayan rubber industry. In 1938, American factories and consumers bought 40.7 per cent of Malaya's rubber output, or 214,651 tons, at an average price, in New York, of US 14.6¢ a pound. This brought to Malaya around US \$56,000,000. In 1939 we took 54.2 per cent of the total output, around US 17.5¢ per pound. Malaya netted about US \$100,000,000. In the first ten months of 1940 the total output was 651,080 tons, of which we bought (United States

Government and commercial purchases combined) 363,097 tons, for which we paid US \$132,000,000. With November and December statistics still to be compiled, the total for the year 1940 will approach US \$150,000,000, or nearly US \$100,000,000 more than we paid Malaya for rubber in 1938.

Price fluctuations for rubber, based mainly upon American prosperity or hard times and upon the demands of the American automotive industry, have shown the following enormous ranges in the last decade, based on annual averages:

	U.S. CENTS PER POUND
1930	11.9
1931	6.1
1932	3.4
1933	5.9
1934	12.9
1935	12.3
1936	16.4
1937	19.3
1938	14.6
1939	17.5

In lean years of low prices, the planters are strapped, cannot pay their bills or buy gasoline for their automobiles. In good years, like 1939 and 1940, it is a case of high living, fast cars, champagne. In times of high prices for rubber, many of the big companies have been able to pay dividends ranging from 50 to 100 per cent in one year.

After the "black years," 1932 and 1933, with prices ranging from just above 3¢ to just under 6¢ a pound, it became evident that there would have to be instituted some kind of official control of production and export or many of the rubber plantations would be uprooted and the land put to other uses. Accordingly, under inter-governmental agreement, in May of 1934 there was constituted the International Rubber

Regulations Committee, which has authority to fix quotas of production for all rubber-producing areas of any importance. These quotas may be revised quarterly if world demands and existing reserves justify increased or decreased production schedules.

In the first quarter of 1939, for instance, the quota was 50 per cent. Then came the war, growing demands for rubber, and necessity for larger production. Malaya's quota was fixed at 80 per cent for the first quarter of 1940. Subsequently this was raised to 90 per cent, and the first quarter of 1941 was fixed at 105 per cent.

A well-managed rubber plantation can produce about five hundred pounds per year per acre. This involves tapping the trees every other day, but in most areas they could be tapped daily for a long period without injury. Trees come into bearing at from seven to ten years, according to rainfall and fertility of the soil, and the average life of trees under continuous tapping is not yet known. In Malaya some have been tapped for from thirty to forty years and are still healthy.

One of the main reasons for continuing Japanese pressure upon the Netherlands East Indies is that Japan is virtually squeezed out of the market in Singapore. She gets about what her average purchases of Malayan rubber have amounted to per year for the last five years—not a pound more. As is the case with tin, another war necessity, it is feared that if Japan obtained any surplus supplies of rubber, she might resell them to Germany and ship them by way of Vladivostok and the Trans-Siberian Railway.

The manner in which Japan is squeezed out of the market is that Great Britain, of course, gets first call upon all supplies. Suppose production is 50,000 tons in any given month; Britain would take 20,000 tons. America would then announce the need for 40,000 tons, but there would be only 30,000 available. As a special concession, one month late in 1940, Japan

was allotted about 1,400 tons. No surplus for Germany during that month.

At the close of 1939, Malaya's rubber acreage totaled 3,422,649. "Estates," that is, areas of 100 acres or more under one management or ownership, accounted for 2,107,117 acres, of which mature trees covered 1,861,336 acres, whereas 245,781 acres were planted to trees still immature. "Small holders," that is, plantations of less than 100 acres, accounted for an area of 1,335,532 acres. Europeans and Americans, or companies controlled by Europeans and Americans, own the greatest proportion of bearing rubber plantations, Chinese owners come second, Indians third, and Malays and Japanese make up a poor fourth and fifth.

Rubber purchases make up the greatest single import bill of the United States. In the five years preceding 1940, our rubber purchases and imports averaged a little more than US \$151,000,000 annually.

During those years 96 per cent of all American rubber supplies came from Malaya and from the Netherlands East Indies. If Japan should succeed in wresting control of these rubber-producing areas from the British and from the Dutch, our industry and our national-defense programs would be greatly imperiled. Hence, Secretary of State Cordell Hull's stern pronouncements against any change of the status quo in those areas. Hence, too, our great haste in storing up adequate rubber reserve supplies before any situation develops under which Japan might try to block the sea lanes of the Pacific.

Singapore in particular and Malaya in general are together experiencing a period of spectacular war prosperity. The world's demand for tin and rubber, both essential war commodities, has sent prices skyrocketing to such an extent that even though the copra and pineapple businesses suffer as a

result of the war, the country's favorable balance of trade will, in 1940, far exceed anything known in its history.

Exchange control is rigid, and the whole system devised is motivated by the determination to provide American dollar balances to help the British Empire buy airplanes, ships and the products of American factories that are vital to the conduct of the war against the Axis Powers.

The Singapore or Straits Settlements dollar fluctuates between 47¢ and 48½¢, American money. For the first nine months of 1940, Malaya's exports were valued at \$846,052,000 in Straits money, or roughly US \$400,000,000. October's exports alone were \$96,000,000, Straits money, which adds another US \$45,000,000 to the already impressive total.

For many years Malaya's prosperity and depression periods have been based upon like periods in the United States. When America is prosperous and buys rubber and tin, plantation owners and tin share holders ride in limousines; when the United States experiences hard times, these same people ride on borrowed bicycles. Or so goes a saying often heard in Singapore's clubs.

In October, 1940, for instance, Malaya exported goods to the United States valued at \$58,266,000 in Straits money, whereas imports from the United States in that same month were valued at only Straits \$3,165,000. This afforded a trade balance in Malaya's favor of Straits \$55,000,000, or a little more than US \$25,000,000 for one month alone.

The figures for trade with the United Kingdom in October were imports from Britain worth Straits \$8,114,000, whereas exports from Malaya to the United Kingdom were worth only \$9,248,000.

In spite of this remarkable showing, there is a campaign afoot aimed at the further curtailment of purchases from the United States. There is, of course, no tinge of anti-Americanism back of this campaign. It is inspired by the feeling that

the people of Malaya are not sufficiently curtailing their "luxury buying" but are permitting their immense prosperity to lead to a recklessness of extravagant expenditure that is held to be unpatriotic, since the British Empire needs every dollar of foreign exchange it can legitimately obtain.

Every traveler arriving in Malaya is apprised of exchange control as soon as his passport has been examined. He must make out and swear to a signed statement detailing all foreign currencies, drafts, notes and securities that he brings into the country with him, and when he leaves he is not permitted to take out a single dollar or guilder more than he brought in. And it is also forbidden to take out of Malaya more than \$200 in Straits currency. Penalties for evasions or attempted evasions are relatively heavy fines, and in aggravated cases may also include terms in prison.

The very rigid exchange control, particularly concerning currencies not in the "sterling bloc," results in some seeming absurdities, and in many cases in genuine personal hardships. Most of the Americans in Singapore grumble about it a lot, and the Canadians grouchily say they are "treated almost like enemy aliens."

One Canadian friend of mine in Singapore, as an example, earns a very sizeable salary, paid in American dollars. His wife and two children, for reasons of health, are spending a year in Victoria, British Columbia. The wife pays \$80 a month for a small apartment, but under Singapore's rigid exchange regulations the husband is permitted to send to his wife only US \$78 a month.

It would seem simple to have American or Canadian firms pay their Singapore employees only a portion of each month's salary in Straits dollars, and to pay the balance into American or Canadian banks. But the Singapore authorities will not permit such evasions; they have access to all records and salary

lists, and any false statements about salaries or incomes may bring severe punishment.

The grievances of Singapore residents who enjoy United States or Canadian dollar salaries or incomes range all the way from not being permitted to send even \$5.00 to America for a magazine subscription to loud laments over not being permitted to send enough money home to keep sons or daughters in American schools or universities. Even insurance policy premiums may not be sent abroad unless the policies were in effect before the exchange regulations were first enforced.

Americans living in Malaya had to submit sworn lists of foreign securities owned and the incomes paid by such securities. One American business man, long a resident of Singapore, made up a complete list of his stocks and bonds, which are held for him by a bank in New York City. His securities included two US \$1,000 paving bonds issued by an upstate city in New York, and a few months ago these bonds were paid in full. His New York bank notified him by mail that the \$2,000 had been placed to his account. The Singapore postal censor read the letter and promptly notified the exchange control office.

This American's wife and only son happen to be in Los Angeles for the winter, and he has been permitted to send them only US \$78 a month. When the New York bank's notice about the \$2,000 came to his desk, this American heaved a sigh of relief—plenty of money for the wife and kid, Bessie would no longer have to borrow each month from her own father.

But next day came a notice from the exchange control authorities. The American would no longer be permitted to send US \$78 a month to his wife and son. Instead, they would first have to use up the \$2,000 in the New York bank—and if they used it faster than at the rate of \$78 a month, that

would be their lookout. The husband would be permitted to send them no more money until after the lapse of more than two years.

"This is all very well, if Britain wins the war," said this aggrieved American to me. "I think she will win, of course. But if she loses? It simply means that US \$2,000 of my capital will have been spent, while I'll have the equivalent of that sum frozen here in Straits dollars. And if Germany and Italy should win, Straits dollars will be worth only the paper used for making the notes."

Britishers suffer just as unfairly under these restrictions as do Americans. At the Raffles Hotel in Singapore I met a charming white-haired Englishman on the shady side of seventy, and here is his complaint:

"My wife and I lived up at Kuala Lumpur for thirty-eight years. We left here some years ago because my wife's health failed. After considerable travel, we found that southern California agreed with her. I built a home at Capistrano, and she is there now. I came back here to try and get some money.

"It happens that I own the controlling shares in a tin-mining company up the Peninsula, and this year our dividends will exceed half a million in Straits dollars. In Singapore we would be rich folks, but my wife would probably soon die if we returned here to live. All my dividends must stay frozen here for the duration of the war, and meanwhile we two old people are told to live in Capistrano on US \$78 a month. It can't be done.

"So I'm going back to California and will have to sell my home. On the proceeds we'll live in a small apartment, I fancy, and try to make the money last as long as possible."

In justice to Singapore and British Malaya, it must be said that the Dutch, in the Netherlands East Indies, are even more strict about foreign exchange than are the nearby British.

In both colonial areas the entire business and financial structure is being handled with the sole ruling idea of earning as much money as possible, preferably in American dollars, in order to help finance foreign purchases that are essential to winning the war against Germany and Italy. "And," they say, "probably against Japan, too, although the defeat of Japan will probably be Uncle Sam's job almost exclusively."

9.

THE ISLES OF COURAGE

WITH their motherland overrun by German armies, their Queen and her government living in dangerous exile in London, their homeland cities being wrecked by the bombs of the Royal Air Force, the Dutch in the Netherlands East Indies are now living in fear of two things. First they fear Japanese armed invasion of their rich archipelago, and second they fear that such an invasion may succeed for the same reason that the invasion of Holland succeeded—lack of advance co-operation by the highest authorities of adjacent areas threatened by an aggressor nation.

Britain and France hesitated to confer in detail on defense with the authorities of Belgium and Holland; such conferences might have been labeled “hostile collusion” by Germany—might have been used as an excuse for an attack. Nevertheless, the attack came, and one of the reasons it succeeded with such stunning rapidity was because of the lack of advance teamwork against a common threat.

So today, when the Netherlands East Indies should be helping to devise a common defense scheme against Japanese attack by conferring and planning with the British authorities in Singapore and Australia, and with the Americans in Manila, formulation of detailed co-operative defense plans is being deferred—lest it irritate the Japanese and precipitate hostilities.

But why defer planning to take joint action? Japan is openly allied with Germany and Italy. Japan's admirals and generals and Cabinet members all openly proclaim the intention to continue the southward expansion program. They say it is "manifest destiny" and that no nation or group of nations may dare to offer opposition.

Japan already holds Canton, Hainan Island, the Spratley group of islands. Japan is in effective military occupation of northern Indo-China, and the southern half of that great French possession is at her mercy. In Thailand she dominates policy and has been busy stirring up strife between Thailand and France in order that she herself might benefit from the resulting confusion. Is she to be permitted to take Borneo, because there is no joint plan for checking her further southward advances? Is she to be permitted to take Java, because to plan to keep her out might irritate the Japanese leaders?

The grim and bitter lessons of 1940 in Scandinavia and in the Low Countries of Europe would seem already to have been forgotten. But Britain cannot have forgotten; Washington and Manila are surely alive to this peril. The Dutch in the East Indies are ready and even eager for anything from a formal defensive alliance to an elastic "understanding." Yet the beginning of 1941 had brought about no effective common plan.

It is because of the lack of existence of a common defense plan that the Netherlands East Indies may properly be called the isles of fear. But they are also the isles of courage, the isles

of active preparedness and the isles of grim determination to blast and ruin the achievements of more than three centuries of colonial development if there arises the necessity of finally surrendering to the invader.

The Netherlands East Indies were stunned with the suddenness of Holland's capitulation in May of 1940. In less than a week their home army had scattered or surrendered, their elaborate flooding and other defense plans had miscued, their Queen and her government had fled to England. With almost no army in the islands, with a fleet good for little more than patrol duty, and with an utterly inadequate defense force, it is no wonder that there was momentary panic. Rapacious Japan was not far over the northern horizon and immediately began to move south, exerting pressure first against the helpless French in Indo-China. But the panic was only momentary.

Today the whole life, effort and thought of the leaders of the Netherlands East Indies are devoted to three aims: first to make their islands defensible as quickly as possible, second to mine and prepare to destroy everything of any value to any conqueror on any island upon which the Japanese may effect a landing, and third to develop production and expand trade as greatly and as rapidly as possible—not for their own enrichment but to aid their exiled government in London, and their ally the British Government, in the acquisition of more and ever more foreign exchange with which to help finance essential war purchases in the United States.

The markets for sugar and spices and copra are almost ruined just now, and prices are low, but for oil, for rubber and for tin there is an enormous and increasing demand at top prices. So the Netherlands East Indies are producing oil and rubber and tin at top quotas. Part of the foreign exchange thus earned is spent in the United States for American-made airplanes, tanks, anti-aircraft guns, ammunition and other war

necessities for the islands themselves, and the remainder is regularly remitted to London.

Let there be no doubt or minimizing of the determination to surrender only useless ruins if the Japanese do land. The bombs and dynamite charges are already planted, and the switches are ready to throw.

The Japanese covet oil and refineries that can make high octane gasoline for airplanes. Borneo has oil in plenty, and at the harbor town of Balik Papan there are gigantic refineries. But if the Japanese seem about to effect a successful landing on Borneo, then Balik Papan will go up with a roar that will be heard clear across the Straits of Macassar. There will be no docks left at which Japanese ships could tie up. The refineries will be smoldering ruins. The pipe lines into the interior, some of them seventy miles in length, will have been destroyed at more than a score of key places. The oil wells themselves will have been dynamited and will be either flaming beacons against the blue of the Borneo skies or hopelessly choked to great depths.

There is nothing haphazard in these plans for destruction. Everything has been carefully mapped out by competent engineers, and the universal slogan is: "Assure such a degree of ruin that an invader will have neither produce nor profit for at least two years ahead."

On the island of Java the port facilities, all electric power plants, the railways, dams at reservoirs, telephone exchanges, bridges and highways will be dynamited, as will the naval base at Sourabaya. On the smaller islands off the southern coast of Sumatra the rich tin mines will be dynamited and flooded, and on Sumatra itself there will be wreckage of the oil wells and reduction plants precisely as there will be on Borneo.

This policy of destruction has been adopted with a two-

fold purpose: first to make the Japanese realize that a conquest of the Netherlands East Indies will be neither militarily nor economically profitable for a long time, and second to make certain that if Japan should succeed in effecting landings and capturing any of the islands, there will be no products necessary to the prosecution of war which could possibly reach Germany. For at the moment Germany is the main and hated enemy of the Dutch of the Indies; for Italy they have contempt, and for Japan a profound distrust and a deep dislike because Tokyo has joined the Rome-Berlin Axis and subscribes to the policies that have brought ruin and chaos to Holland and to much of the continent of Europe.

This dislike and distrust of Japan finds striking expression in the newspapers of the Dutch East Indies, and this is particularly significant in view of the fact that local censorship there is even more strict than it is at Singapore. For instance, in late November of 1940, just after Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham had reached Singapore with the title of Commander in Chief of all British forces in the Far East, the *Algemeen Indisch Dagblad* declared editorially:

It is impossible that we could be neutral in the conflict, which may spread to this part of the world at any time, as a direct result of the tripartite pact. . . . We survive or die with the British Empire, and the battle of England is our battle, in Europe as well as here and everywhere in the world. . . . The thorough preparation of good co-ordination would be a better warrant for our safety than a sterile neutrality policy based on promises, which, according to the lessons of a very recent past, aim especially to prevent efficient co-ordination with our present and future allies.

By "future allies," it is then explained, is meant the United States.

The *Sourabaya Handelsblad* takes the same tone and insists

that if any British territory is attacked in the Far East or the South Seas, the Netherlands East Indies will have to help at once, and that American naval aid will doubtless be forthcoming immediately. The newspaper points out that such joint action would be dictated by common sense and the desire for survival. The Sourabaya newspaper then continues:

Britain and America have to be prepared for eventualities, and this means staff conversations, by means of which we safeguard our own safety. In the present world of power politics, aggression cannot be withheld by moral considerations. . . . If anything should happen here and co-operation not already exist, our position would be weaker. In fact, the possibility of aggression would then be greater. . . . In Europe country after country was lost by the motto, "We are quite safe if we keep quiet." For heaven's sake, let us take warning from the past.

While they continue to hope for powerful and openly declared allies like the United States and Britain, the Netherlands East Indies are doing much more than preparing to destroy the riches of their island empire if the Japanese land. They are planning and training and working day and night to perfect their very extensive defense plans, and the opening of 1941 found those plans progressing so rapidly that confidence was growing fast.

These Dutch islands are truly an empire in extent and in population. The combined land and sea area is about the size of the continental area of the United States and extends far both north and south of the equator. The total population is about 63,000,000 people, of whom about 43,000,000 live on the island of Java alone. Sumatra, which is seven times as large as Java, is the world's fifth largest island and has a population of 9,000,000. The group includes half of Guinea, the world's third largest island, four-fifths of Borneo, the fourth largest island in the world, and all of Celebes. Then

there is, of course, Bali, famed in song and story—and unjustly a stirring fable in the minds of the lecherous.

The word "island," to most Americans, suggests a body of land rather unimportant in size. But Java, with its 43,000,000 people, is almost as large as New York State, and Sumatra is seven times as large as Java. The collective land area of all the islands of the Netherlands East Indies is, in fact, nearly three times that of the state of Texas.

The sea distances are as amazing as the land areas. Singapore is nearly opposite and just east of the middle of the island of Sumatra, but from Singapore to Batavia, on the northwest coast of Java, the distance by ship is 525 miles. From Batavia to Macassar, on the Island of Celebes is 769 miles. From Macassar to Balik Papan on Borneo, "just across the Straits," the distance in a straight line is 318 miles. From Balik Papan to Manila, the route leading through the Macassar Straits and across the Sulu Sea, the distance is 1,114 miles. And night and day during that trip there is scarcely a single hour when picturesque and fertile islands are not in sight on either side of the ship.

When possible naval co-operation between Britain, the United States and the Netherlands is under contemplation, it must be remembered that from Manila to Singapore, by the most direct route, the distance is 1,375 miles, from Hongkong to Singapore 1,440 miles, with the Japanese-held Spratley and Hainan Islands lying across the route. From Shanghai to Singapore the sea lane is 2,213 miles in length, whereas the nonstop route from Shanghai to Manila is 1,132 miles long.

In terms of American geography the distance from Batavia to Macassar is about equal to the airline flight from New York to Atlanta, Georgia, while the distance from Balik Papan to Manila is almost precisely that between Richmond, Virginia, and Hastings, Nebraska. No wonder the Netherlands East Indies ranks as an Empire.

Since any invading enemy must approach by sea, the Dutch of the Indies put particular stress upon the value of their air force. Daily now, at dawn and just before dusk, scores of scouting planes set out from the different islands and cruise as far as 400 miles out to sea. The planes operate in pairs and fly low for an inspection of every ship encountered in the waters surrounding the Indies. Under this system it is impossible for enemy warships or transports to approach close enough to make a night dash and a surprise attack at dawn on any of the islands.

How many bombers, scouting and pursuit planes has the Batavia Government at its immediate disposal? As usual, in these times, the exact number is an official secret, but the air force is admittedly in excess of 500 planes, exclusive of those being used for training. New pilots are being trained daily at half a dozen military and naval airfields, and every ship that arrives from Europe brings more and more trained Dutch pilots who escaped to England when Holland was overrun by the German Army.

Early in 1940 the Dutch Parliament finally yielded to long persuasion and appropriated ample funds to construct new cruisers, submarines and destroyers for the Dutch East Indies fleet, but the invasion of Holland halted the realization of this plan. Accordingly the islands are admittedly short of adequate naval forces, but have enough light cruisers, submarines, destroyers and small, swift torpedo craft to seriously harass any naval attacking force or fleet of transports. All harbors are well mined, and nearly every ship arriving from the United States increases the number of available anti-aircraft and shore defense batteries.

At Balik Papan, Borneo's great oil port, the mine fields extend miles out to sea, and every vessel entering and leaving the harbor is preceded by a minesweeper with spread paravanes. As an added precaution against surprise, this port is

closed except for the hours between six in the morning and three in the afternoon.

The main naval base of the East Indies is at Sourabaya, which could become a valuable and strategically important auxiliary to either Singapore or Manila. Here, as at other key points of defense, there are great underground workshops in shelters believed to be proof against even direct hits by heavy high explosive bombs.

Everywhere in the East Indies air-raid shelters have already been provided. On Java alone, it is estimated, fully 20,000,000 of the population would be in adequate shelters within one hour after the first alarm had sounded at the most remote outpost. These alarms will be transmitted from district to district by radio, by telephone, by the booming of coastal guns, by heliograph in daytime and by light signals and even by primitive beacon fires at night.

The air-raid shelters run all the way from elaborate steel and concrete structures to caves in the hills, and on down to mere deep trenches in the country districts. These deep trenches are lined with upright bamboo stalks driven deep into the ground, to prevent casualties from caveins resulting from nearby explosions. All parks and the grounds of every schoolhouse in Batavia and the other large cities have spacious, well-ventilated shelters, and behind every office building or business block is a shelter large enough to accommodate all tenants. Hotels have also constructed shelters large enough to afford refuge to a maximum number of guests and the entire staffs of servants.

These preparedness measures differ sharply and creditably from the lack of air-raid precautions in Hongkong, Singapore and Manila. Hongkong began work on its first shelters late in October, 1940, Singapore was still discussing the problem in December, and Manila, at the end of the year, had not even formulated any plans.

Practically all the Dutch and most of the other white men in the East Indies, except those over age, are in one branch or another of the defense forces. There are also large and growing military organizations of the numerous Euro-Asian inhabitants, and native contingents are said to be shaping up excellently. Rifles, however, are urgently needed. In December, 1940, on Java alone nearly 40,000 Dutch were training with broomsticks instead of with guns.

Even those men engaged in "essential occupations," or who for other reasons are not in the full-time defense forces, are now required by law to be in training camps for one week out of every five. This has occasioned considerable dislocation in industry and in the professions, but employers do not grumble at having to pay full wages or salaries while their employees are learning to become effective citizen soldiers.

If Germany has had any hopes that a rebellion in the Netherlands East Indies might bankrupt Queen Wilhelmina's refugee government, or curtail the output of tin, rubber and other war essentials for England and for the factories of the United States, those hopes might as well be abandoned. The Malays are not even restless, and the former Nationalist movement, which never aimed at much more than a greater degree of racial equality, is entirely abandoned for the time being.

The religious factor is important in these days of peril. Fully 50,000,000 of the inhabitants of the islands are devout Mohammedans, and daily in the thousands of mosques the hadjis preach to the natives the warning that if Japan ever becomes master of the archipelago the Malays will all be reduced to the level of coolies working long hours for harsh and arrogant masters.

Dutch colonial administration has often been sharply criticized, and for decades it has been charged that the main aim of the Netherlands was to keep its subject peoples well fed but ignorant. Fortunately for the meeting of today's crisis,

the Dutch colonial policy has become more and more considerate and benevolent during the last half century, and today Batavia is not being forced to meet problems like those the British administration of India is vainly seeking to bring to solution.

Curiously, however, coincident with the growth of the East Indies' loyalty to the Crown, and with the amazing development of the war effort of the people of the islands, there has also grown up a determination that at the close of the war this great colonial empire must have a "new deal" of its own. This determination is most widely shared by the Dutch of the islands and by those of part Dutch blood. They want to be graciously given something akin to the Dominion status that holds the British Empire together, and they confidently expect to get it without a struggle.

The rise into existence of what is now thinking and acting like an independent nation, in the vast area covered by the Netherlands East Indies, is an event of prime importance in the whole political make-up of the Far East. These islands, hitherto an exploited colonial empire, are being formed by events into an important self-contained unit with political and economic policies of their own. They are not leaning primarily upon strong neighbors but are resolutely arming themselves. Their leaders love liberty and are determined to defend this new-found unity and existence at all costs. If the sentimental tie to the Crown and to the motherland is not jeopardized by stingy shortsightedness of Holland's political leaders at the war's end, Holland will ultimately be greatly strengthened, both in Europe and in the Far East, by this development.

For several decades there has been a growing realization, in the Netherlands East Indies, that the islands, with a land area of more than 733,000 square miles, had for three centuries been drained systematically of practically all the wealth pro-

duced from year to year. Much of this went to about fifteen great corporations, with headquarters in Holland, or directly to the Dutch Government or to the private purse of the Crown. This continuous depletion of earned wealth was, as a rule, actually leaving less than a sound subsistence residue in the islands themselves, and the native scale of living had actually been declining. Originally the natives are said to have had only three desires—not too much work, plenty of rice and plenty of fish. Rising prices and new desires created by the gradual spread of education had made more and more work progressively necessary, and then gradually the quality and quantity of what that work would buy had begun to decrease.

When Holland was overwhelmed in May of 1940, the Indies soon came to a bitter and somewhat resentful realization that they had not been able to retain enough of their produced wealth to provide for decent self-protection, and that the home Government had been shortsightedly negligent and dilatory in dealing with the prime problems of imperial defense.

Dissatisfaction with the past has done nothing to mar present or future loyalty, but most of the Dutch officials sent out from Holland, as well as an overwhelming majority of the Dutch born in the East Indies, openly declare that when the war in Europe comes to an end they must be given a semi-independent dominion status with a determining voice in their own foreign relations, fiscal and economic policies and defense measures. No longer will Holland, with only 13,000 square miles of territory and a pre-war population of a little less than 8,500,000, be permitted the selfish exploitation of the East Indies with their 63,000,000 people scattered over a rich area of 733,000 square miles.

At present, millions of people in the East Indies wear little buttons carrying the slogan "Holland Shall Arise!" and the

islands are unhesitatingly pouring out their riches for the benefit of the exiled Dutch Government and for the aid of England. Decisions on matters of policy are courteously referred to Queen Wilhelmina's Cabinet in London, but the recommendations from London are not always followed to the letter.

Except in one particular there is no spirit of defiance or rebellion manifested; if London's recommendations are in a measure disregarded at times, this is because the leaders in the East Indies feel that they are better informed on Far East problems, and therefore better fitted to decide wisely than are the far-off Cabinet members.

The one issue over which Batavia will openly defy the Queen's government is that of appeasement toward Japan. In Batavia it is feared that some cautious members of the Government living in exile in England would rather yield to Japan's economic demands than to run the risk of hostilities that might deplete the riches of the Indies and curtail production and dividends for years. Those far-off Government members look to the wealth of the Indies to pay, in large measure, for the rehabilitation of Holland after the war. They do not want the oil wells dynamited, for instance.

But Batavia is grimly determined that Japan shall not gain a dangerous economic foothold in the islands, and above all that Japan shall not force any trade agreements that would give Japanese importers of East Indian products any surpluses of oil, tin, rubber, sugar or other commodities to re-export to Germany.

At the opening of 1941 the Netherlands East Indies braced themselves to meet new and increased Japanese pressure. The Kobayashi economic mission, which negotiated in Batavia for several months late in 1940 for special trade agreements, had admittedly achieved results bitterly disappointing to Tokyo. Most of the mission went home to Japan, the personnel was

revised and strengthened and Kobayashi himself was supplanted by Kenkichi Yoshizawa, former Minister to China, former holder of several Cabinet posts in Tokyo and the man who initially presented Japan's case over Manchuria before the League of Nations in Geneva.

Yoshizawa and the reorganized mission returned to Batavia during the Christmas-New Year holiday period at the end of 1940, bringing with them a written agenda which the Dutch had not seen. It was known, however, that the Japanese intended to insist upon reopening the question of Japanese purchases of oil and oil products, regarding which Kobayashi had signed an agreement that highly displeased the Japanese Army and Navy.

The Netherlands East Indies Government produces no oil. Dutch, American and British companies operate in the islands under separate concessions and pay the Government royalties based upon production. Those concessions give the Government the right to take part or all of the production only in case of "extreme national emergency," so that unless such an emergency were declared to exist as a result of Japanese pressure and threats, Batavia could not actually sell Tokyo any oil.

The leaders at Batavia have made it known, however, that if Japan exerts intolerable pressure or resorts to threats of direct action, the Dutch will break off negotiations and make the whole issue and the details of the negotiations public to the world, and this action will surely be taken regardless of the feelings or opinions of the "appeasers" in Queen Wilhelmina's Cabinet in London. Japan knows this, and may tread cautiously, but Japan's Army and Navy are in acute need of much oil, and particularly of high octane aviation gasoline.

In the past, Japan's annual purchases of oil and oil products from the islands have averaged about 494,000 tons. When negotiations were opened in the autumn of 1940, the Japanese original demands were for about 4,000,000 tons a year, to

be made up largely of high octane gasoline and of aviation crude oil.

The various companies operating in the East Indies proved to the Batavia Government that they were unable to make such deliveries. They showed contracts giving the Straits Settlements, India, Australia, South Africa and New Zealand the first right of acceptance of their maximum possible tonnage of these commodities. Japan was enraged, suspected she had been outsmarted, but could do nothing. In the end an agreement was made under which the Batavia Government pledges itself to "make available for Japanese purchase" annually for the next five years an average of 1,800,000 tons of ordinary crude oil, kerosene, paraffin, a small quantity of ordinary gasoline and other oil products. These are not what Japan wants and must have.

H. J. Van Mook, who is nicknamed "the strong man of the Indies," heads the Dutch negotiators. He was formerly Director of Economic Affairs for the Netherlands East Indies, but was raised to Ministerial rank as Minister of Economic Affairs when the Japanese insisted they would not negotiate with anyone of lesser rank than Mr. Kobayashi, who is a member of Prince Konoye's Cabinet.

Japan does not like Mr. Van Mook. She blames him for having included in the oil agreement of late 1940 irksome provisions under which Japan must call for the oil with her own tankers and must pay for the oil with good American dollars—depreciated Japanese yen not to be accepted at any rate of exchange.

It is of the highest significance that when it was announced negotiations with Japan would be continued, an official Government statement was issued at Batavia, saying in part: "The closest watch will be given to the possibility of direct or indirect advantages accruing to an enemy of the Netherlands. . . . The Government wholly and absolutely refutes the par-

ticipation of another power in our own affairs in the Netherlands East Indies. . . . The Government rejects the world economy that would enclose the Netherlands East Indies in a so-called Asiatic bloc."

Of all European peoples, the stolid Dutch, who are making such a valiant stand, seem most misplaced against the background of these beautiful and still untamed tropical islands. Even on overpopulated Java there are still huge tracts of jungle. Large portions of Borneo, Sumatra, Celebes and Guinea have never been explored. Savage life, beast and human, persists unchanged over enormous areas. A few years ago a Dutch explorer crossed Borneo on foot from east to west; the journey took him eighteen months.

The Netherlands East Indies are not a white man's setting. Travel across those equatorial seas is called "romantic." Well, maybe so, but night and day there is always thunder muttering in the distance; by day the sea and the land are spotted with splashes of vivid sunshine, and between those splashes low-hanging black clouds pour torrential rains over limited areas. At night there is always lightning flickering in the sky, and in many places the glow from live volcanic peaks vies in splendor with the electrical displays. Nearly always, when land is sighted, a jungle fire can be seen reddening the side of a mountain and spreading its unmistakable acrid odor far over the sea. At night, when the black ocean breaks into a foam-crested wave, phosphorus gleams as though a giant had sowed the sea with a handful of evanescent stars.

The clearings of the plantations, the narrow aisles through which the pipe lines for oil run to the sea, the hacked-out areas where men mine for tin or gold or less precious metals all must fight the encroaching jungle without pause for rest. And in that jungle wild elephants roam in destructive herds; many plantations are fenced with a score of strands of highly

charged electric wire and outside the fencing are wide deep moats—but still the herds break through.

Tigers and leopards are common, and so are the dreaded wild carabao. Twenty-foot pythons excite no comment; those thirty feet long are relatively rare. Cobras abound in the jungles, and orangutans are so plentiful that many households have captured young ones for pets to play with their children. Saber-toothed crocodiles infest the quieter lower reaches of the dark-watered rivers draining from the mountains and the jungles.

Human head hunters still live in palmleaf shacks in the more inaccessible portions of some of the islands, and even in the towns and on the plantations it is still common for enraged Malays to run amok and slash and kill with dagger and with sword.

Strange and distant, these Netherlands East Indies. In 1939 news from there would scarcely have been put on the first page of any American newspaper unless there had been a particularly spectacular and destructive volcanic eruption, or unless a typhoon had wrecked an American ship.

And yet, in 1940, our Secretary of State sternly warns Japan and the rest of the world that the United States will tolerate no change in the status quo of these islands. Japan, on her part, says she wishes to have the status quo maintained, but no one believes her, and then international tension is heightened.

Actually the Japanese declaration preceded that from Washington by about forty-eight hours. Japan spoke up as soon as the German armies occupied Holland, and the Japanese attitude was undoubtedly dictated by baseless rumors that the Netherlands East Indies intended to ask the United States or Great Britain, or both, to assume protection of the islands for the duration of the war. It was decidedly not to Japan's interest to have the East Indies guaranteed protection by any

nation with a powerful navy. Germany complicated the position by announcing that it was not interested in the political status of the Dutch possessions in the East Indies. The radical faction of the Japanese Army promptly interpreted this declaration as a generous act by which Berlin gave Tokyo a blank check against the Far East colonial possessions of the European democracies.

“Let us show our appreciation by joining the Berlin-Rome axis,” shouted the Japanese demagogues—and the formal joining took place late the following September. The Cabinet of Admiral Yonai, which objected to joining the Axis, was turned out of office, and when Prince Konoye became Premier for a second time the extremists had their own way.

Japan now takes the attitude that since the United States has embargoed the shipment of many war essentials, it is only natural for her to insist upon obtaining substitutes from the Netherlands East Indies. Any opposition to this program is held “an act hostile to the Japanese Empire.” But the United States looks to the East Indies and to Malaya for rubber and tin and will tolerate no developments in those areas that would jeopardize obtaining adequate supplies of those commodities.

Foreign Minister Matsuoka continues to announce periodically from Tokyo that Japan has no ambitions in the Netherlands East Indies except to share in the economic development of the islands. Batavia frankly disbelieves him and continues to extend its mine fields and to strengthen its shore defenses around Balik Papan. For strategists believe that if Japan attempts an invasion, this great oil port on the eastern coast of Borneo will be the first place subjected to attack.

It is strange, say the Dutch, if Japan has only economic ambitions, why so-called Japanese “fishing boats” continue persistently to penetrate the closed waters along the east coast of Borneo. And why are the “fishing boats” of a Power desiring only economic co-operation nearly always well

equipped with fathometers, cameras, photographic dark rooms, map-making and charting devices and particularly high-powered engines?

The Dutch know about this sort of equipment, for they have captured and confiscated nearly two score such craft between the conquest of Holland in May of 1940 and the beginning of 1941. The crews have been tried and sentenced to long terms of imprisonment and are now in jails or concentration camps on the island of Java. It is significant that Tokyo makes no protests over these seizures and convictions.

In view of all these facts and conditions, the leaders in the Dutch East Indies ask why a formal Anglo-American-Netherlands pact cannot be concluded as a reply to Japan's formal joining of the Rome-Berlin Axis last September.

"Why," they ask, "should Japan be permitted to openly join the enemies of the world's democracies without being given an appropriate reply by the framing of a new tripartite pact concerning the East Indies, the Philippines, and Singapore and Malaya?"

Some people reply that the United States never enters into alliances. Others say that such a pact would change the status quo of the Netherlands East Indies and give Japan a plausible excuse for an attack.

"Well," the Dutch retort, stubbornly and a shade wistfully perhaps, "if we can't have an alliance, what about just a simple understanding?"

10.

ONE IMMEDIATE PROBLEM

JUST a glance at the map will show that Japan, regardless of the extent of her possible conquests in the south, will never feel secure so long as the United States has a foothold in the Philippine Islands. Tokyo may deny as often and as loudly as possible any "intentions" toward these islands, but it is manifest that unless she can grab the Philippines, whatever position she may attain in French Indo-China, in Siam, in the East Indies, will always be menaced by the possibility of a flanking movement if the United States fleet has a base at Manila.

Strangely enough the Filipinos today do not seem to realize this obvious fact. When the course of Japanese aggression had penetrated as far southward as Canton and Hainan Island the Filipinos became greatly alarmed, and for a time their desire for independence was clouded by uncertainty and misgivings. But this phase has definitely passed.

"Independence won't come until 1946," they say in Manila now, with lazy indifference. "The war will not last that long,

and if the world is at peace by 1946, then freedom will bring us no dangers. Anyway, if conditions are still unsettled then, we can change our minds at the last minute."

The strange part of this attitude is that they do not definitely envision a 1946 world changed by the complete defeat of the Axis Powers, nor do they envision what an Axis victory would imply for them by that time. No voices are raised to warn the Filipinos that Japanese domination would mean degrading the Filipino people to the level of service and of subsistence of coolies, as are the voices that warn the Mohammedan Malays in the mosques of the Netherlands East Indies.

A "re-examination" of the Philippine independence problem is possible at any time, and indeed specified for not later than 1944 under the Tydings-McDuffie Law, which makes the grant of independence and which established the present Commonwealth status, but so far there is no sign of an intelligent crystallization of opinion as to the lines along which re-examination will proceed.

If, by 1946, Japan still holds Hainan Island, the Spratleys and a dominant position in Indo-China, will the Filipinos dare to take independence? If all three Axis Powers have been decisively beaten before that year, will the Philippines be able to afford independence in an economic sense? The present policy of playing for political expediency and letting tomorrow take care of itself is as astounding as it is dismaying.

A more immediate problem is being faced in the same manner—or rather not being faced at all. In Manila there was not, at the end of 1940, a single air-raid shelter—and yet the situation was held so disquieting that in October all wives and families of American naval and Marine officers and personnel were sent to the American mainland for safety.

President Quezon is credited with having said that if Japanese airplanes should bomb Manila, "the Filipinos will take to

the hills, and what will be destroyed will be principally American property."

Take to the hills? And live on what? Manila and its vicinity rely upon heavy imports of foods. Would an enemy air force leave the roads and bridges undamaged, or would each Filipino sit under a coconut tree and live on coconut meat and milk?

Manila, with its narrow, winding streets, would be a particularly dangerous spot at the time of an air raid, and the old Walled City would be a death trap. This old walled area is about twenty-two acres in extent and today is inhabited by about 22,000 people. The streets are so narrow that in many places two automobiles can scarcely pass. There are seven gates, and in several places approaching the gates the streets feed into a V, pointed outward. Any evening around five o'clock the congestion is so great that it requires ten minutes or longer to make a single block of progress.

Half a dozen bombs dropped in this walled area, with resultant wreckage blocking egress and resultant fires leaping from street to street, might easily cause one of the greatest short-time holocausts in the history of warfare. And even in the modern business section of the city the streets are perilously narrow and most of the buildings highly inflammable. Here, too, wreckage and flames would combine to cause tremendous loss of life.

Manila has learned nothing from the lessons of Chungking. An intensive air raid upon the Philippine capital would probably have results as ghastly as some of the earlier Japanese raids upon the wartime capital of China. And raids are not advertised sufficiently in advance to give 600,000 people a chance to "take to the hills."

It is probable that the presence of the American Asiatic fleet at Manila has given the people of that city a mistaken

confidence and feeling of security. There is here no intention to disparage the fleet—but there is not enough of it. Even such able men as Admiral T. C. Hart, his officers and the seamen on the ships cannot accomplish miracles. The fleet in early 1941 consisted of the cruiser *Houston*, the flagship, about 10,000 tons; the light cruiser *Marblehead* and her sister ship the *Cincinnati* (the latter arrived only in December), each of about 7,000 tons; some destroyers; and some submarines. The nearest American naval reinforcements were then around Hawaii, more than 4,700 miles to the northeast, and with the direct route flanked by islands held by the Japanese. The number of American naval and military planes in the Philippines was officially said to be "more than 100."

The arrival of the *Cincinnati* in Manila perturbed Japan, but that light cruiser returned to Hawaii in January after unloading airplane parts for the Philippines.

Manila would not be attacked directly from the sea, or so say the strategists. But an enemy—in this case hypothetically the Japanese—could make a surprise landing on the east coast of Mindanao, at or near Isabella, which is only about eighty air-line miles from Manila, long before naval aid could come from Honolulu. What about the "more than 100" American planes? Well, Japan has more than 5,000 planes available, and if she sent down 500 by carrier, the odds would certainly be unpleasant. From an air base at Isabella, or on the island near Isabella, Manila could be made uninhabitable, and our Asiatic fleet could theoretically be raided if it were still in Manila Bay.

The prospect is not a pretty one. It may be argued, of course, that it is based upon "supposing the worst." Well, why not? Holland, Belgium and France refused to suppose the worst, and look at them today. In times of war it is not enough for even neutrals to merely prepare by training men and manufacturing material. If they would preserve their

neutrality, their existence even, they must "suppose the worst" and take appropriate measures. These measures are not being taken in the Philippines today.

But what about Corregidor? What about the United States Army in the Philippines; what about the Filipino defense force being raised and organized and drilled under the plan formulated by Major General Douglas MacArthur?

Corregidor is a fortress. However formidable it may have been made by the secret activities of the last year, it is still immovable, like Gibraltar. If it is strong enough it can insure sanctuary from naval attack to naval or other vessels in Manila Bay, but it can guarantee nothing against attack by air.

The United States Army at Fort McKinley and at Stotsenburg? It is efficient, of course, and ably commanded. But officially it is less than 10,000 strong—considerably less. Any-way, any attack upon the Philippines will be initially a naval and an aerial attack, and an army, however large or small, would have to have a network of roads to use and would have to be largely equipped with transport and with mobile artillery. Obviously a force of "less than 10,000" could not have enough equipment of this kind to repel attempted landings in force at several points on a long and exposed shore line.

The Filipino defense force leads to a debatable problem. General MacArthur, who was three times in the Philippine Islands while he was an active officer in the United States Army and who was once chief of staff, says the islands are defensible and that his force can do the defending.

The MacArthur plan envisioned calling up 40,000 Filipinos a year annually for ten years and giving each class about six months' training. Not allowing for deaths and disabilities, this would theoretically have provided a partly trained force of 400,000 men. Incredible as the estimate may seem in these days when billions are being spent for armaments and defense, General MacArthur's original plan stated that the

cost of equipping this force would be about \$8,000,000, and certainly less than \$10,000,000.

The original classes called for training were larger than the 40,000 estimate, but after a lapse of several years (by 1939) the number dropped to around 20,000. "Lack of funds" was the excuse given, but this excuse challenges credulity, for in 1939 the total Philippine budget was around \$45,000,000 and the military appropriation was less than \$1,000,000. Actually one of the reasons for the slowing down of the program was probably the lack of officers and non-commissioned officers, for the proposed "West Point of the Philippines" was slow in getting really under way.

But in midsummer of 1939 General MacArthur still insisted that the Philippines could be adequately defended under his plans, and in December of 1940 his faith was still apparently unshaken. In February, 1940, Mr. Francis B. Sayre, the American High Commissioner, suggested that not even the United States could successfully defend the archipelago, and the next month President Quezon gave evidence of shaken faith when he said that not even if every citizen of the islands were armed and trained could a powerful invader be repelled.

General MacArthur's 1939 statement declared, with reference to a possible Japanese invasion, that "the battle would have to be brought to these shores, so that the full strength of the enemy would be relatively vitiated by the vicissitudes of an overseas expedition. . . . In any event, it would cost the enemy, in my opinion, at least a half million of men as casualties, and upwards of five billions of dollars in money to pursue such an adventure with any hope of success."

Other military men disputed this whole point of view, and in opposition they cited the Japanese landings in China, the capture of Nanking, the advance 600 miles up the Yangtsze River to and beyond Hankow and the capture of Canton. The

Chinese armies that were in opposition were, of course, greatly larger than the proposed 400,000 Filipino defense force, had known more than the proposed six months' training, and were equipped with arms, artillery and other war supplies costing many, many times the \$8,000,000 that was supposed to completely equip the Filipino defense forces.

Long before the better-trained and -equipped Chinese armies had inflicted 500,000 casualties upon the Japanese, the invaders had killed three times that many Chinese and had successfully occupied areas in China several times larger than all the Philippine Islands lumped together.

To a person who witnessed much fighting in China the suggestion that 400,000 half-trained and ill-equipped Filipinos could successfully combat an invasion by Japanese, who would land under the fire of naval guns and advance under the protection of fleets of bombers, brings a shudder. It recalls the description given by Mussolini's most unpleasant son, who wrote of bombing Abyssinian troops that when the missiles exploded, Haile Selassie's army "exploded like a flowering rose."

For years some of our own Army and Navy men have believed and repeatedly publicly declared that the Philippines constitute a serious strategic weakness. For the sake of our safety we have been urged to shorten our defenses to the Panama-Hawaii-Alaska line. Those who argue this way have been aided by the section of the American public who held that the Filipinos had not a single real grievance against American rule but had persisted for years in making the independence question a profound political nuisance. Sugar and other interests, naturally disliking the admittance free of duty of competing Philippine products, have cleverly backed these arguments with subtle propaganda. Some have even professed to believe Tokyo's protestations that Japan wouldn't have the islands as a gift if they were offered to her.

But Japan's southward advances, her enlargement of the "New Order in East Asia" to the "New Order in Greater East Asia," have changed the conditions and prospects. The moral sense of the world has been stirred anew by the atrocious actions of the grabbing Powers. A few years ago we might have turned the Filipinos loose with a shrug and with the cynical remark that they'd been yelling for independence long enough, now let them fend for themselves.

Now we should think twice before withdrawing our protection. And the Filipinos themselves should think twice before they talk of relinquishing their independence program. If they want to remain under our flag, they must do so under conditions of permanence and stability and not merely make expedient use of sheltering behind our strength until quieter international conditions seem to favor a renewal of political agitation. A decade from now we will want no renewal of agitation and speech-making, largely for the sake of vote-getting in the islands themselves.

When we purchased the islands from Spain the total population was about 6,000,000—largely illiterates. We have eradicated the plagues that made the death rate appallingly high. Cholera, smallpox, bubonic plague and typhoid fever annually took a shocking number of lives. In Manila, when we took over, the infant-mortality rate was around 800 per 1,000 living births. When the Commonwealth was inaugurated this was down to less than 55 per 1,000. Today, as a consequence of these changes, the population of the islands is around 16,000,000, and literacy is the rule rather than the exception, even in remote rural and mountain districts. The living standard in the islands, according to Dwight F. Davis, when he was Governor-General in 1931, was 300 per cent higher than in any neighboring Asiatic land, and the standard has been raised rather than lowered since that estimate was made.

But if we get out of the Philippines—whether to shorten our

Pacific defense salient, to comply with the clamor of Filipino politicos or to please our sugar barons and allied interests—there will be an immediate and sharp recession of this standard of living.

The Philippines cannot have their independence and also have tariff-free access to our markets at the same time. We now buy 850,000 tons of Philippine sugar annually; if that pays the duty of foreign sugar, the livelihood of about 2,000,000 Filipinos will be directly and indirectly involved. The same considerations apply to copra and coconut oil, upon which 4,000,000 are dependent, to hemp, to tobacco, to several minerals—in short to everything we buy from the islands. True, Japan once grandiloquently announced that she would buy the entire Filipino sugar output if we levied tariff duties against it, but Japan is one of the world's smallest sugar consumers and already draws a large supply from the island of Formosa, which she owns, and can get the rest from Java more cheaply than she can from the Philippines.

During the last fifteen years the United States has never bought less than 75 per cent of Philippine exports, and in one year the record ran as high as 86 per cent. The profound dislocation of the economic life of the islands that independence would bring about staggers the imagination. How could they maintain their freedom? How finance even the defense force which General MacArthur envisages? In five years they would be helpless and bankrupt—or else already overrun by an alien invader known for harshness to conquered peoples.

The war in Europe has already had a depressing effect upon Philippine economy. An annual summary, issued late in December, 1940, by Cornelio Balmaceda, Director of Commerce, shows a prevailing low price level for most products of the islands, and the complete loss of that 10 per cent of the Philippine trade that formerly was carried on with Germany, France, Italy, Denmark, Belgium and Holland. Shortage of ships, ris-

ing freight rates, higher insurance rates and exchange controls have also had adverse effects. In 1939 the United States took 81 per cent of Philippine exports; the first ten months of 1940 showed that the United States took 83 per cent of the total; and Mr. Balmaceda expects the proportion to rise higher and higher.

The European war has had a similar effect upon Philippine purchases and imports from the United States. In 1938 the islands took 58 per cent of their imports from us; in 1939 this had risen to 68 per cent; and for the first ten months of 1940 the proportion was up to 78 per cent.

Admittedly the Philippines are an important and profitable market for the United States; but they are not indispensable to us as we are to them. Some optimists insist that by "Independence Year" the world will be at peace and the islands will find an expanding and eager market in Europe, but how a Europe with about 70 per cent of its industries already ruined can pay the Filipinos in cash for their products will probably prove another and a serious problem.

The question of the future of the Philippines is inextricably involved with the question of whether or not our fleet is to have joint use of the great Singapore naval base. If Singapore were at our disposal, our position would at once become very strong.

The close of 1940 found as yet no reply to the question of the United States obtaining more naval stations in the Pacific by some deal similar to that under which we traded Great Britain fifty over-age destroyers for Atlantic bases. If we are to maintain our position in those islands, or pledge ourselves to their defense, such additional bases will be a necessity. But if we are to withdraw from the Philippines in 1946, if we are to cease being an Asiatic Power, such bases might well be only danger points and the causes of useless expense.

11.

OUR PACIFIC BASTION

FROM Manila to Honolulu the sea distance by the shortest, almost straight, line across the Pacific is 4,767 miles, and in a ship averaging fifteen to sixteen knots an hour the trip requires thirteen days and thirteen nights.

But at Hawaii, as in the Philippines, in the East Indies and in Malaya, the great and ever-present questions are: "What will Japan do next?" and "Will we have to fight Japan?"

In Honolulu this general question subdivides into three major questions: "Is our preparedness far enough along?" "What about the tens of thousands of Japanese in Hawaii?" and "How will we feed ourselves if the sea lanes between here and the coast are interrupted?"

What Japan will do next no one knows—probably not even the Japanese leaders themselves at the time this is being written in early 1941. As to whether or not we shall have to fight Japan—in Hawaii at the moment the slogan, the general aim and purpose of feverish preparedness measures, is to become

ready to fight anybody or everybody at the earliest possible date. Nothing is being left undone around Honolulu, and all over the island of Oahu, to make Pearl Harbor an impregnable land fortress to shelter the great naval base; and by the navy itself equally strenuous preparedness measures are being made to make it impossible for any hostile power to approach either the Hawaiian Islands, the West Coast of the United States or the Panama Canal.

The importance and value of Hawaii to the defense of the United States, and to the maintenance of our safety and prestige in the Pacific Ocean and in the Far East, are really almost incalculable. Collectively the total land area of the whole group of islands is only 6,407 square miles. Little New Jersey is 1,717 square miles larger. The population of the Hawaiian Islands according to the last census is only 414,991, and Honolulu, the territorial capital, has only 154,476 people.

But Hawaii in terms of strategy increases the "reach" of our navy by a little more than 2,000 miles. In other words it can operate effectively more than 2,000 miles southward, westward and northward from Pearl Harbor than it could if based on any of our seaports in California, Oregon or Washington. And "reach" to a navy is even more important than it is to a boxer in the ring.

With Pearl Harbor as a center, a circle drawn with a radius of 2,000 miles would have a diameter of 4,000 miles, and in all this huge circle, containing 12,500,000 square miles of water, there is no continental soil nor coastline. That vast area of water is more than four times as large as continental United States (excepting Alaska), and within that area no other power has a sea or land base of any kind.

This position makes Pearl Harbor unique among the naval bases of the world and gives it a place of power unapproached even by Malta or Singapore. Malta and Singapore have had their value sharply reduced by the advent of aviation. Both

could be, and Malta has been many times, bombed by land planes from comparatively nearby mainland bases. If Japan gains coveted airfields in Thailand, for instance, Singapore would be only 400 miles away by direct air line.

It was on May 7th, 1940, that Admiral James O. Richardson, Commander-in-Chief of the U. S. Fleet, announced the decision to "keep the fleet indefinitely in the Hawaiian area for further tactical exercises and training." This news was of immense strategic and political importance. Japan was chagrined and a little bit aghast. England, facing the imminent debacle in the Low Countries and in France, was immensely relieved. The American decision meant at least a respite for Hongkong and Singapore. The East Indies, Australia and New Zealand felt a new sense of security, both as to the safe maintenance of their sea lanes to India and to Britain, and as to possible attack direct from Japan if Germany succeeded in invading England.

Without taking into account 72 auxiliary vessels and 13 mine craft, the United States Navy in the summer of 1940 had the following known total strength:

Battleships	15
Aircraft carriers	5
Heavy cruisers	19
Light cruisers	21
Destroyers	184
Submarines	<u>50</u>
Total	294

Fifty of the destroyers were later traded to England for bases in the Atlantic, but aside from that deal there have been constantly in or near Hawaiian waters since Admiral Richardson's historic announcement the following vessels of our main fleet:

Battleships	12
Aircraft carriers	4
Heavy cruisers	10
Light cruisers	15
Destroyers	70
Submarines	<u>35</u>
Total	146

In other words, out of the 244 main vessels of our navy, after the deal with England was concluded, 146 have been based upon Pearl Harbor. No wonder there has been hesitancy and delay in the development of the "New Order in Greater East Asia" concerning which we have all heard so much.

Pearl Harbor, the great base a few miles from Honolulu, is surrounded by barbed wire, sentries seem to be at all corners, photography is forbidden and great secrecy is maintained about many activities and new developments. Some people call it a "sinister" place. But Rear Admiral Claude C. Bloch, who is commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, and as such commander at the base, says that Pearl Harbor is no more sinister than any ordinary service station—merely vastly larger and infinitely more efficient. The Pearl Harbor establishment is there to fuel and supply the Navy and keep it in perfect repair at any time of the day or night. And these repairs may range all the way from replacing broken ropes or fixing up a hole in a navy plane's wing to doing things to a 16-inch gun that only an expert would understand.

The layman, after a hasty trip through and around the great naval base, is apt to worry over the very obvious fact that there is only one entrance to the great bays and bayous that afford a protected water area of about six square miles for naval use. A very narrow entrance, too. Nearly every civilian asks every naval officer he knows what would happen if some Japanese "Captain Hobson" sank a Japanese ship right

across the harbor entrance, as was done at Santiago, Cuba, during the Spanish-American War. The usual reply is a wise smile and some such remark as: "If the harbor were bottled, the fleet wouldn't be inside."

But the layman wonders if Japanese submarines couldn't approach unseen underwater? Plenty of Japanese crews would volunteer happily for that form of *hari-kiri*. Maybe the answer to the question is that Captain Hobson became the most kissed man in the world after his exploit with the *Merrimac*. And the Japanese think kissing is vulgar.

Anyway, there is only one entrance to Pearl Harbor, and only one narrow entrance to Honolulu Harbor. The project, much talked of twenty-five years ago, of digging a wide, deep canal through the few miles of intervening land to connect the two has apparently been permanently shelved.

On the ships, of course, the important men are those in trim white uniforms. But ashore at Pearl Harbor it is the men in overalls who count, for the harbor itself would be almost useless to the ships of the Navy without the experts ashore who service those ships and keep them fit for sea or for battle.

Geographically and for administrative purposes the Fourteenth Naval District includes not only Pearl Harbor but all of the Hawaiian Islands, Johnston, Palmyra and Midway Islands, and all of their adjacent shoals and atolls, and headquarters for these far-flung and important dots upon the map are at the naval base. U. S. Marines, under Colonel H. K. Pickett, furnish the guards and the police force for the base, but the other personnel on December 31st, 1940, gave a census return of 12,104 persons. These were comprised as follows: 315 officers, 3,568 enlisted personnel, 1,882 dependents of officers and enlisted men, 17 nurses and 6,322 civilian employees.

The rapidity with which the base is being expanded and strengthened is shown clearly in comparative expenditures and appropriations. In 1939 a total of \$14,436,000 was spent

there. In 1940 total expenditures jumped to \$21,412,000, and on December 31st of 1940 there was on hand an unexpended appropriation fund of \$62,518,000, which in 1941 will be laid out for graving docks, industrial shop buildings, a central power plant, quay wall and wharf, naval fuel depot, temporary warehouses, dredging of new and old channels, communication facilities, aviation, housing and recreation buildings. The construction of underground storage fuel tanks will eat up \$5,160,000 of this total.

The Navy also has its own air base at Pearl Harbor, occupying all of Ford Island there. On the island are found a maze of streets and great masses of buildings—hangars, shops, store-houses, armories. There are magnificent runways and a fine large landing field. It is not permitted to publish facts about the number of Navy planes at Ford Island, nor is it permitted to publish the total personnel of the Navy vessels now based upon Pearl Harbor, but it is known that the nucleus of the air force consists of sixty immense long-range bombing patrol planes.

To arrive at Honolulu from the Far East at sunrise, as I did early in January, after thirteen days and nights without having sighted a ship, and having seen only one tiny island of the Japanese-mandated Mariana group, is a pulse-stirring experience.

Dawn was still gray and cold and land not yet in sight when the air about our decks began to throb and out of the low-hanging clouds swooped a huge American naval plane. It circled the ship to establish our identity and nationality, and then sped away and vanished eastward. Three minutes later came a different plane, which repeated the process, and then through the lightening grayness there loomed a battleship and three heavy cruisers heading to the southwest. A misshapen gray lump following the big ships soon became clear in outline and proved to be a giant aircraft carrier.

By this time the sky suddenly flamed into all the colors that make Hawaiian sunrises among the finest in the world, the outline of the island of Oahu became clear, and the air seemed to fill with planes. Six came over in such close formation it seemed the wings must touch and lock at any moment. Then a flight of fifteen more, in lines of three, swooped down out of the north, and a single plane of vivid red high against a patch of blue sky looked like a gigantic flamingo in graceful flight. At one time there were thirty-three planes in the air. How Japanese travelers reaching Honolulu must marvel at this prodigal use of aviation gasoline! For in Japan every gallon is carefully husbanded.

Before we slowed down and began idling about outside Honolulu Harbor, awaiting the health and immigration inspectors, there were nineteen naval vessels in sight, including four submarines, five destroyers and two gray-painted Navy oil tankers. Home again, and proud of it!

The layman might think Pearl Harbor and the great Army posts on the island of Oahu would be easy to attack from any of the other islands of the Hawaiian group, but it will be the function of the Navy to see that no enemy lands on any of the other islands to establish bases from which bombers might fly to attack any of the establishments on Oahu. Indeed, already American air bases are being established on the islands of Maui and Molokai, and the "big island," Hawaii, off to the south, is also to have an important base.

Midway Island, west by north of Honolulu, the first hop on the westward flight of the Clipper planes, would be a fine base if an enemy could capture it, for it is only about 1,200 miles from Pearl Harbor. But already Midway is being heavily fortified. For months work has been under way there upon concrete foundations, and now anti-aircraft guns and coast artillery pieces are being installed with the aid of a whole battalion of Marines.

On January 9th President Roosevelt's defense-budget message asked for more than an additional \$22,000,000 for expenditures on naval defenses for Hawaii, Guam, Midway, Palmyra and Johnston Islands. A new seaplane hangar at Midway will cost \$741,000. Johnston and Palmyra will each have an additional \$168,500 for expanded gasoline storage, and \$5,000,000 will be spent improving the Pearl Harbor channel.

Additional expansion of Navy air operations on Oahu was indicated early in January when naval authorities announced that defense plans would necessitate restrictions of civilian use of air and water surface areas around Kaneohe Bay, on the north shore of the island. Simultaneously the President's message asked for \$773,000 for new seaplane hangars there. Kaneohe Bay is the magnificent stretch of water which all tourists see when they drive to the windswept gap in the mountains back of Honolulu known as The Pali.

The United States Army plays a vital part in the defense of this great bastion of the Pacific which Hawaii has become. At the end of 1940 Army personnel on Oahu numbered more than 30,000, and at that date another 5,000 men were under orders to embark from the mainland and sail to Honolulu.

Whereas Pearl Harbor has been rapidly expanded into the world's strongest and most important naval base, it has been the task of the Army to fortify the island of Oahu so effectively that the task of capturing Pearl Harbor would be prohibitively costly to any enemy naval attack.

Ten years ago a project was afoot to ring Oahu with a vast system of concrete fortifications and pill boxes, similar to the Maginot and Siegfried lines along the frontiers of France and Germany, but this plan was later abandoned in favor of a scheme for elastic and mobile defense. The Army in Hawaii is today largely concentrated in and around Schofield Barracks, on the great plain northwest of Honolulu. The whole command is highly motorized, and a magnificent system of

concrete highways, fine roads and wide trails has been built that would permit immediate and rapid dispatch of men and guns to any and every vulnerable spot on the whole island.

The strategical experts have it that Hawaii now has five lines of defense each of which would have to be eliminated one at a time before the next could be contacted, and that all five would have to be virtually destroyed before Pearl Harbor, Honolulu and Oahu could be captured. These "five lines of defense," in their order of contact with an enemy, are as follows: first, naval aircraft; second, naval surface craft; third, army aircraft; fourth, coast defense artillery; and fifth, infantry of all branches.

Before the outbreak of the European war the Army's total strength in Hawaii was about 20,000 men. This has already been increased by 50 per cent, and when the additional 5,000 men arrive early in 1941 the increase will total 75 per cent.

The Army authorities are naturally chary about giving out a too-detailed breakdown analysis of strength. Even to state the number of officers on the island would give an astute enemy a good basis for intelligent guesses on total strength. But the authorities do permit publication of the fact that such a breakdown would reveal "about" 15,000 infantry at Schofield Barracks, about 6,000 men in the coast artillery at "various points," about 6,000 in the air corps and "about 3,000 in miscellaneous organizations including antiaircraft and other units." In addition to this strength the National Guard of Hawaii placed more than 1,600 men on active duty in 1940; 700 Hawaiian conscripts reported for duty January 1st, 1941, and an additional 700 will report July 1st.

There is an understandable and purposeful vagueness about Army discussions of the strength of coast defenses, but it is readily admitted that there are at least four 16-inch guns on the island, and "about a dozen batteries, of from two to four guns each, of 12- and 14-inch artillery."

In addition, they concede, there are "approximately" 20 batteries, of from two to four guns to the battery, of 6- and 8-inch coast artillery, "several" batteries of four guns each of "less than 6-inch caliber," and a very large number of 155 mm. rifles.

Forts de Russy and Ruger, guarding Honolulu from the shoulders of Diamond Head, have heavy guns, as do the three forts guarding Pearl Harbor and its entrances—Forts Kamehameha, Barrette and Weaver. The Sixty-fourth Coast Artillery, stationed at Fort Shafter, has anti-aircraft guns, machine guns and giant searchlights of 800,000,000 candlepower. Other searchlight stations behind Honolulu blaze for a score of miles across the seas, as night coast artillery practice reveals to every excited observer.

Diamond Head, which juts out beyond famous Waikiki Beach and is a favorite landmark for seamen and tourists, is not a cliff, as it appears to be from the west, but is really a gigantic volcanic bowl, is strictly prohibited to all persons except those having military business of first-rate importance and is often called a "second Gibraltar." It is popularly supposed to contain enormous mortars capable of belching huge shells far out to sea.

Of course this impressive military establishment is costly; in 1940 Army expenditures in Hawaii, exclusive of new construction, cost \$32,333,000, which was an increase of \$9,528,000 over the 1939 outlay. An additional \$5,000,000 was allotted to Army construction demands in 1940; and of the \$32,333,000 payrolls for officers, enlisted men and civilians used up a little more than \$15,800,000.

Most spectacular of the Army's expansion achievements in Hawaii during 1940 has been the growth of the air force and the building up and enlargement of Hickam Field, which directly adjoins the Pearl Harbor base on the side towards Honolulu and immediately inland from Fort Kamehameha.

A year before, the gigantic barracks erected at Hickam Field was one of the wonders of military housing. With wings and a continuous series of H-shaped additions, it accommodates 3,500 men under one roof, and the structure is only three stories in height. It is so large that it is a common jest that airmen who have inside day duty never get out into the sunlight and are as pale as office workers instead of being ruddy and bronzed as are most soldiers in the tropics.

The number of planes now located at Hickam Field is not revealed, nor is anyone telling what the total strength of land planes will be when it is completed. But it is an open secret that contracts have been let and construction is under way to house a total of more than 13,000 officers and men of the air corps there, of whom more than 2,700 will be flying officers.

The installation at Hickam Field is already overwhelming to an outside observer. Guides casually mention such figures as expecting at a date early in 1941 the arrival of 255 more bombers. "Of which 60 will be Flying Fortresses." Hickam Field, in addition to the planes at Ford Island, the new installations on Maui and Molokai Islands, at Hilo, on the island of Hawaii, not to mention the work under way at Midway Island, gives a comforting assurance that, in spite of delays and bottlenecks, preparedness is becoming an accomplished fact and not merely a plan and an aspiration.

Still, Japan is known to have more than 5,000 planes constantly on active duty.

Presumably Hawaii already has adequate supplies of bombs, shells, torpedoes, machine-gun and rifle ammunition, flares and all other kinds of munitions that might be needed in time of war. At least if the Navy or Army authorities worry about that kind of supplies they keep their worries strictly to themselves. Oil and aviation and motor transport fuels are also apparently amply stocked.

But when it comes to food supplies for the military and civilian populations there is worry in plenty. One committee, after careful study, found late in 1940 that there existed in the islands only a twenty-four-day complete supply of all essential foodstuffs, but other estimates are less pessimistic and place existing reserves at sufficient for from two to three months.

Although Navy authorities say it is almost impossible to imagine a situation arising under which convoys of foodships from the mainland to Hawaii could be entirely prevented, the Navy nevertheless openly favors increased storage of supplies. In case of open warfare, they say, losses from submarine attacks would "not exceed the average," but ample reserves of food in storage would reduce the number of armed vessels that would have to guard convoys, and this would be a distinct naval advantage. The Navy has been steadily adding to its number of supply ships and is now well supplied with such vessels. In emergencies, airplanes could supplement surface vessels as carriers of certain foods or medical supplies that might be acutely needed.

The Army in particular supports a plan for having the islands increase their acreages devoted to essential food supplies, and plans exist for immediately and sharply reducing the areas devoted to pineapple and to sugar cane if a critical emergency threatens. Fortunately the Hawaiian climate, warm and humid, and existing irrigation facilities would result in quick growth and early harvests of many necessary crops.

The Navy has an acute supply question of its own to face. When the major proportion of authorized new naval building is completed, naval supply ships will have a stupendous task to face: that of supplying about 500,000 personnel scattered from Manila, Hawaii, Alaska, to the Panama Canal, the West Indies and the newly acquired bases in the Atlantic. The minimum daily food requirements will be about 1,250

tons. To cope with this problem nearly thirty new supply ships were purchased in 1940, and in 1941 another fifty-two vessels, averaging 15,000 tons, will be acquired.

A definite policy of "buy American" has been adopted by the Navy, and with the exception of tea, coffee and cocoa, nearly all foods consumed on the ships and at shore stations come from American farms.

As all these comprehensive defense plans near completion and perfection, one seemingly unanswerable question continues to disturb the minds of those who are responsible for the safety and the perfect functioning of our titanic war machine in Hawaii. That question is: how extensive would "fifth column" activities be in time of actual war; how loyal to the United States is the Japanese population of the islands?

The last census revealed that 155,042 persons, out of a total population of 414,991, are Japanese or at least half Japanese. If even one per cent of them were actively disloyal to America in case of a Japanese-American war they could do enormous damage. If 10 per cent of them were to turn out to be fifth columnists the danger would be appalling.

The situation is particularly delicate and difficult. If suspicion were manifested by official quarters the result would probably be the alienation of thousands of men and women of Japanese blood who are American citizens by birth and who are now entirely loyal and devoted to the cause of the United States.

But to assume a 100 per cent loyalty would be nothing less than criminal negligence, for if only one in ten or one in twenty were to sympathize with an enemy Japan, this negligence might cost us a tremendous price or greatly delay an eventual victory.

Most Americans long resident in Hawaii sincerely believe that much of the present distrust of the Japanese, as a class of the population, is unjust and unwarranted. They incline to

the belief that a vast majority of the Japanese are loyal American citizens who actually keenly resent Tokyo's claim of dual citizenship. This is particularly true of Japanese children born in Hawaii who are now grown young men and women. In the islands they have not clannishly kept mainly to themselves, as they do in most other parts of the world, but have freely mingled socially with the people of many races and colors who make up the population.

The older Japanese, those born and reared to maturity in Japan, are in many cases more pro-Japanese than pro-American. This is particularly true of those who have never returned to Japan since they first emigrated. Most of those who have paid return visits to their motherland, it is said, have been so sharply struck by the contrasts between liberty and restraint, between prosperity and poverty, in their old homes and their new, that they returned to Hawaii staunchly pro-American.

In Hawaii we have been and still are guilty of the same official folly that the British have perpetrated in Singapore and elsewhere. We have permitted the maintenance of Japanese-language schools, openly paid for by the Government of Japan. This example of "good-neighbor policy" may cost us dear if it comes to war. But many of the leading educators of Hawaii firmly believe that these Japanese-language schools have done less harm than is generally imagined. They say that since all Japanese children in the islands are required to attend the regular American public schools, five or six hours a day, five days a week, this has more than offset any tendency to divided allegiance that might have been inculcated by one hour a day in the Japanese-language schools.

There are today a few Japanese officers serving in the reserve corps and in the National Guard, and there are many non-coms and personnel in the ranks.

German plans for fifth column activities in Hawaii, in case America is drawn into war against the Axis Powers, are fairly easy to detect, and it is believed they will be easily checkmated. But unhappily Japanese officialdom in the islands seems to be adopting the Nazi system in all its objectionable details—probably under secret German prompting and guidance.

Normally, one would think, the personnel of the Japanese Consulate-General in Honolulu would diminish as the number of Japanese-born residents has decreased, and as Japan's trade with the Hawaiian Islands has declined. But the reverse has been the case. The number of Consular officials has grown amazingly and continues to increase, and "consular agents" are on all the other islands and in most towns of any size.

Education and religion are also apparently being utilized by Japan to increase the number of pro-Japanese propagandists in the islands. The number of Japanese teachers has been increased beyond all reason, and although Japanese followers of Shintoism are rapidly decreasing in numbers, the number of Shinto priests is increasing even more rapidly. To those who know how this class of priests was instrumental in fomenting clashes and stirring up hatred in China before the outbreak of the Chino-Japanese war this aspect of the problem is particularly ominous.

Quite aside from the question of a possible war with Japan, the Japanese problem in Hawaii is serious in view of the movement for early statehood. The islands voted a little more than two-to-one in favor of statehood in a plebiscite held late in 1940, and the American public seems to favor statehood by an even larger ratio. In Honolulu in some quarters it is strongly suspected that voters of Japanese blood were instructed to vote against the statehood project, or otherwise the majority in favor of it would have been much larger. Tokyo may fondly imagine that a victorious Japan could more easily de-

tach a territory from a defeated United States than to force the cession of the forty-ninth state!

During the first week of 1941 Senator Guy M. Gillette of Iowa made public charges to the effect that Japan is trying to conscript Hawaiian-born Japanese between the ages of 21 and 36, and he asked the State Department to investigate.

To this charge the acting Japanese Consul-General at Honolulu, Mr. Otojiro Okuda, made a sweeping denial and avowed that a recent Japanese census of the Hawaiian Islands "has no military significance." He did admit, however, that Japanese with dual citizenships who visit Japan might possibly be drafted for military service, but said "very few have been drafted in the past."

For several decades the large proportion of Japanese in Hawaii, in comparison to the total population, was purely a domestic social, economic and lingual question for the islands themselves. Now, with Japan openly aligned with Germany and Italy, and with the United States drifting rapidly toward open participation in the war on the side of the democracies, the problem is not only of national but of international importance.

Hawaii today is more than the main defense post of our own western coast. It is more than an important "jump" in the direction of the Far East.

So long as Pearl Harbor and Hawaii are firmly in our possession no other nation can attain naval superiority in the Pacific. It would first be necessary to wrest Hawaii from us before any nation could attack our western coast or successfully assail the Panama Canal from the Pacific side.

If participation in the second world war becomes essential to the saving of the world's democracies, Hawaii automatically becomes, in strategy and in international politics, the most immensely valuable and important place in the world today. If we were to lose Hawaii we would lose control of

the Pacific, California, Oregon and Washington, and British Columbia and Alaska would be vulnerable, and the Panama Canal might more readily be subjected to attack.

When these dire improbabilities are suggested to Navy or Army leaders in Hawaii they grin widely, and say:

"Let 'em come and take it—if they can."

NOTE—Many of the foregoing facts, and particularly the figures, were obtained by consent from a splendid special "Defense" issue published just before January 1st, 1940, by the Honolulu *Star-Bulletin*. All of the Navy and Army statistics in that issue were censored and approved before publication.

H.A.

12.

SINGAPORE'S CENSORS

SINGAPORE should be the great news-gathering and -distributing center for a vast tropical area larger than the United States. All the essential cable, telegraph, radio and postal facilities exist and function excellently. It is the center, too, for sea and airplane travel, with lines radiating northward and eastward to Penang, to Rangoon, to all of Burma to the China borders, to Indo-China, to Thailand and to the Philippine Islands. Southward and southeastward lie Batavia, Java with its millions, Borneo, Macassar, the air and travel lines to Australia. Westward are Sumatra and Ceylon, and much of the news from that portion of India tributary to Calcutta should naturally feed into Singapore.

Events and developments of tremendous importance are under way in this region. All portions of the British Empire in this zone are making immense war efforts. The Netherlands East Indies, suddenly assuming the functions of nationhood, are a potent factor in the struggle against the Axis Powers.

Japan is pressing for political, economic and territorial expansion against the determined resistance of the United States, China, Britain and the Dutch. There are huge investments in oil, rubber and tin production.

It would be of distinct benefit to the British Empire to have important news bureaus and news agencies centered at Singapore, with efficient and large staffs ready to go to any locality where important developments occur. They would send their carefully sifted findings back to Singapore, where they would be rewritten and then distributed to the world. The information so gathered would be of incalculable value to the British war effort.

The location is ideal, all necessary facilities exist—but there are the Singapore censors. I shall not call them the British censors, for the system they have evolved and the methods they pursue are, fortunately, not common to the British Dominions. They differ radically, for instance, from those of Hongkong.

I reached Singapore from Manila late on the afternoon of Saturday, October 26th, and learned to my dismay that I could not contact any of the cable administration officials until Monday. The *New York Times*, I was certain, had arranged in advance for me to send "collect press" messages, but this could not be verified or made operative over the week end. I hoped ardently that no event of first-class interest or importance would occur during the next forty hours.

Monday morning, when I saw the courteous and obliging cable officials, I asked them what I could count upon as the general average of transmission time of news dispatches to New York and was dismayed when the reply was: "Oh, from eighteen to twenty-four hours."

"You see," it was explained, "there are the censors to be considered first. A doubtful message is rarely cleared by their office at night, but is held until someone with real authority

comes in the morning. Anything questionable filed after eight o'clock in the evening almost automatically is thus delayed for thirteen hours. Often, too, the censors have first to contact naval or military or other authorities before they can release certain items."

Intent upon trying to save time wherever possible, I asked if the censors had offices in the cable building, but learned that they were in the Post Office building, many blocks away. Mindful of the leisurely pace of Tamil or Malay messengers, I asked if I could not take my cables direct to the censors, and so cut down on the delays, but such an innovation, it seemed, was not to be thought of.

My next call was at the office of the British Information Bureau. Robert H. Scott heads the organization, the activities of which cover nearly all of the Far East, even as far as Japan. I had known Mr. Scott long before, in Shanghai.

Greetings concluded, I asked Mr. Scott how to locate the office of the censors and for whom I should inquire when I called there. Mr. Scott, in my presence, did some telephoning, and then, showing every evidence of apologetic discomfort, gave me the following information. A Mr. Middleton-Smith headed the department of the censors' office that would be concerned with my cables. But I must on no account call at his office. The censors would find it "embarrassing" to meet foreign correspondents, socially or in any other way. No, there were no rules or instructions under which correspondents were to operate. They were given no list of topics that were taboo—to give out such a list of such instructions, the censors feared, might be tantamount to "divulging vital information."

But, I argued, maybe if I could talk with someone in the censors' office I might convince them of the value of co-operation. Of what use to spend a day or two gathering information that could not be transmitted? Why should I waste

my own time, and the time of the censors, writing things they would be put to the trouble of reading and crossing out, or suppressing entirely? More telephoning, but the same verdict; the censors received no callers and would not define rules or policies.

Musing somewhat grimly about the old British phrase concerning "muddling through," I went about my business.

The amusing stories told in Singapore about the censors are beyond counting—and most of them are told by Britons. For instance, there was the case of Fred and Elsie Jones. Fred continued to toil hard and sweat copiously in Singapore's muggy heat, while his wife was enjoying the cool mountain air up in the hill post at Cameron Highlands. Telegrams must be signed by surnames, otherwise they will be refused acceptance or delivery at Singapore. So one day from the cool of the mountains came this message:

"Jones, Singapore. Need money. Much love. Jones."

And the reply:

"Jones. Cameron Highlands. Busted sorry. Ditto. Jones."

And then there is the famous case of the amusing and futile efforts with which Singapore censors vainly tried to cloak the removal of the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief of the British Pacific squadron from Hongkong to Singapore. The move was announced from London, was published in newspapers in Hongkong, Shanghai, Manila and Australia. But the Singapore newspapers were commanded to silence.

Six weeks after the removal had been accomplished, one of the Singapore newspapers, on its Sunday society page, published a guest list for a reception held at Government House, and this list carried the name of the C.-in-C. (The British, by the way, exceed the zeal of the New Deal for the use of alphabetical designations.)

The day after publication the newspaper in question received a stern warning from the censors' office to the effect

that further publication of secret information vital to the conduct of the war would bring swift punishment.

Then there was the case of Mamoru Shinozaki, which surely challenges credulity.

When I reached Singapore this Shinozaki was being publicly tried for a violation of the Official Secrets Act. In other words, he was a clumsy Japanese spy. Subsequently he was convicted and was sentenced to three years' rigorous imprisonment and fined \$1,000. On appeal, the judge upheld the original conviction and sentence, and caustically commented from the bench that in most countries Shinozaki would have been shot.

Singapore newspapers were publishing columns and columns about this case when I arrived there. No secrecy was enforced, and the Japanese Consulate-General kept official observers in court. I studied the case, obtained some exclusive angles and a good background, and wrote a news cable for my newspaper. Three days later I learned, from a British newspaper man, that the censors would not permit news cables to go out about the Shinozaki trial. Stories sent by mail were permitted; anyone might mail out any number of cuttings from the Singapore newspapers, but news cables—no. Why this ruling? Bewilderingly, no explanation.

Weeks later I was able to clear up this matter. Portions of the testimony dealt with the fact that Shinozaki and some British soldiers, whom he was entertaining lavishly and to whom he was giving large sums of money, went together to a dance for service men given at the Y.W.C.A. and there met some persons of doubtful repute.

"The ban was ordered so that the rest of the world would not have wrong ideas about the Singapore Y.W.C.A.," it was explained.

Then, late in November, there was the case of the arrival of very substantial Army reinforcements from India. I had

learned from friendly military authorities the day the transports would arrive, the number of troops involved in the transfer, the hour when they would begin to disembark that first day, and to what points on Singapore Island and farther up the Malay Peninsula various contingents would be sent.

I was down near the entrance to the dockyard section when the first of the seemingly endless stream of lorries loaded with uniformed men came through the gates. There, with no effort at concealment, were two civilian-clad Japanese, notebooks in hand, tallying the trucks as they came through. I went over to the railway station where some of the men were entraining for points up country. More Japanese, with notebooks and pencils. This disembarkation continued briskly for several days. When it was completed I happened to be writing on a cable dealing with a general survey of tension in the southern seas and mentioned reports from Hongkong concerning a concentration of Japanese naval vessels and army transports near Hainan Island.

"These reports concerning the Japanese," I wrote, "are viewed by the British authorities in Singapore with interest as great as the Japanese authorities in Tokyo must be according to reports that for the last several days the streets of Singapore have been crowded with rumbling lorries disembarking reinforcements from ships lying in harbor here."

The British authorities in Singapore must have known that the Japanese were checking those troop movements, and they surely surmised that the Japanese were informing their Axis partners of this strengthening of the defensive forces of Malaya. My guarded phrasing, which did not mention the number of men involved, the names of their units, or the eventual destinations of any of the troops, surely told less than any of Britain's enemies already knew.

It was with surprise, then, that I received a telephone call several hours after filing that cable.

"This is Middleton-Smith speaking," said a pleasantly modulated voice. "I am sorry, but we must delete from your cable the reference to troops landing. Is that O.K.?"

"Oh, quite," I said, "but please delete the whole sentence, or the reference to the Japanese near Hainan will be meaningless. And thank you for letting me know."

I spent fifty days in and around Singapore, and this was the only evidence I obtained that Mr. Middleton-Smith was more than a name or a legend.

Until the last day of my stay, December 14th, I heard from the cable censors only once more, and that was a curious and anonymous telephone call. With a curious aftermath.

The *New York Times* had cabled to me early in December to send a news cable concerning the extent of Japanese aid, if any, to Thailand in its border clashes with the army and air-force of French Indo-China. This cable arrived very early one morning. Bangkok, the Thai capital, is a twenty-four-hour journey by train from Singapore, and the Thai censorship, I knew, was extremely strict.

I spent the morning checking with various sources which should be well informed direct from Bangkok. Britain, I knew, kept an intelligent naval attaché there, and I went, accordingly, to British Naval Intelligence offices at Fort Canning. Next I talked with British army people and with several civilian officials of the government of the Straits Settlements. A call at the American Consulate-General was followed by a long talk with Mr. Kao Ling-pai, the Chinese Consul-General, and then I talked with managers of banks and oil companies having branches in Bangkok. At two-thirty o'clock that afternoon I filed a five-page cable.

Nineteen hours later, at nine-thirty the next morning, came the anonymous telephone call.

"This is the censor's office calling. We are forced to stop in toto your cable about Thailand."

"Oh? Why?"

"Mr. Robert Scott, of the Bureau of Information, doubts if all of it is true."

"But Mr. Scott has not bothered to ask me as to the character nor credibility of my sources of information."

"I'm sorry, but he says it must not go out."

"Well, I presume I may cable to my New York office to the effect that the cable they ordered was stopped in toto by the censors here, may I not?"

"Oh, by no means; certainly not."

So, here was a new angle to the censorship situation. I had not guessed before that Mr. Scott was one of the censors, nor that just because he did not happen to know about the correctness of a given statement he could or would presume to stop the transmission of an important piece of news. And how was I to let my managing editor in New York know that I was on the job?

I finally wrote a service message to New York saying that because of censorship I was unable to transmit the Thailand-Japan story, and asked if I should file it later from Batavia or from Manila.

It will be much too late, by the time this gets back to Singapore, to check back on that telephone call and get my kind anonymous informant into trouble, so that all the amusing facts may now be told with safety.

With the service message in one pocket and a carbon copy of the censored cable in the other, I called at once upon Mr. Scott, saying that I was presuming upon our former Shanghai acquaintance to ask him for information and advice.

"A cable of mine about the forces behind the Thailand border troubles has been stopped in toto by the censors," I began, "and now the censors will not let me notify New York of their ruling. New York specifically ordered this story, and if I am not permitted to communicate with them what will

they think? That I am dead? That I am dead drunk? That I ignore orders? That I have left Singapore? I think, in mere fairness, I should be permitted to send this service message," and I handed over the lines I had just written.

What a good thing I had been cautious!

"How do you know the message has been stopped?"

"Someone in the censor's office telephoned to that effect."

"Hm! They are not supposed to do that. Do you know who talked with you?"

"Naturally not. You know they refused, through you, to let me call and meet any of them."

"Well, I think if you file this service message it will get through, after all," said Mr. Scott.

That man would make a good poker player. Or, since smooth dissimulation is supposed to be a prime necessity for success as a diplomat, he might even aspire to an Embassy.

However, I was enjoying myself, and I wanted some information. I had ridden downtown with a sage young friend who has a crafty sense of humor, and his advice had been: "Ask 'em if the period of appeasement, so far as Japan is concerned, isn't supposed to be at an end, and I'll bet you get a rise."

So I went on talking to Mr. Scott, apparently without guile or probing intent.

"It's surprising," I said, "that British censors stop this in toto. Portions of the information must be correct, for the two first sources I approached were Fort Canning and the Army Intelligence."

Mr. Scott's eye gleamed. He thought he'd drawn a big pair to three of a kind.

"Oh, what portions of the cable were based on official British information?"

"I couldn't say, exactly," I replied guardedly, "without a

copy of the cable in my hand. You see, I wrote it nearly twenty-four hours ago."

Mr. Scott meditated. I'm sure my cable was in his desk drawer, but unless he produced it I was not going to produce my own copy from my inside pocket. How far, he was evidently wondering, could he go without revealing himself as the man who had bottled up this news?

"If you rewrote the cable," he began, choosing his words slowly and carefully, "saying that the border incidents are unimportant, that the reports from Bangkok, Saigon and Hanoi are mostly incorrect—minimize the whole thing—then I'm sure the censor will pass it."

Oh—“sure,” was he?

"But that's not what New York ordered. My cable from my managing editor asks specifically what part, if any, Japan is playing in this mess."

Mr. Scott was silent. I waited.

"It seems to me," I finally hazarded, "that stopping this entire cable is inspired by a desire to appease Japan, and I thought the days of appeasement of the Axis Powers were ended."

"That's not the idea or the attitude," Mr. Scott snapped, obviously stung into indiscretion. "But it is inadvisable to let news go out under a Singapore dateline which might antagonize the Thai authorities."

So that was it! Shade of poor Mr. Chamberlain, who tried to appease Moscow even when Hitler and Stalin had reached a secret agreement behind his back!

My service message evidently reached New York, for twenty-four hours later came a cabled inquiry as to the feasibility of sending the story by air mail. I cabled back that the situation concerning control of cables and the posts was identical. But of the mail censors, more later. Oh, much more.

On my way out of the Bureau of Information office I was struck by a many-colored poster on the wall which declared that the British Empire is fighting for **FREEDOM**, adding, in smaller letters, "Freedom to Worship, Freedom of Assembly, Freedom of Speech and Press." Going down in the elevator I recalled reading that morning in one of the Singapore newspapers the boast of a local official, criticizing some domestic issue, that "free speech is still our proud prerogative as free men."

Back at my hotel, I dug up my copy of the Defense Regulations. Freedom of opinion and expression was therein guaranteed anew except where such expression was calculated to be of assistance to the enemy, either by the conveyance of information or by the creation of alarm or despondency among the civilian population, or was contrary to the ordinary criminal and civil laws covering sedition, blasphemy, slander and indecency.

My disputed cable seemed quite innocent of offending these regulations. Had it, then, been illegally held up? I could find no authority for Mr. Scott or any other person stopping a piece of news because of doubts whether it was all true.

I had first consulted those Defense Regulations when the Colonial Secretary, Mr. S. W. Jones, arbitrarily stopped a proposed broadcast by me to the United States. In the absence of the Governor, Sir Shenton Thomas, Mr. Jones was called Officer Administering the Government, or "The O.A.G.," and seemingly exercised arbitrary powers.

The affair of that broadcast, and the reasons for its complete suppression, afford an interesting example of what happens when a people resigns its liberties to autocratic authority during a struggle for survival. It impressed me profoundly, as a warning of the kind of thing that will probably develop in the United States if we become involved in the war or if we

delegate sweeping powers in view of the present or any future national emergency.

On November 1st I received, by special messenger, a long official envelope marked "URGENT." It was from this same Mr. Robert Scott of the Far Eastern Bureau, British Ministry of Information. The letter inside, informally friendly, read in part as follows:

Dear Abend:

About a fortnight ago the National Broadcasting Corporation of America asked if we could arrange a broadcast from Singapore for them to relay in the United States on the situation in this part of the world and local reaction to the current situation. They said they would prefer an American citizen to give this.

I have just had a telegram from London saying that the N.B.C. would like the talk given this Sunday evening at 10.30 p. m., Singapore time. Could you very kindly undertake this talk? It would be about six or seven minutes' duration.

The snag is that the text of the talk would have to be censored by the Singapore authorities. It would have to go through Australia, as otherwise it would not be received in America direct from Singapore, and we would have to get a wire to Australia, in the name of the Governor, saying that the talk had been censored and passed. So, if you are willing to undertake the talk, it will be necessary to have the text sometime this evening or first thing tomorrow morning, about say 9 A. M.

Would you please let me know as soon as possible whether you could take on this labor of love?

Yours sincerely,

R. H. SCOTT.

Of course I was glad to contribute time and effort toward a good-will project of this kind, and immediately telephoned Mr. Scott to that effect. November 1st was a Friday, and this

meant I would have to write and work over my talk that evening. Regretfully I then telephoned to a home to which I had been invited to dine that night, and also made my excuses by note to a kind would-be hostess who had invited me for dinner at eight-fifteen on Sunday evening.

Promptly at eight-fifty the next morning, Saturday, I walked into Mr. Scott's office with the text of the talk ready for inspection. Mr. Scott liked it, and said so, with rather embarrassing praise. Three of his assistants liked it. The Navy and Army censors approved of the text of the talk, which was not to be heard in Singapore or anywhere else in the Far East.

All seemed clear sailing, but Sunday morning my telephone gave a vicious buzz.

"This is the Information Ministry speaking. I am sorry, but the broadcast may have to be called off or postponed."

"What's happened?"

"Well, the fact is, Mr. Jones, the O.A.G. has censored your entire text."

"But the Army and Navy censors approved."

"I know, but the Acting Governor is deeply offended. He interprets the text as an indirect attack upon his domestic policies. He says you have evidently been talking to the wrong people. He will be willing to receive you, to discuss the matter, and to advise you how to rewrite the broadcast to meet his views."

It was, as the British say, a bit thick. I considered my reply carefully, and for so long that a disturbed voice came over the wire asking: "I say, are you there?"

"Yes, I'm here," I replied. "I was invited to contribute my services and to express my views on the local reaction of the current situation. I regret if the Acting Governor interprets this reaction differently than I do. I suggest that if he wishes to get his views before the American public he can give an authorized quotable interview to American newspaper corre-

spondents. Or, better still, let him broadcast in person to the American public."

"Oh, I say, you know—"

"Good morning. That is all, and thank you for calling."

I dined alone at the hotel that evening, reading those portions of the Defense Regulations that deal with freedom of opinion and freedom of expression.

Of course my proposed broadcast was not a criticism of the O.A.G. and his domestic policies. I knew nothing about either. I'd been in Singapore only a week, you see. But I learned later that he had become extremely sensitive to criticism, that he had been considerably and unfairly heckled in the press, and that the fact that no action had been taken on the immensely important question of air-raid shelters in Singapore was a particularly sore point with him. He is, actually, a high-minded and conscientious public official. In addition, he is a charming gentleman. I met him later at dinner parties, but we were both wary and never even mentioned politics or policies.

My utter innocence of any intention to offend, or to take sides in local political affairs, is shown by the text of the suppressed broadcast itself. Here it is:

Nothing could contrast more sharply, or more surprisingly, with the tension which today prevails at Shanghai, at Hongkong and at Manila than the amazing complacency that is practically universal in this great city of Singapore. Already rich, and growing richer daily because of the war, with exports valued at more than four hundred million American dollars during the first nine months of this year, Singapore nevertheless not only ignores the war as a reality but seems to take no count of the fact that the trend of events is likely to bring enemy bombers overhead and shells from enemy warships showering around its defenses.

From the city's docks goes a steady stream of shipments of rubber, of tin, of other essential war supplies. Into its well-mined

harbor come troop ships from Australia and from New Zealand, taking young men from those parts of the British Empire to various areas of combat. Freighters carrying raw materials and war supplies from far-off ports come here for water and fresh foods, and sail on for unspecified destinations.

Singapore today, as Japan well knows, is a magnificently equipped naval base—but without any navy. But in addition to that it is also a magnificently prepared land fortress, dangerous and costly to assault. The garrison here has been heavily augmented. On the streets are seen the uniforms of half a score of British Army organizations the names of which have been famous for many years—some for several generations. Australian airmen, flying and learning to fly here, keep the air pulsating for hours on end.

Malaya has made voluntary gifts to different war funds totaling around nine million dollars in American money, and has raised war loans equivalent to about another twenty million. In that sense the people of Singapore are conscious of the war, but as a grim reality, and as a potential and growing threat to Singapore itself, the war is ignored with a smug attitude of fancied security and isolationism that is almost incredible.

The heads of the army and naval establishments here know the true situation, but they are not talking. It is their business not to talk in time of war. But the average civilian resident of Singapore regards as something only short of lunacy any suggestion or question which implies the possibility of Japan attacking Singapore in the course of her southward push or as a natural result of her alliance with the Axis Powers.

And yet, the situation here is full of dynamite. In September, when Japan concluded her new treaty with Germany and Italy, Prince Konoye, the Japanese Premier, when asked if Japan would at once join in active warfare in aid of her European allies, replied guardedly with only two words: "Not immediately."

Admittedly, according to Washington, negotiations are under way between the United States and Great Britain, for another arrangement under which America will gain new naval bases in the Pacific, and admittedly joint British-American use of Singapore is envisioned as more than a probability. Japan has given public and

official warning that any such arrangement will bring about what the Japanese Premier called "swift and decisive counteraction by Japan." And yet Singapore continues to dream on.

More British women and children have been ordered away from Hongkong; thousands of American men, women and children are making a forced and hurried exit from China, from Japan, from Manchoukuo, from Korea, from Formosa and from Hongkong and French Indo-China; the wives and families of American Navy and Marine officers have been ordered out of the Philippines. But Singapore dreams on, ignoring the fact that these precautionary measures are frankly nothing but an attempt to minimize civilian losses and tragedies if war comes.

Singapore's optimists explain that it is about a thousand miles from here to the Japanese-occupied zone of northern French Indo-China. Well, in July, 1937, when the China-Japanese war broke out in the vicinity of Peking, people in Shanghai shrugged their shoulders at first because Peking was eight hundred miles away to the north. But consider what happened to Shanghai! Then, when the war hit Shanghai, Hongkong and Canton rejoiced smugly—they were eight hundred miles farther south than the mouth of the Yangtsze. Even last spring, when I visited Haiphong and Hanoi, the French in those Indo-China cities felt secure, in spite of the fact that the Japanese already held Hainan Island and were then in neighboring Kwangsi Province in full force.

In Japan today Prince Konoye and his Cabinet are in a perilous position. If they do not push farther southward, they will be pushed out of office by the radical militarists of their Empire. The radicals, who favor expansion, are giving eager ear to the swarms of clever German agents and propagandists who first convince their Japanese dupes that war with both the United States and Britain is inevitable, and who then argue, and soundly at that, that if there must be war Japan must force the issue quickly before American preparedness and rearmament get well under way.

Of course the Nazi aim is merely to have the United States involved in war as soon as possible, so that shipments of airplanes and other war essentials to England will be sharply curtailed. But the Japanese do not seem to sense this fact. Nor does Singapore realize

that today this city may be compared to the core of deep calm which scientists say exists in the center of every gathering hurricane.

Of course, Singapore rejoices in censorships other than those pertaining to cables and radio broadcasts. In particular there is the mail censorship, concerning which there are innumerable tales ranging from gay to very grave indeed.

There was the young American couple, for instance, who on a Friday afternoon decided to give a small dinner and theater party the next night. Among others, they wanted to invite their friend Jack Knighton, first officer aboard a ship permanently tied up in the harbor—not a ship in transit, mind you. Young Knighton, studying for an examination for his master's ticket, rarely came ashore. So the young Americans wrote a note of invitation and, leaving it unsealed, took it to the offices of Boustead & Company, agents for that particular line. But the people at the Boustead office raised their hands in negation and protest when asked to have the note sent to the ship when their launch made its next trip during the afternoon. The note must be censored, they said.

So the young Americans made their way to the office of the postal censor, finally gained admittance and stated their case. Would the censor please read, seal and officially chop their informal missive? Indeed, the censor would not.

"You must go downstairs, buy a stamp and post your note in the regular manner," he said.

"But, this is Friday afternoon—if we do that Jack will probably not get the note until Monday, and we want him for dinner tomorrow night."

The censor expressed a sentiment equivalent to the Japanese "So sorry for you!" but refused to be helpful.

The main objection to mail censorship is that it is secret, that autocratic powers are exercised, and that even if specific

decisions are known, there is no possible avenue of appeal. Also, since a large staff is naturally required to handle from 50,000 to 100,000 letters a day, many of the censors are both slow and stupid.

After all, an attempt at effective censorship is, in principle, stupid when allies of one's enemies are free to live and move about and gather information. Britain is at war with Germany and Italy, Malaya is part of the British Empire. Japan is formally allied with Germany and Italy, and yet Japanese, several thousands of them, live as free from restraint in Malaya as do Americans. Japanese consulates function and would be derelict in duty to their government in Tokyo if they did not send home information valuable to their own country. There is no reason to believe that Japan would withhold such information from Rome and Berlin.

The Singapore mail censors, who often hold up incoming letters for five or six days, possibly because they are understaffed, and who also hold up outgoing letters so that they frequently miss ships and planes and foreign connections, have one trait that is probably unique. They apparently do not trust the judgment of other censors in other cities of the British Empire.

In November an American mining engineer, in a great hurry to get to New York with geological maps of the oil fields of Saudi Arabia and of Bahrein Island in the Persian Gulf, flew from Bahrein to Bombay, with through tickets that would enable him to catch a Clipper from Manila to San Francisco on a given date. In Bombay the censors spent five days over his maps, and finally approved, sealed and stamped them. The packet, with great blobs of red wax, was truly impressive. He'd missed one Clipper, but by flying across India and then to Singapore, this American figured that he would be able to catch the *City of Norfolk*, sailing from Singapore to Manila on November 10th, and then fly from Manila homeward.

There was no air route from Malaya to the Philippines, although about once a month a chartered plane flew from Batavia.

But the Singapore censors looked with grave suspicion upon the packet sealed and approved by the Bombay censors. Maybe those Bombay fellers didn't know their business, eh? Better have a look.

They had a look lasting another five days. The American missed the sailing of the *City of Norfolk* and was forced to spend another thirteen days idling around Singapore.

The mysteries of censorship do not end there. Consider the case of my thirty-two photographs taken in and around the great naval base.

A pleasant and obliging young naval officer took me to the base twice. With us went the official photographer of the Bureau of the Ministry of Information. He, and he only, took the thirty-two photographs in question, and each print, when given to me, was stamped on the back "PASSED BY CENSOR," and then the censor's own number inked in to fix responsibility.

I numbered those photographs and carefully wrote colorless and unrevealing captions. Into a photomailer addressed to the Manila correspondent of the *New York Times* went the lot, and I next went to the post office, had the packet weighed and affixed the required stamps. Leaving the flap unsealed, I then went to Fort Canning to have a censor's chop put on the cover, so that it would not be held up in the post. This, like those ill-fated maps from Arabia and Bahrein, was to have gone to Manila by the *City of Norfolk* and then to New York by Clipper.

At Fort Canning there were delays. Where had I obtained the photographs? Who had put the censor's chop on the back of each? Who had written the captions?

Occasionally the young officer who had the job in hand

would go to a telephone, read one of the captions to some other officer at the naval base, and then come back frowning. Finally, however, everything was approved, the young officer himself sealed the packet in my presence. He stamped both the front and back with a triangular seal saying "PASSED BY CENSOR" and chucked the thing into a wire basket lying on his desk.

I arose, greatly relieved. The job had taken an hour and a half, and I was hot and greatly thirsting for beer.

"That will surely go by the *Norfolk*, will it?" I asked, as a last precaution. "The pouches close tomorrow morning at ten o'clock, you know."

"Well," said the young officer, looking at me pityingly as though I were one of the Outer Barbarians, "now the whole thing must go to The Top Censor, of course."

The words "The Top Censor" were spoken in capital letters. But I never learned this august person's identity.

The packet did not go off by the *City of Norfolk* next morning. It reached Manila by another ship, more than a fortnight late.

On my last day in Singapore, as was fitting, occurred my most human, most laughable and most irritating contacts with the censors.

I was booked to sail in a Dutch ship, and since Holland is at war the agents were extremely secretive. I did not even know the name of the vessel that was to carry me away and was vaguely told that she would sail "about December 17th," which was a Tuesday. However, at 9.30 o'clock on the morning of Saturday, the 14th, a telephone message informed me that the ship had come in and that I must be aboard before midnight.

Fortunately I had been warned that the search and scrutiny of all outgoing documents was very slow and very thorough; thus, on the preceding Tuesday, December 10th, I had taken

all my papers to the censors for examination and sealing.

Having left Shanghai in a hurry in October, this accumulation was considerable and included files of correspondence with the *New York Times*, insurance policies, contracts, important receipts of various kinds and many letters and very personal papers treasured for reasons of sentiment. These together made a large leather brief case bulge. In addition there were two flat desk leather files, filled with clippings from newspapers and magazines made before I left China. Another thick file contained carbons of all letters and news and other cables sent since I had arrived in Singapore as well as a thick sheaf of clippings made from Singapore newspapers and kept for reference and for statistics. Carbons of news stories sent by mail, and approved by Army and Navy censors were there too.

In perfect good faith I left all of these with the censors and was told the examination would have to be very thorough and would take at least two days. Instead, four days were required, and my papers were just being sealed with paper and string and imposing looking lead seals when I arrived at the censor's office that last Saturday morning.

With me I had conscientiously brought an accumulation of carbons and letters and clippings made since the first lot had been left for censoring five days before. There was an unaccountable lapse of time and considerable running to and fro while this examination was going on. While I was waiting, I asked a portly person who had had charge of my initial deposit of papers if everything had been passed as correct, and he assured me all of my papers, without exception, were being returned to me under seal. Those seals, he warned, must not be broken until after I left Singapore, or another detailed examination would have to be made.

Finally I was told that a Mr. Duckworth and a Mr. Bowery wished to talk with me, and I found these two gentlemen

greatly perturbed. With the documents I had brought in that morning they had found a page of typed notes under the headings "Censor," "Exchange" and "Naval Base." It was the six lines headed "Censor" that had created such a stir. I copy them here:

CENSOR. Won't meet foreigners, embarrassing. Won't explain what's permitted, what's banned, nor why. Doesn't let you know when stuff is deleted, nor even if whole cable is killed. Case of C.-in-C. and party. Had been published Hongkong, Manila, Shanghai. 9.30 to 4.30, after that cannot be disturbed. Compare with Japs at Shanghai.

Both Mr. Duckworth and Mr. Bowery said they were deeply concerned, even grieved. The notes, they said, were in a measure incorrect and in a measure unjust. They said they would like to clear up misunderstandings and would greatly regret having me leave Singapore with a critical or bitter attitude, or under the misapprehension that full co-operation with correspondents was refused. Mr. Bowery, in particular, was pathetically funny in his repeated lamentation that I had used the word "foreigners."

"How can you imagine we regard Americans as foreigners," he said again and again. "We are surely spiritually one people so far as this terrible war is concerned."

I readily agreed about the spiritual oneness but said that none the less I was a "foreigner" when in Singapore, but that more than that I and other American correspondents were often treated with such suspicion that we might even be enemy aliens—and I added that we did not like such treatment. Finally our talk became very cordial, even friendly, and I pointed out the weaknesses and faults of the operation of their office—as viewed from a news correspondent's standpoint. On many points we finally reached complete agreement. They saw the wisdom of some of my suggestions when I said:

"Gentlemen, in the interests of efficiency and good will, consider what the situation would be if an agreement is reached for the joint use of the Singapore naval base by the British and American fleets. You'll then have twenty or thirty American correspondents here, in all likelihood, and the confusion and bad feeling, the news jams and delays and frustrations will become really terrible. A change of attitude and of system will become essential."

Finally, after more than an hour and a half, we parted with expressions of good will all around, and I was at last given a pass for my files and documents, the number and nature of each file or container being carefully specified. I was told I would have to show the pass and the sealed brief case and packets when I passed the guarded gate of the dockyard area.

I hurried downstairs, hailed a taxicab and drove down to my ship. Other than obtaining a personal pass and a pass for the chauffeur, there were no formalities. No one looked into the cab to see what it contained. I then supposed the examination would take place at the foot of the gangway. But no, I boarded my ship without seeing anyone except a Lascar watchman, left my papers in my cabin, and locked the door.

I could easily have taken aboard with me several suitcases of documents and no one would have been the wiser. Later in the day the hotel porter took to the ship for me two small steamer trunks, a wardrobe trunk, a suitcase and two gladstone bags. They were not opened or searched, and they might have been crammed with documents or maps. The painstaking examination of the documents I had submitted to the censors was an utterly useless and meaningless formality, and was in no way an effective preventive against smuggling forbidden documents out of the port. My case was not an exception; every other passenger on my ship had the same experience.

There was only one more contact with Singapore officialdom. The ship was delayed and did not sail until 6 o'clock

the following morning. At 5 o'clock all passengers were called, and they surrendered to a very pleasant young police officer their permits for exporting documents. He simply took those slips of paper, bowed and went away. No count was made of the number of sealed packets aboard, no inspection was made of cabins or of luggage.

"Ho-hum!" I thought, "muddling through. What a laughable anticlimax to a lot of struggling with red tape."

But the real climax came five days later, after my ship had passed Batavia and was nearing Macassar. Wishing to refer to some statistics, I broke the Singapore seals. My personal papers seemed intact, though sadly disarranged. The files of Shanghai notes and clippings appeared undisturbed.

But when I opened my Singapore file nothing was left except the newspaper clippings and a few typed notes on rubber and tin. **EVERY CARBON COPY OF EVERY CABLE I HAD SENT WHILE I WAS IN SINGAPORE HAD BEEN ABSTRACTED, AS HAD EVERY CARBON OF EVERY NEWS STORY I HAD SENT BY MAIL.**

This material, with the exception of the before-mentioned cable about Japan and Thailand, had all been previously read and approved by the Singapore cable or mail censor. Nearly all of that material had already been published in the *New York Times*. Some of the news stories, at the request of the Singapore Bureau of the British Information Ministry, had subsequently been printed in Singapore newspapers, with credit given to the *New York Times*. But somebody in the office of the censor had decided they were "dangerous documents" and must not be permitted to leave the country!

Had those carbons contained information banned under the Defense Regulations, the confiscation of them would have been entirely legal. However, they had, with the one exception noted, been passed by the censors with official approval.

Under those circumstances the abstraction of those papers from my files, even by a chuckleheaded underling, amounted

to nothing more nor less than the theft of my only copies of fifty days of news collection and news writing, and from Macassar I sent a formal complaint to that effect to the American Consul-General at Singapore.

By the time I reached Manila my indignation had cooled somewhat, and I sent a cable to the Ministry of Information in Singapore, stating the details of what had happened and asking if they cared to cable to me, for publication, any excuse or justification they might care to offer. It seemed only fair to give the Singapore authorities a chance to put in their defense.

After more than thirty hours came a longish cable in reply, but it began with these words: "THE FOLLOWING NOT FOR PUBLICATION."

Unfortunately that wording makes it impossible for me to comment upon the manner in which it was sought to excuse and explain this outrage.

There is another short chapter to this story. When my homebound ship neared Honolulu, early in January, I made a further inventory of my papers and discovered further senseless confiscations. The following letter was, accordingly, mailed to Singapore from Honolulu on January 10th, 1941:

M.S. Jagersfontein,
January 9th, 1941.
Nearing Honolulu.

Mr. Robert H. Scott,
British Ministry of Information,
Singapore, S.S.

DEAR MR. SCOTT:

A further inventory of my files and papers reveals to me new imbecilities on the part of the Singapore censors, which I am here-with reporting to you.

1st. While I was in Singapore I purchased, at the good British firm of Kelly & Walsh a copy of a rather new book by Major Evans F. Carlson, U.S.M.C. Retired. The title is *Twin Stars of China*, I believe, but am not certain. Anyway, the exact title is immaterial, since the bookstore had many copies on hand and the book must surely have been passed by the censors before it was publicly displayed for sale.

From this book I made nearly two pages of single-spaced typed notes and quotations concerning the Japanese and Chinese armies, crediting page and chapter. The notes were headed as taken from Major Carlson's book.

Yet these notes, taken from a book freely sold in Singapore, were also stolen from my papers.

2nd. When I left Shanghai on October 14th last year I had with me a current copy of the American news weekly, *Time*. Several million copies of this magazine circulate all over the world, I am sure. From this magazine I tore for future reference a double-page map in colors of Indo-China, Siam, Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies. On the reverse sides of the map were statistics and tables of distances, verifiable in any atlas or encyclopedia.

This, too, was stolen from my papers.

3rd. When I left Shanghai I had with me a copy of the entire editorial page of the American magazine *Collier's*, of which several million copies are printed weekly and circulated all over the world. This editorial, quoting me by name, paid flattering reference to a "scoop" I had had in the *New York Times* about Russian activities along Bering Straits and north of Vladivostok.

This, too, was stolen from my papers.

Really, Mr. Scott, one boils with rage over the thought of having submitted, in all good faith, all one's papers to such a chuckle-headed, or dishonest, censor or censors. I now revolt at the idea of having had such an ignorant person or persons pawing over all my most personal effects—insurance policies, contracts with publishers, personal letters kept for sentimental reasons, cables and letters about a death in the family, sad little mementoes like the last Christmas and New Year cards received from persons now lost forever.

Of course I believe in censorship in wartime. Equally of course I believe in the correctness of penalties for criminal evasions of censorship. But for the sake of decency and good feeling have the work intelligently and honestly performed.

If your censors did not know who I am, nor to what principles and loyalties my many years as a writing man have committed me, they surely knew that I was and had long been employed by a great American newspaper which has taken the lead in campaigning for "all out" aid for England. They must have known that any anti-British attitude, writings or activities on my part would have at once imperiled my position. With those facts in mind, they might, surely, have used intelligence in going over my papers. Or is that too much to expect?

This letter will be published.

If the Singapore authorities have anything to offer in extenuation of the activities of their censors in dealing with my papers, a cable sent to me, at my New York office, will be given immediate and courteous attention.

I renew this offer, since the cable you were good enough to send to me at Manila opened with the words "The following not for publication."

Yours sincerely,

HALLETT ABEND

Up to the middle of March, 1941, there had been no reply to the foregoing letter, but letters from Singapore indicate that the censorship has been made much more sensible and effective. Copies of the foregoing chapter were given to the *New York Times* and to the foreign news bureau of one of the great American news distributing agencies. It has also been seen by the British Embassy in Washington, has been forwarded to Canadian authorities, and has even reached London, from where there have come reassuring promises of speedy reforms. The British Consul in Manila also took a hand in the affair and sent a stiff protest to Singapore. He

heard the unpleasant details from two kind Britons who were fellow passengers with me on the *Jagersfontein*, and he acted entirely without my having made any complaint or having even met him.

13.

PACK UP AND SAIL

FORCED evacuation of 16,000 Americans from the Orient may seem to be a relatively unimportant matter when compared with the mass migration of millions of human beings that Europe has witnessed since September of 1939, but it is actually the most spectacular calamity that has befallen any group of Americans since World War I.

This great exodus—in October and November, 1940—did not have to be accomplished under a rain of bombs or to the crackling stutter of machine guns coming out of the skies, but nevertheless it involved haste and fear, irretrievable losses which collectively reached a vast and staggering sum, and uncertainty and the threat of penury in the future for many of those involved. It involved, too, the pain and wrench of partings, the upsetting of thousands of lives, and the inevitable deepening of a bitter hate for that group of men and that way of greedy ambition that made this mass movement necessary.

It is important to note, and not to forget, that Americans

were evacuated in haste from only those parts of the Far East where the shadow of the Japanese militarist falls long and dark: from Japan itself, from Korea, from Formosa, from Manchoukuo, from the Japanese-occupied areas of China, from Hong-kong and from French Indo-China, where the Japanese now play the role of arrogant dictator. These are the areas no longer deemed safe for Americans.

If things get worse, of course, if Japan provokes us to open war, then thousands more Americans will have to flee from the Philippines, from Thailand, from Malaya, from Burma and from the Dutch East Indies. And that exodus may well be already under way by the time this book appears in print.

My friend Eric, asleep in a canvas chair in his garden, will always remain for me a symbol of what has been inflicted upon foreigners in the Orient since Japan began to try to create what she ludicrously calls her "New Order."

This is being written on the evening of Monday, October 14th. A week ago yesterday, Sunday, October 6th, knowing that I was soon to leave Shanghai, I piled my unknowing and happy dogs (three of them) into the back seat of my car and drove out Hungjao Road to make a last visit to Eric's home.

Hungjao Road is Shanghai's fashionable residence district. It is outside the foreign-controlled area, and to reach it one must drive past a line of scowling Japanese army sentries. The countryside lay serene and quiet under the pale October sunlight. Between the fine homes and spacious gardens and grounds were what, until the Japanese came three years ago, had been fertile Chinese vegetable gardens. Today the blight has changed them into abandoned barren plots, ragged with weeds.

Eric is one of those much-abused Shanghailanders known as a "taipan." In other words, he came ashore at Shanghai about thirty years ago from a freighter on which he had been second engineer. Shrewdly estimating the future growth of the

port, he set up in business as a marine engineer and surveyor, and prospered and then grew rich. That, the wealth, is what makes him a taipan, and people with funny twisted minds seem to hold it against taipans because most of them became rich through hard work.

Eric's Hungjao home was a mistake. He bought the land in the early spring of 1932, just after the armistice put a stop to the bloody and fruitless six weeks of fighting between the Chinese and Japanese which began on January 28th that year and cost upward of 35,000 lives. Eric showed me his land and the plans for his home that spring. I urged him against the investment; said there would surely be more and worse fighting around Shanghai; that in the end the Japanese would grab his property.

But he went ahead. His wife did not like life down in the city; she wanted a few acres of garden and lawn. Their only daughter would soon be having her coming-out party—they took pride in being able to give her the proper background. So they built in Hungjao, and also built a summer home at Iltis Hook, near Tsingtao. The Iltis Hook place has a background of mountains and pines and firs, and a foreground of shining yellow sand and white-crested tumbling breakers.

The two places together probably cost about \$120,000 in Shanghai dollars—then equal to about US \$40,000. Today the places could not be sold for nearly that total, and even if they could be so sold, \$120,000 in Shanghai dollars is now worth only about US \$7,000. That is the kind of “licking” Americans and Britons have been taking in China and the Orient generally under Japan's “New Order.” And today no one, except a Japanese, a German or maybe an Italian would buy these properties. They have only to wait to get them for even less, or to get them simply for the taking.

Well, that Sunday afternoon when I got to Eric's walled place his Number One Boy let me in at the front gate and said

Master was asleep in the garden. I went quietly through the house, across the terrace and down onto the lawn. There, in the shade of a maple tree turning gold and russet under the quieting hand of autumn, lay Eric sound asleep in a long canvas chair. His dog, lying on the grass at his feet, wagged a friendly tail.

Eric's only child, the beautiful daughter, married to a British official in Hongkong, had been evacuated to Australia six weeks before. Mrs. Eric had sailed for Australia only five days before. I had called on her the day before she sailed.

"But all your beautiful things, your furniture, your silver, your paintings—are you leaving it all here?"

Mrs. Eric is ordinarily soft spoken and gentle. But this time she looked around her living room, then out across her terrace to her peaceful and beautiful garden, which she planned and planted herself, and her voice vibrated strangely when she replied:

"This is my home. I made it myself. We were to grow old here together. If I must lose my home, to hell with the stuff that's in it."

She turned and walked with uncertain steps into the wide front hall and stumbled blindly when she started to mount the stairs.

So, a week ago Sunday, tears were in my eyes, too, as I scribbled a ribald jest on one of my cards and slipped it into the sleeping Eric's pocket and then went quietly away and drove thoughtfully back to town.

There are Erics beyond counting all over the Japanese-dominated portion of East Asia.

In Tokyo and Yokohama and Kobe there are hundreds of American men who have been forced either to abandon their business careers and their fortunes or send their families away while they stayed and ran the risk of internment camps or worse, and the practical certainty of being robbed, one way or

another, of the rewards of years or of lifetimes of work. If they do not go to the United States now, after Government advice, they stay entirely at their own risk.

Besides the business men there are the missionaries, the teachers and professors in Japanese and Chinese schools and colleges, the doctors and nurses in widely scattered hospitals who have been trying to teach cleanliness and hygiene and sanitation and modern methods of healing to the swarming hundreds of millions of people of East Asia.

Every night and every morning and at every meal hundreds and hundreds of missionaries are praying and asking God for guidance. Shall they abandon their converts, their work of years, and seek personal safety, or shall they run the risk of death or internment and stay with the people to whom they have dedicated years of their lives? And if they go home, how will they live, how support their families and educate their children?

When news was cabled to the Orient that the United States Department of State was "advising" all Americans to return to the United States, it was at first thought that the advice was meant only for women and children. Then, a few days later, came the news that ships were to be sent to evacuate at least 15,000 Americans. That means everybody—men as well as women and children.

The news hit Shanghai particularly hard, because the more than 4,000 Americans there constituted the largest American colony on the Asiatic mainland. Diplomatically worded announcements from Washington said the evacuation was to be solely "precautionary," but to Shanghai's mind the move meant the probability of war—war between the United States and Japan. The supposedly soothing assurance that this was precisely similar to the advice to Americans to get out of Europe in the autumn of 1939 was heavily discounted. For had not the Japanese and Chinese been actually at war for

more than three years without such a wholesale evacuation being carried out?

Americans had been advised to get out of Europe's zones of hostilities and possible hostilities, but the eastern Asiatic mainland had been the scene of actual hostilities since early July, 1937. This "pack-up-and-sail" advice from Washington was held to be clearly a move to get Americans away before the development of additional and specific expected hostilities, and only one answer made sense.

Americans have been residing in China and elsewhere under the protection of specific treaties. In some localities they have been there for as long as 125 years, and in some cases American landed forces and American gunboats and warships have been kept constantly on station because the authorities with whom the treaties were made were not strong enough to guarantee the fulfilment of their treaty obligations.

Clearly, now, a situation had arisen when treaties were held as insufficient assurances of safety, and when American armed forces on the spot were held too weak to give that protection to which Americans had become accustomed.

This move represented the abandonment of an American position built up through a century and a quarter of effort, and such an evacuation was interpreted as clearing the field so that American civilians would not be caught in the whirlwind of war—a war which, if it is fought, will make it possible for them to return to East Asia only when that important area has again been made safe for them to live once more in peace and security.

A handful of educated, traveled and sane-minded Japanese understood the portent of this American move, but the arrogant militarists, lustful for more conquest, exulted that the United States was "abandoning its position in the Orient." And scores and hundreds of clever Nazi agents spurred on the militarists.

"Strike now!" they urged. "Every month you wait will give the United States more planes, more men, more ships, more guns. The quicker you attack, the easier your victory."

And a great part of the Japanese Army leaders listened and agreed. But a majority of the Navy men doubted and demurred. The Army thought the Nazi advice was given unselfishly to forward the power and greatness of Nippon; the Navy men guessed that the Germans merely wanted to have the United States embroiled in hostilities with Japan because such a war would curtail American shipments of needed war supplies to England.

To begin a career of conquest is like beginning the use of opium. The more you get, the more you want. Appetite grows with each new satisfaction. The use of opium leads to ruin, but while he lives the opium user is a menace to society. The conqueror, as the democracies are learning today, is also a menace to society, but conquest unopposed does not necessarily lead to ruin. There is another difference—one can be cured, but the other must finally be destroyed or forcibly restrained.

Japan's appetite for conquest has grown with each new victory. Unquestionably, the Japanese militarists, in the summer of 1937, planned only the nibbling off of China's northern provinces of Hopei and Charhar and part of Shantung. But the war spread, and soon they captured Shanghai and Nanking, then more coastal cities and Canton, then Hankow.

Coincident with these military successes came many triumphs over American and European interests. Japan infringed upon this and that trade right, and the response was nothing more frightening than paper protests. Japan bombed foreign-owned missions, hospitals, schools and homes. More protests. Japan deliberately bombed and sank the *U.S.S. Panay*, and shelled *H.M.S. Ladybird*. There ensued tension but no reprisals. Japan became more bold. Greedy trade monopolies

were established, foreign trade was restricted on the specious plea of military necessity. The good opinion of the world ceased to count with the Japanese militarists. They had lost that good opinion, anyway, because of their wanton bombings of open towns and cities, their savage reprisals against communities harboring guerrillas, the shocking excesses of their soldiers.

Then they became corrupt and base. Satiated with slaughter and rape, they became greedy for money. Japan, as a nation, was being steadily impoverished by the indecisive war, but some of the militarists began to get rich. The opium evil was revived—under Army protection. Chiang Kai-shek's government, sorely in need of funds, scorned opium revenue. In Chungking, long-time addicts often commit suicide because they can no longer obtain the drug. In Japanese-held Nanking and Shanghai, Peking and Tientsin, any ricksha coolie can satisfy his craving by spending an almost valueless twenty-cent note. Brothels and gambling houses, paying "protection money" to Japanese Army men, flourish all over the occupied territories. In Japan foods and commodities are rigidly rationed, and reserves are running low. In China most Japanese officers are having the time of their lives.

The day after the signing of the Berlin-Tokyo-Rome pact in late September the Japanese Premier, Prince Konoye, warned the nation that in the present crisis it was intolerable to think of any Japanese being "richly clothed or eating copiously"; in Shanghai, that same day, the Japanese celebrated by drinking hundreds of cases of costly champagne, and the restaurants and geisha houses in Hongkew were overtaxed with orders for lavish dinners and banquets.

It is this type of militarist who has decided that the white man must get out of "Greater East Asia"; it is this type of militarist who ardently advocated Japan concluding an alliance with Hitler and Mussolini; it is this type of man who has

brought about the crisis which necessitates evacuating upward of 15,000 Americans from all parts of East Asia where his shadow falls.

And so, in October, 1940, in American harbors hundreds of carpenters were hurrying the work of building extra bunks in great ocean liners, and soon these great ships were plowing across the Pacific to take these uprooted thousands of men, women and children back to the United States.

It is no light matter to have a definite period put to any settled way of life, to have savings endangered or wiped out, to hastily abandon well-loved homes and friends. It is a serious thing for young men, who are beginning to succeed in chosen careers, to have to pack up and sail to a jobless future, to middle-aged men to let their businesses go for a song in depreciated currencies, to the old to be uprooted thus violently and abandon settled ways of life and what seemed security.

All over Japan, Manchoukuo, coastal China, Indo-China and in Hongkong American women began packing and sorting their household things, sadly deciding what to leave behind. Freight capacity was limited on the refugee ships, of course, and for many persons the freight rates over thousands of miles of ocean were prohibitively high.

Men and women who stayed awake through the hours of the dark, because of the gnawing worry that they might not get their children onto ships before the anticipated storm broke, faced the daylight wearily and with heavy hearts. For then they had to discharge trusted servants and office helpers. They strained their resources to provide pensions or farewell gifts of money to these dependents, knowing that new jobs would be almost impossible to find, and that at doubtful best these people would have to work for harsh and domineering Japanese. Hundreds of American women up and down the China coast those days were going with strained faces to pay last visits to little tablets in foreign cemeteries. For the last time they pulled the

weeds from the graves of their loved ones, scattered the mounds with flowers, and then with heavy hearts went home to face the problems of packing up and getting away.

The wives and families of officers and men of the United States Asiatic fleet were told to go home—not just to Manila. So were the wives and families of the officers and men of the United States Marines stationed at Shanghai, Peking and Tientsin, and it was expected that the wives and families of the personnel of the United States Army in the Philippines will follow suit before midsummer of 1941.

This is being written aboard the *S.S. President Garfield*, which sailed from Shanghai this morning, October 14th. Mrs. Hart, the wife of Admiral Thomas C. Hart, commander of our Asiatic fleet, is a passenger together with one of her daughters. Mrs. Hart sailed from San Francisco in this ship, got to Shanghai yesterday at noon, intending to rejoin the Admiral for the winter. But she was permitted to stay ashore in Shanghai for only twenty hours, and is now going on to Manila, from where she and her daughter will probably sail for Australia and then catch a ship from Sydney to San Francisco.

There are other “navy wives” aboard—all going home. They hang over the ship’s radio, hoping for news, but most of the circuits are so badly jammed by the Japanese that they hear nothing. These navy wives have worries all their own. Will the Japanese strike at Shanghai, or at Manila? Will the ships their husbands are on get safely to Singapore, there to await reinforcements from Honolulu, or will the inadequate Asiatic fleet have to bear the brunt of a surprise attack?

“I was just a bride in 1917,” one of them said to me on the deck as we watched the sun setting over the China coast. “Twice in a little more than twenty years would seem—well, excessive, wouldn’t it, now?”

Then there is the shabby but pathetic angle connected with

the probable early withdrawal of the Fourth U.S. Marines from Shanghai. Since the news of the evacuation order came there has been grief and almost panic among hundreds of White Russian cabaret girls and among some scores of half-caste and Chinese girls as well.

For the Marines, with exchange at around \$18.00 in Shanghai money for US \$1.00, have been a prosperous lot of young men. That has meant \$540 in Chinese money each month, over and above their uniforms and keep, even for the privates. So, naturally, many of them have maintained what are politely termed "little establishments on the side," although the regimental term for it is "being shacked up." Most of the girls who share these "shacks" are Russian or Oriental girls from the dance halls and cabarets—Japanese and Koreans excluded, for because of the dangers of espionage American Marines and sailors from the fleet have long been forbidden to associate with any of the subjects of Nippon.

These girls in Shanghai, and in lesser numbers in Peking and Tientsin, suffered emotional and monetary shocks when the British troops were withdrawn from those cities last summer. Now if all the Americans leave there will be only a handful of French soldiers and even fewer German and Italian civilians to choose from, unless they want to abandon the "White Girls' Standard" and pick up with Japanese. But nobody seems to love a Frenchman, a German or an Italian much these days, and as for the Japanese—they are only meagerly paid in depreciated yen.

Many of these "little establishments on the side" do not deserve to be made the subjects of cynical jesting, for many of them harbor really devoted couples united by deep attachments. And in some cases there are babies, too. Marriage for an enlisted man is almost impossible unless he is a non-commisioned officer, but even marriage does not confer American citizenship upon these girls, and the refugee ships will have no

room for them. And so they will be left behind—to what fate?

Ah, the things and the people we are forced to leave behind—we who have to pack up and sail. I know, because I, too, am now an *évacué*. I am not getting out because of the danger of an outbreak of war. I've been in China fourteen and a half years and have reported an average of more than one war annually. Wars become "old stuff" to foreign correspondents in the world as it is run these days. No, I sailed from Shanghai this morning because of Japanese threats of kidnaping and assassination.

And that's a funny thing. Never since I have been in the Far East as a newspaperman has the Japanese Government made any complaint against me, never have they charged prejudice, unfairness or inaccuracy of reporting. In fact, it was only in mid-July of this year that their Consul-General in Shanghai, and their Embassy Spokesman, too, told me that reports from their Embassy in Washington and from their Consul-General in New York classed my dispatches to the *New York Times* as "more fair and just than any news reports coming out of China."

But the Army, and particularly the Gendarmerie, did not like my news cables, my books or my magazine articles. As long ago as August of 1937 two lieutenants and twenty men spent five hours in a raid on my apartment and office, strewing papers and files on the floors, unfolding my shirts and socks, tearing the covers off of my books. They caught my chauffeur, stripped him to the skin, slit open the soles of his shoes, and when they found no incriminating documents they beat him badly. Apparently furious at finding in my files nothing more "dangerous" than a note from Madame Chiang Kai-shek asking me to tea, they took their revenge by pocketing more than \$2,000 worth of ivories and jades. For that, though, the Japanese Government paid me in full, according to inventory.

Then, late in 1938, some of their gendarmes forced their way

into my office and by threats tried to make me reveal my Chinese news sources. For that a Colonel of the Army and a Gendarmerie Major made stiff and formal verbal apologies.

The next sign of dislike and danger occurred late in January of 1940. A civilian Japanese friend of mine came to my apartment—and he was about the most frightened man I've ever seen. "I cannot talk to you in this apartment—it may be wired," he whispered. So we went out onto my terrace, which overlooked Shanghai from a height of sixteen stories, and there he whispered to me that I was in grave danger. He would tell me no more, except to cross-question my servants. And then he scuttled out of the apartment in such fright that he did not even wait for the elevator but went clattering down the stairs.

I called my servants in, one by one. And, so that they could not compare notes I shut each one in my bedroom after I had talked to him and while I interviewed the next. Yes, one of them had been offered a bribe by a Japanese gendarme. He was to have put "some papers" in my office files. Another one, when the chauffeur and I were not around (they did not approach the chauffeur, whom they had beaten in 1937), was to have put a small box in the front of the car, where it would not be noticed. For this he was offered (and refused) \$500. The box, as responsible Japanese authorities admitted later, was to contain a quantity of opium and two loaded revolvers. Then, when my car crossed Garden Bridge that night, I was to be stopped, the car would be searched, and "damning evidence" would be found. I'd be arrested and dragged to a Japanese gendarmerie jail, and my reputation would be ruined.

Here was a real problem. What to do? For twenty-four hours I did nothing except think and plan. Oh, and worry, of course.

Then I wrote five identical letters. One to the American Ambassador, one to the American Admiral in port, one to the Colonel commanding the Marines, one to the American Consul-

General, and one to the *New York Times*. When these had either been delivered or were safe in the mails, beyond the reach of Japanese censors, I wrote a joint letter to a friendly Japanese Admiral and a Japanese Army Colonel. In this letter I told them that my employers and the American authorities had been informed, asked for a careful investigation and pointed out that thereafter no matter what kind of "frame-up" was tried it would be the Japanese, and not I, who would automatically be held guilty.

Twenty-four hours passed. No reply. Thirty hours, and then the telephone rang. "This is your friend the Colonel. May the Admiral and I call on you at five this afternoon?"

They came and said that a careful investigation had been made. "We are sorry and ashamed to admit that all you charged, and much more besides, is true. The leader of the plot has been arrested and is being sent back to Japan in chains."

That was late in January, 1940, and then came a period of quiet. But early in July I was disturbed to hear that the man "sent back to Japan in chains" had returned to Shanghai and resumed his former activities. Those were the collection, for a very eminent higher-up, of squeeze from gambling houses, bordellos and opium hongs in the portion of Shanghai under control of the Japanese Army and Gendarmes. Hongkew and the area held by the Naval Landing Party has been kept creditably free from the grosser forms of vice and graft.

From early spring on it had seemed to me that Japan was stubbornly heading for a serious collision with the United States. Events and tendencies going on behind the scenes were ominous. So I had my twelve-year accumulation of Chinese art objects crated and sent home, nineteen packing cases filled with jades and ivories, porcelains and paintings and bronzes. This was in May.

In June things looked worse to me. I had been living for more than four years in a building formerly British owned but

recently purchased by the Japanese. I scanned sailings of American ships, reserved space in the *President Taft*, scheduled to sail July 20th, and then gave written notice to my new landlords that I would vacate by noon of July 20th. I had resolved to send home all my rugs and furnishings worth the freight. Halfway around the world, on a gracious slope of countryside in northern Vermont, stands a friendly old house where I hope to unpack those things some day.

Then came midnight of July 19th. The Japanese knew it was my last night on what is called their side of Soochow Creek. They knew, too, that I had a new book nearly completed, for I had applied repeatedly for a military pass so that I could send a photographer to the near-by city of Sungkiang to get pictures of the tomb and temple of General Frederick Townsend Ward, noted American, who was killed in battle nearly eighty years ago. What they apparently did not realize was that my new book dealt solely with events in and around Shanghai in the period from 1860 to 1862, and that therefore it did not concern them at all. The only reference to any of the tragic events of the last few years was a brief account of how Japanese soldiers, when they captured Sungkiang late in 1937, looted and wrecked the Ward Temple and toppled the Ward tombstone from its base.

That midnight of July 19th my six-room apartment was denuded. Everything had been sent either to New York or across the creek into the International Settlement, where I planned to live and work in a small two-room place. The only things remaining in the place that had been home for four years were my desk, my office file and books, my bed and two small steamer trunks already packed.

Then came a gentle tapping at my door, which I opened thinking it was the elevator boy with a telegram, for I often received several late at night. There were two clumsily masked Japanese, each with a drawn revolver. They asked for two

things only: "that anti-Japanese book you are writing," and "the telegrams you have sent insulting General Miura." I told them neither such things existed, whereupon while one of the thugs held his revolver within two feet of my head the other twisted my arms behind my back, forced me to kneel, and then kicked me in the small of the back. The one with the gun used his free hand to strike me about the face and head.

Well, they got the 354 typed pages of my new book, and other manuscripts, and went away.

"Just an ordinary case of armed robbery," was the Japanese Embassy explanation and defense, to which my retort was that these extraordinary robbers were certainly acting under official instructions since they wanted only my papers, and examined but did not steal some valuable jewelry and a bundle of currency containing about \$350.

After that life in Shanghai was not so pleasant. The authorities of the International Settlement immediately sent armed Chinese constables to guard my new office and residence, working four-hour shifts night and day. I was urged to go armed, to hire an armed bodyguard to attend me everywhere, to wear a bulletproof vest. I consented to the guards at my doors, so that my servants would not be molested or my papers further pilfered. But as to the other items, I stoutly declined. A bulletproof vest weighs twenty-two pounds, and in July, in Shanghai, the thermometer ranges well above 90°, while humidity registers from 84 to 96.

Again there came a lull, until late September, when by great good luck I obtained a three-day scoop on the now famous Berlin-Tokyo-Rome "defensive alliance," so-called. The story was printed in the *New York Times* and cabled back in its entirety to the War Office in Tokyo, and to the Japanese authorities in Shanghai.

Then it began. The first day after publication there came five threats by telephone. The next day more phoned threats.

And then the anonymous letters began to arrive by mail. I had, it seemed, grossly libeled the honor of the Japanese Army. I had slandered "imperial polity," and I had had the temerity to publish prematurely a "sacred State secret" before the Government in Tokyo was ready to make announcement. Most of the telephone calls were monotonously something like this:

"This Mr. Abend?"

"Yes."

"This Major (or Captain) of Japanese gendarmes. Who told you about treaty?"

"I'm not telling."

"Was it Japanese told?"

"I'm not telling."

"Did *New York Times* man in Tokyo smuggle out?"

"No, he had nothing to do with it."

"Who did?"

"I'm not telling anyone."

"Never mind. We will get hold of you, and then we know how to make you talk."

Twice after two o'clock in the morning Japanese in civilian clothes, slightly drunk, tried to force their way into my apartment with a resultant unseemly uproar in which my Chinese constable and the would-be intruders were outdone by the angry barking of my three bristling dogs.

So the new status was reported to the American Consul-General, to the State Department at Washington, to my New York office, to the Settlement police. Then I acquired an armed personal bodyguard, but no bulletproof vest, even though the weather had moderated. And now I have become an *évacué*, slipping quietly out of Shanghai without telling good-by even to many good friends.

So I know what I am writing about when I speak of the bitterness of a forced departure. Half a year in Canton, three

years in Peking, eleven years in Shanghai—uprooting is a grim business.

This morning I sailed from Shanghai, with a ticket for Singapore. Thanks to the Japanese I have no home, and only vague plans. There is that desired farmhouse in Vermont, there is a corner of a warehouse on Staten Island filled with things that will probably deteriorate from mildew and moths and rust before I can claim them. Aboard this ship are some trunks and handbags and a portable typewriter.

To pack up and sail presents problems even for a footloose bachelor. What to do about Ling Bau, who has been my cook for more than ten years? And how about Lee, the loyal chauffeur who was beaten by the Japanese in 1937? Lee has a wife, who has washed my clothes, darned my socks and sewn on my buttons this long time. They have worked for me for seven years—their little daughter is nearly four years old now. Then there is old Chang, my faithful coolie, and even older Wang, he of the too-perfect courtesy. Poor old Wang, who was Number One Boy for one mistress for thirty-one years before he came to me, is well past sixty-five and his eyesight is failing. His too-perfect courtesy came to the fore when I asked him his age, and he hesitatingly said: "A little more young than the Master."

A week later my bewilderment was cleared up when a Chinese friend explained that the head of the household is, by courtesy, always assumed to be the oldest person beneath the rooftree.

What to do about such loyal employees? You cannot take them with you, even if the cost were not prohibitive. You cannot find them new jobs under present conditions. Give them money? If the Japanese move into the International Settlement it will be taken from them—by torture, if necessary. Leave a sum in the bank, from which each is to be paid at least "rice

money" every month until their day of liberation comes? But if war develops there will be no more American or British banks in Shanghai, and the Japanese will take over by force all Chinese banks. Leave money to their credit at our Consulate-General? But that will be closed if we break off diplomatic relations with Japan.

Then there was the question of my dogs, my three constant companions: Sheila, my short-barreled, matronly looking little Scottie; Hsiao-mei, my long-barreled dachshund, whose name, in Chinese, means "Little Sister," and the incomparable Rod-erick Dhu, Sheila's father, he of the mournful big brown eyes and loyal, stout heart.

Give them to friends? But the friends will have to evacuate, and then what? Some people, with averted eyes, told me of foreigners who are leaving and who are having their dogs, horses and cats shot or chloroformed. Better that than have my dogs roaming homeless on Shanghai's streets. There is no real famine in Shanghai as yet, but Chinese do steal dogs, kill them and eat them, and then sell their hides. Send my three playfellows home? Fifteen days, at least, in cages going across the Pacific, then four days by rail, and then life in a kennel until that vague and distant day when I might reclaim them? I decided to take them to Singapore, but the steamship company thought this impossible and verified new rulings. Today Singapore firmly refuses to permit the landing of women, children or dogs from China.

It was a melancholy morning for me today. Ling Bau prepared a delicious breakfast, which I could not eat. The coffee was scalding hot, or something, and brought tears to my eyes. Then each of the servants came in and was given a farewell present. For the last time I gave the dogs their breakfasts on the little porch, and then broke all precedents by giving each of them a piece of special dog candy—a delicacy they never expect until after their supper in the evening.

Lee goes downstairs to put my bags in the car and drive me to the Customs Jetty, from which a tender will take me down-river to my ship. A final word and stroking for each of the doggies, a look back at them from the doorway, and it is over.

I am not sorry to leave Shanghai, the city, for it has become a horrible place of terrorism, fear and crime. My fine old friend Tang Shao-yi is dead. He opposed the Japanese, and one morning some men disguised as curio dealers got into his home and left him slumped in his chair with a hatchet quivering in his skull. Almost daily bombs or hand grenades are thrown in the streets, kidnapings are a commoplace, and political murders create only a momentary stir. Only last week another Chinese friend, Mayor Fu Hsiao-en, a genial old man who hated Chiang Kai-shek and accepted the job of Mayor under the Japanese, was slain in his bed while he slept. No hatchet—a huge heavy knife used for chopping vegetables. He was struck three times—across the throat, across the chin, and across the eyes.

No, I was not sorry to leave Shanghai, the city, even though I shall probably never go back so long as the Japanese are in power there.

My ship slipped her moorings, and we went slowly down the muddy river. But at one o'clock in the afternoon we anchored, to wait for the evening tide. Dusk came on, and the lights of the town of Woosung, at the river's mouth, began to glitter. Then came the dark of night, and off to the northwest a great red glow filled the sky.

The tide is in now, and we are sailing.

Good-by, Sheila; be a good girl, Hsiao-mei; good-by, Roddy Boy!

14.

RELIGION AND EDUCATION

THE day of the Protestant educational missionary—American, British or any other nationality—is done in China, provided Japan can succeed in establishing her “New Order in Greater East Asia.” Medical missionaries will be welcomed, but only if they will consent to work under Japanese supervision, and missionaries who confine their activities to purely evangelical endeavor will be tolerated, but they must not mix politics or economics or sociology with their religious teachings, or out they will go, too.

This is the considered and “immutable” policy, as frankly announced in Shanghai by the Japanese Army, even though the Foreign Office spokesman in Tokyo officially declared that Japan “had no such idea” as to force the withdrawal of any Christian missionaries from the occupied areas of China.

American missionary efforts in China were begun more than a century ago, and the mission lists of martyrs is a long one. Not only have missionaries, their wives and children been

brutally murdered time and again when there was a recurrent wave of antiforeignism among the Chinese people, but they have also died by the score of cholera, typhus, dysentery and other diseases peculiar to the Far East. As recently as 1927 more than 6,000 mission workers had to abandon their stations and flee for safety as General Chiang Kai-shek's armies marched from south to north under banners inscribed with antiforeign slogans. Many were brutally slain in that and succeeding years, and since July of 1937 some have been killed by Japanese aerial bombs.

Early 1941, after more than forty months of Chino-Japanese hostilities, finds American mission work in the Japanese-occupied territories seriously crippled. Many churches, hospitals, schools and mission homes have been destroyed by shells or bombs, have been burned or have been looted or forcibly occupied by Japanese troops. But the missionaries themselves have made a remarkable record, for in few cases, except where their stations have been totally destroyed, have they abandoned their fields of work. Most of them remain in spite of Washington's advice to come home.

In the areas still under Chinese control the period of hostilities has seen a great expansion of mission work of all kinds, for the Chinese Government has given the missions ample protection and encouragement. In fact co-operation between missionaries and Chinese has been so notable that the Japanese, and not without some reason, class all Protestant missionaries with being pro-Chinese and anti-Japanese. Catholic missionaries, regardless of nationality, the Japanese say, never meddle in politics, and records show that the Catholics are rarely molested.

In October of 1939 Mr. Joseph Grew, the American Ambassador to Japan, shocked the Japanese public by frankly expressing the discontent of the American Government over the fact that more than 600 complaints and claims filed at Tokyo concerning American losses and the treatment of Americans

during the Chino-Japanese hostilities had not even been answered. Fully half of those cases have to do with missions and missionaries.

In the archives of the Japanese Embassy at Shanghai, and of the Japanese Army headquarters at Nanking, however, I find on file 505 official Japanese complaints against the acts and activities of American missionaries, and as a poor offset only thirty reports commending American missionaries for any form of co-operation with the Japanese forces of occupation.

Typical of American grievances is the case of a Methodist mission at Hsuchow, in northern Kiangsu Province. Late in the winter of 1938-39 Japanese soldiery illegally raided the mission compound and carried off nineteen Chinese Christians. Three were released in May, after being kept incommunicado and tortured, and the rest were liberated in midsummer. All will carry through life the marks of the torture they endured—torture inflicted in a Japanese military prison in an endeavor to make them “confess” that this American mission was a center of anti-Japanese plotting.

It is not only the “heathen Chinee” who have strange and peculiar ways. Christian Chinese do amazing things, too. For these nineteen ex-prisoners, soon after they were all freed, gave a “banquet of friendliness,” at which their ex-captors were guests of honor, and a week later the Japanese, not to be outdone in Oriental courtesy, gave a banquet in honor of the men they had tortured!

Now for some of the 505 Japanese complaints. The invading military charge that missionaries often connive at hoisting the American flag over properties owned by Chinese Christians, that they interfere with pacification work and that by their general conduct they seem to fail to realize that it is only by Japanese military courtesy that they are able to carry on their work at all in areas where martial law prevails.

Specifically the Japanese charge that American and British

missionaries at Kuling made thousands of padded winter jackets for Chinese soldiers, and thereby enabled the Chinese to hold the mountain heights. "Humanitarian, but unneutral," they comment. "If the Chinese Army couldn't afford winter jackets for the Kuling force, they would have had to come down from the mountain, and we could have gotten at them." The Japanese also charge that an American missionary from Nanchang directed Chinese guerrillas in transporting ammunition for the Kuling defenders across Tungting Lake.

The refugee or safety zones that have been established for Chinese civilians in mission compounds in many of the cities which the Japanese have captured are also sources of friction. The Japanese charge that frequently when the mission stores of rice have become exhausted, missionaries have asked for free rice from the public gruel kitchens maintained by the Japanese Army and have raised a great to-do when their requests were refused. Such refusal, it is explained, was based upon the fear that refugee zones not under military control might become seats of anti-Japanese propaganda and plots, that the refugees could not be forced to accept smallpox and cholera inoculations, and that the Japanese wanted to cultivate good feeling by feeding the indigent themselves.

"And in one case, at the city of Wuhu," my informant said, "the missionary tactlessly told the Japanese Colonel that he would not let the Chinese women leave his compound lest they be raped by Japanese soldiers. All negotiations ceased abruptly."

But Japanese grievances are more general than these specific cases. Another official informant summed up the case for me as follows:

"Japan is at a loss to understand why the United States did not take a stronger line of action against China over the bombing of the International Settlement on August 14th, 1937. The *U.S.S. Augusta* and the American gunboat *Sacramento* nar-

rowly escaped direct hits, and the Chinese aerial bombings that day actually killed and wounded more Americans than have been killed or injured in all of China by Japanese bombs or shells since the hostilities started.

"The Chinese say it was all a mistake. Japanese bombings of American missions are mistakes, too. War is a risky business, as Britain has learned since September of 1939. A British bomb landed in Denmark. British bombers mistakenly engaged in dog fights with Belgian planes. Aerial warfare is far from being an absolute science, and accidents are bound to occur."

It is only natural for American missionaries to sympathize with the Chinese and to resent the Japanese invasion of China. These missionaries made China their home; the hostilities brought death and destruction and poverty to their groups of converts and interrupted and imperiled the work to which they were devoting their lives. But official Japanese think other elements have entered into the missionary attitude toward the great struggle. As one of them phrased it to me:

"American missionaries exulted when General Chiang Kai-shek was converted to Christianity. They envisioned the Chinese Government as a Christian dictatorship, and this was particularly welcome after the fiasco, a few years earlier, of the conversion of General Feng Yu-hsiang, who baptized his armies with a fire hose and then went to Moscow and adopted Communism. While Chiang Kai-shek ruled most of China the American missionaries were the honored 'teachers' of their towns and cities, and wise magistrates who liked their jobs catered to the American mission workers."

Japanese objection to American educational missionaries, to their schools, colleges and universities, is deep rooted. They say that in these institutions the Chinese have been taught to glorify democracy and equality; that Washington, Lincoln and Jefferson have been exalted over the great men of Asia; that while religious education was emphasized, moral edu-

tion according to Oriental standards was utterly neglected. The courses in these institutions, they charge, were based upon the American system of education and were largely designed so that graduates could go to the United States for further study. This system, they say, ignored the necessity for developing for China a sound national educational system.

Democracy, of course, has nothing in common with Japan's planned "New Order in Greater East Asia," and so educational missionaries will find no place in the areas occupied by Japan's armies. The Japanese have always blamed American missionaries and their schools for the long fight they had before they subdued the Korean revolutionists. Japan occupied Korea in 1904, and it was not until after the insurrections of 1920 that order was firmly established. The 1920 uprisings, they say, were directly attributed to President Wilson's doctrine of self-determination for small peoples and to the use missionaries made of the Wilsonian doctrines.

The Japanese military, holding Chinese towns and cities with garrisons that are often perilously small, are eternally suspicious that American missions may be centers for Chinese patriots, that the missionaries may be supporting the Chinese in their attitude of non-co-operation with the invaders. In justice to the missionaries it must be said that there is no established case that justifies these suspicions—no case in the occupied areas, that is. But it is also true that in the safety of the International Settlement at Shanghai there are some mission headquarters that seek to flood the American press and which supply some American lecture platforms with violent anti-Japanese propaganda.

"If the headquarters in Shanghai do this," the Japanese argue, "certainly the workers in the outlying districts will bear watching."

Official American statistics show that, aside from cases where bombings or shell fire have actually swept mission plants out of

existence, American missionaries have suffered less than other American civilians.

Missionaries who wish to return to their inland stations must apply, through the American Consulate-General, for Japanese military passes. As a rule, these passes are issued without question and no promises of good behavior are exacted. The Japanese Army pass specifies the route by which the returning missionary must travel, warns him against the use of a camera in the military-occupied territory, and implies that he understands he is living under martial law. That is all.

Evidently there has been very little active missionary co-operation with the Japanese forces of occupation, for the outstanding "good" case listed in the Japanese archives is that of the Rev. W. L. Holland at Nanchang. It is recorded that he opened the mission hospital to Japanese wounded soldiers and permitted Japanese male nurses and Japanese doctors access to their patients. When the hospital ran short of meat, he gratefully accepted beef offered by the Japanese Army, and in return sent gifts of fresh vegetables from the mission garden. Pathetically little, but it is deemed worthy of special commendation.

The liberality with which passes are issued to mission workers is exemplified by the case of the Rev. Robert E. Brown, of Wuhu, a medical missionary. Mr. Brown left Wuhu and went to Chungking, the Chinese capital, in the spring of 1939. He was appointed by the American Council on Medical Missions, after consultation with the Chinese National Christian Council and the American Advisory Relief Committee, "to bring mission hospitals into closer contact and co-operation with Chinese governmental institutions for medical relief." Hospitals, of course, are considered a vital arm of all fighting forces. And yet, when Mr. Brown returned to Shanghai in the autumn of 1939 and asked for a Japanese military pass so that he could make an inspection trip to Wuhu, he got the pass, in

spite of his announced plans for an early return to Chungking.

The Japanese reluctantly admit that they feel deeply aggrieved over the fact that neither American nor British Protestant mission hospitals have offered to co-operate with the Dojin Kai, a civilian Japanese organization, which maintains hospitals and traveling clinics for the benefit of Chinese civilians in the occupied area. "They help the Chinese, but do not offer to help us," they say.

As yet the American missionaries in the occupied areas of China have not been subjected to the full measure of control which the invaders plan. That will develop only after Mr. Wang Ching-wei has more firmly established his so-called Central Government of China. Then, under Japanese suggestion or dictation of course, restrictive edicts will be issued, and the missionaries will either have to comply or get out.

This will mean a fresh period of tension between Washington and Tokyo, for the United States Government will know full well that the restrictive issues are Japanese-inspired. Theoretically, the missionaries will still enjoy extraterritoriality, but actually they will be trying to carry on in conquered territory under martial law.

The technique then will probably duplicate that which has already been used against the British—the organization of gangs of hired Chinese anti-American demonstrators, led by Japanese badly disguised in Chinese gowns.

That famous other cheek will probably be in for a lot of painful slapping.

Japan's undeclared war against China is not confined to battles on land and in the air. In the Japanese-occupied areas, which now include all or parts of sixteen provinces, grim struggles have long been going on in which Japan is fighting to obtain control of China's economic and natural resources and to oust all Third-Power nationals. And since midsummer of 1939

the battles have been extended by a Japanese effort to obtain absolute control and direction of the education of the oncoming generations of Chinese.

This struggle to mold the minds of the future citizens (or subjects) of China has already passed the stage of using political methods and of revising the Chinese textbooks, and in many places, but particularly in Shanghai, has progressed to the use of violence and assassination. As a result the entire educational system in the occupied areas is in a state of turmoil and approaches early paralysis. Student strikes, mob violence, bribery, threatening letters, daggers, revolvers, even bombs—all of these figure in the history of education in the occupied provinces since the middle of 1939.

The Chinese, in the years between 1931 and 1937 in particular, which is the period between the seizure of Mukden and the outbreak of the present prolonged hostilities, set the Japanese a lurid example of how to use textbooks in the schools to inspire nationwide hatreds and equally intense loyalties. China's textbooks, during those years, books revised and edited by the then Ministry of Education at Nanking, were so flagrantly anti-Japanese that the Japanese Ambassador filed complaints frequently with the Nanking Foreign Office. Finally, under pressure, revisions were made, and the words "Japan" and "Japanese" were largely deleted, but the textbooks remained filled with stories like the following:

Mr. Hua has a big estate and several children. The latter were busy quarreling with each other when a gang of robbers broke into the northeastern part of the estate. The father called the brothers together and asked them to quit quarreling and join to push out the robbers. They agreed, and the armed gangsters were driven off.

Chinese teachers would then sniggeringly explain to their young pupils that Mr. Hua represented China, "the gang of

robbers" the Japanese, "the northeastern part of the estate" the Manchurian or Northeastern Provinces, and the quarreling brothers the Chinese warlords and politicians.

But even before the Japanese grabbed Manchuria the Chinese were using their textbooks and schools to inculcate rabid anti-foreignism in general, and anti-Japanism in particular, in the minds of Chinese children. In fact Japan often complained about the Manchurian schoolbooks during the years immediately preceding her seizure of Mukden.

In 1932 the League of Nations sent the Lytton Commission of Inquiry to the Far East to investigate Chino-Japanese differences in general and the seizure of Manchuria in particular. In the final Lytton Report, China is charged with having hampered her own progress "by the virulence of the antiforeign propaganda pursued." The report then scathingly commented:—

A perusal of the textbooks used in the schools leaves the impression on the mind of the reader that the authors have sought to kindle patriotism with the flame of hatred, and to build up manliness upon a sense of injury. As a result of this virulent anti-foreign propaganda . . . the students have been induced to engage in political activities which sometimes have culminated in attacks on the persons, homes or offices of Ministers and other authorities. . . . Unaccompanied by effective internal reforms or improvements in national standards, this attitude tended to alarm the Foreign Powers, and to increase their reluctance to surrender the rights which are, at the moment, their only protection.

Today the Japanese are further revising China's school textbooks. Not only are they rigorously deleting all anti-Japanese sentiments and teachings, but they are rewriting the history of China-Japanese relations with ridiculous distortions of facts. They are injecting new preachments of ideas of obedience and are subtly nourishing defeatism in the minds of young Chinese.

But even more important, the former broad antiforeign tenets of the textbooks are being changed to violent anti-white-man slogans, and are seeking to inculcate a fanatical devotion to the scheme of "Asia for The Asiatics."

Of course these textbook revisions have now been made compulsory by orders from the so-called "Central Government" at Nanking, which is being supported under the orders of the Japanese army, but the work of revision is being done by Japanese. Gradually the teaching of the Japanese language is to be made compulsory in all schools. Already at the Medical College of the National University at Peking, Japanese is being used for lectures. The reason advanced for this innovation is "the advanced state of Japanese science and of Chino-Japanese cultural co-operation."

Manchoukuo probably furnishes the model upon which Japan will try to rebuild the shattered educational system of the occupied provinces of China. In Manchoukuo today higher education does not exist. The former thriving universities have been abolished, and the only education to be obtained above the grade of middle schools is that to be had at agricultural colleges and a few medical schools. Every year, however, a few hundred promising Manchurian Chinese are given official scholarships and are sent to universities in Japan.

The determined attempts which the Japanese and their puppet regimes are making to control Chinese education are shown by the situation in Shanghai, where even the educational institutions in the International Settlement and in the French Concession are the targets for continual attacks.

No census has been taken, but it is estimated that at the end of 1940 there were 300,000 pupils and students in the 277 middle schools and twenty-two universities and colleges in Shanghai. Many of these institutions moved into the foreign-controlled area as the Japanese army marched inland. Small

primary schools are so numerous they have not even been counted.

Three notable Chinese educators, openly loyal to the Chinese Government of General Chiang Kai-shek, have been assassinated on the streets of Shanghai by unidentified gangsters. The first was Dr. Herman C. Liu, who was actively identified with anti-Japanese organizations.

The second was Dr. Wu Chih-chieh, president of the Shanghai Women's University. His students suspected that his loyalty was wavering. He declined to reply to their questions, but later published in a Chinese-language newspaper a signed letter proclaiming his detestation of Wang Ching-wei and his plans for a puppet state. Three days later Dr. Wu was shot down and killed by hired assassins.

Then came the case of Dr. Nyieh Hai-fang, principal of the Dah Hai Middle School. He also opposed the "Educational Committee" and was shot and killed by a terrorist.

Three days later all the Chinese educators in Shanghai who had not avowed their support of the "Educational Committee" received identical threatening letters signed "Special Anti-Communist Service of the Chinese Kuomintang." These letters warned the educators that they must "support the anti-communist peace movement, otherwise you will meet the same fate as Dr. Wu and Nyieh Hai-fang."

In September of 1939 the Ministry of Education at Chungking took official cognizance of the struggle going on in the occupied territories by issuing a decree saying that henceforth all diplomas and degrees granted by "traitorous schools" would be null and void and would "never be recognized in China."

Later the Chungking Ministry announced that all students who quit "traitorous schools" will be admitted to Government schools without payment of enrollment fees, while all teachers who refuse to abide by the orders of "traitorous principals"

will be assisted if they wish to establish new schools in the interior provinces still controlled by the Chungking Government.

Shanghai's upper schools, colleges and universities are in a state of political turmoil. Class work suffers. The students of nearly every institution have organized Students' Unions, and these have been federated into a Union of Shanghai Students. They make life miserable for teachers and principals suspected of supporting the Wang Ching-wei regime. They telegraph complaints almost daily to Chungking and placard their campuses with huge posters saying: "WHO SHALL EDUCATE THE COMING CHINESE GENERATIONS—TRAITORS OR PATRIOTS?"

In the far interior of China, to which, in many cases, the entire faculties enrollments of colleges and universities emigrated in a body, anti-Japanese activities engross most of the time of the students, and new textbooks, even more violently anti-Japanese than before, are in general use.

Ironically enough, however, the antiforeign, anti-American and anti-European propaganda, which the Lytton Commission condemned, has been entirely eliminated from the textbooks used in the far interior. For China wants American and European assistance in her long struggle against her Number One Enemy, Japan.

15.

THE ARMY DREAMS ON

WHILE the Japanese Foreign Office continues to work over new trade and fishery treaties with Soviet Russia, and while Japan, Manchoukuo and Russian delegates labor over border delimitation questions, the Japanese Kwangtung Army, which controls Manchuria and is largely a law unto itself, has been busy secretly plotting on grabbing Outer Mongolia from the Soviets and founding a state of vital strategic importance.

The notorious "White" Russian Cossack leader, Ataman Semeonoff, who was such a thorn in the side of General William S. Graves when he was in command of the American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia from 1918 to 1920, is the man who worked out the plans for this bold filching of territory. Ataman Semeonoff presented his scheme to the heads of the Kwangtung Army in Hsinking, the capital of Manchoukuo, on September 19th, 1939. The plan was approved at a secret conference late in December and was taken to Shanghai early in January by Semeonoff himself.

Nothing less than the creation of a Japanese-dominated state including an area of 2,512,500 square miles with a total population of 10,555,000 people is envisioned. This huge, sparsely populated country-to-be is, however, situated so close to the heart of Asia that from it Japan plans to be in a position to dominate radiating trade routes and strategical lines going to India, to Afghanistan, to Russian Turkestan, to inner western Siberia, and to the Lake Baikal and Amur River regions of eastern Siberia.

Ataman Semeonoff's plan envisages forcing Soviet Russia out of Outer Mongolia, combining Outer and Inner Mongolia once more, and then grabbing the vast Chinese province of Sinkiang, or Chinese Turkestan, which is already largely under Soviet Russian domination. Inner Mongolia is now divided into Charhar and Suiyuan Provinces, which have already been largely overrun by the Japanese Army. The Japanese are in occupation of the whole length of the Peking-Suiyuan Railway, which runs from Peking northwesterly for more than 500 miles and ends at Paotow, in Suiyuan Province.

This astounding scheme is not to be carried out with the avowed intention of giving Japan control of the northern half of East Asia. Instead it will be called a fulfillment of Japan's solemn promises to "liberate the Asiatic peoples from the menace and oppression of Communism," and to "found a New Order in Greater East Asia."

"Plan For A Mongol-Mohammedan Federation" is the innocent title of the manuscript with which Semeonoff snared the interest of the adventuring heads of the Japanese Kwang-tung Army. The original of this plan, with Semeonoff's signature, and bound with a large map prepared under his direction, fell into this writer's hands for a few days early in January, 1940, in Shanghai. A rough translation of this document, paragraph by paragraph, reads as follows:

In view of the fact that Germany gave a free hand to the Soviets in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Government declares that it is the destiny of the Red Army to liberate the nations from the yoke of the capitalistic government.

Independent of the fact as to whether a non-aggression pact will be signed between Japan and the Soviets, the possibility will remain that the Soviets may call upon the Asiatic nations to liberate themselves from the oppression of Japan. They will have no difficulty in taking this step under the flag of a Mongolian National Republic, or with the assistance of the Chinese Communist Party.

The Japanese Government made a promise to liberate the Asiatic countries from the oppression of the Comintern and to create a new order. They have to keep their word, as otherwise the people of Asia will lose faith in them.

In order to keep their word, the Japanese must take the following steps:

1. Demand that Moscow withdraw all Soviet troops from Outer Mongolia.
2. Then create, under the protection of Japan, a new buffer state out of North (or Outer) and Inner Mongolia.
3. The Russian emigrants (of their free will) will become subjects of this new State, with full rights. The Russian emigrants consist of 37,000 Buriat Cossacks in Mongolia and of 120,000 White Russians in Manchuria and in China.
4. The buffer State will later include Chinese Turkestan (Sinkiang) with a Mongolian population of 1,000,000, and with more than 1,000,000 Dungan-Mohammedans. There are also more than 30,000 Russian emigrants in Chinese Turkestan—Russians, Kirghize and Sarts.

This buffer State, created in accordance with the foregoing plan, will exist under the official or unofficial control of Japan. The strategical advantages to be gained by Japan will be as follows:

1. All contacts between the Soviets and the Chinese communists will be stopped, and as a result the communist influence and disintegration of China will come to an end.
2. Japan will gain an advantageous position along the Indian

frontier and, because of the present European situation, will be able to establish with England the kind of relations she is wishing for.

The Japanese Government must forget about an alliance with the Soviets because, due to German expansion to the east, the Soviets will be forced to pay closer attention to the situation in the Far East and it will lead to an armed conflict.

The present situation leads either to a Russo-German bloc, directed against Japan, or to a Russo-Japanese bloc directed against Germany.

Germany understands this and is trying to create an armed conflict between Japan and England. At the present moment, more than ever, the Germans think that there is a Yellow Peril. Japan must find co-operation with the enemies of the Russo-German bloc, and the only way to keep her prestige as a great nation in Asia is the formation of the above-mentioned buffer State. This State will control the strategical routes to India, Afghanistan, via Urum-chi to Persia and the Trans-Caspian, and from North Mongolia to Siberia, the Trans-Baikal and the Amur.

If Semeonoff's scheme can ever be carried out, and the attempt to carry it out would certainly precipitate a first-class Russo-Japanese war, Japan would be in control of a stretch of East Asia running from Korea's coasts westward across Manchuria, Jehol, Charhar, Suiyuan and Sinkiang—an airline distance of about 2,500 miles. And this vast Asiatic empire would vary in width, from north to south, from 600 to 900 miles.

Including Korea and all of Manchoukuo, the total area of this projected, this dreamed-of empire would be about one third larger than that of the United States, and the combined populations would be between 65,000,000 and 70,000,000 mixed Asiatics.

The new state itself is designed to include Outer Mongolia, with an estimated area of 1,013,250 square miles and a sparse population of only 2,077,000; Sinkiang, with an area of 1,122,760 square miles and about 4,360,000 people; Suiyuan,

with an area of 182,140 square miles and 2,083,000 population; and Charhar, with 174,345 square miles of area and a population estimated at 2,035,000.

Ataman Semeonoff, who conceived this plan and succeeded in arousing the interest of the Japanese Kwangtung Army in the venture, is one of the most remarkable adventurers in the Far East. Since White Russian resistance to Soviet Russian power in Siberia collapsed about a score of years ago, Semeonoff has continually revolved in Japan's orbit and has usually lived either in Japan, in Dairen, or in Manchoukuo. He is said to have commanded a force of about 16,000 Buriat-Mongol cavalry under the Japanese when the Russian and Japanese armies fought from May until September of 1939 along the Nomonhan portion of the Manchoukuo-Mongolian borders. This force was largely officered by White Russian adherents who were one-time officers in the Czar's Cossack regiments.

Another exploit with which he is credited is having taken Henry Pu Yi, then ex-Emperor of China, from Tientsin to Manchuria in 1931 or early 1932. This is the young man, the last of China's long line of Manchu Emperors, who is now known as Kang Teh, Emperor of Manchoukuo.

Ataman Semeonoff is now fifty-one years of age. He was born in the little Siberian village of Kuranja and was fourteen when the Russo-Japanese war began in 1904. This first aroused his interest in military affairs and he attended the Orenburg Military Academy, where officers were trained for the Imperial Cossack regiments. Because he had learned the Mongol language as a child he was immediately assigned to duty on the Outer Mongolian frontiers.

He recently published a book entitled *By Ataman Semeonoff—About Myself*. This remarkable volume contains a full-page plate showing a reproduction of a document that purports to be Admiral Kolchak's will, and under which that ill-fated defender of Russia's old regime bequeathed to Semeonoff the

headship of what was then the Russian royalist government of Eastern Siberia.

Another of his documentary records that Semeonoff prizes highly is an attested official Russian translation from the Mongol script of an appointment to act as representative of "the Mongolian Nation" in all dealings with foreign Powers. This document, although it is now seventeen years old, was one of the credentials that he submitted to the Kwangtung Army and which was taken as evidence that he still holds considerable power among the Mongol leaders now under Russian domination in Outer Mongolia, which has for many years been a so-called "Soviet Republic." An English translation of this document reads as follows:

We, the representatives of the Mongolian Nation, after due consideration regarding the question of the nomination of a representative of our people to deal with Foreign Powers, with the object of promulgating the rebirth of our Nation, have decided that the only man who can fulfill this mission and who knows the historic past of the Mongols is Chjuan-Wan-Almaz-Machir-Erdeni-Bator Ataman Semeonoff. We have unanimously decided to elect Semeonoff as an Accredited Representative of our Nation with the Foreign Powers to represent the interests of Mongolia.

Signed: Representative of the National Council,
GUN-BAIR-BATOR
Secretary of the National Council,
GUN-TUMEN-YULDZE

March 15th, 1924.

General Graves, in his book *America's Siberian Adventure*, published in 1931, flays Ataman Semeonoff repeatedly. On page 86 he writes: "In September, Semeonoff, who was later shown to be a murderer, robber and a most dissolute scoundrel, came to see me." On page 91: "Semeonoff was later driven out of Siberia, and took refuge in Japan, where he now lives." On page 108 the Graves indictment includes Japan, too, for

he says: "Semeonoff and Kalmikoff soldiers, under the protection of Japanese troops, were roaming the country like wild animals, killing and robbing the people, and these murders could have been stopped any day Japan wished."

On pages 206 and 207 General Graves makes the serious charge that Japan plotted to provoke an armed conflict between American forces and Ataman Semeonoff's soldiers, and says that some of the Japanese knew he had strong evidence to prove these designs.

At one time, during his career in Siberia and Manchuria, Semeonoff ranked so high that Britain, France and Japan assigned military officers to his army as observers. In Semeonoff's book he charges that jealous Russian officials tried to cause trouble between him and Admiral Kolchak and caused his activities to be misunderstood by the Allies. He pays his compliments to the Commander of the American Expeditionary Forces by writing:

"It was unfortunate that the main opposition came from the head of the U. S. Expeditionary Forces, General Graves, who found it necessary to show his sympathy toward the Bolsheviks."

After four years of relative obscurity Semeonoff left Japan for France, allegedly upon the personal invitation of President Poincaré. He went via Canada and the United States, became embroiled in a lawsuit instituted by Yuroveta (South-Russian Company for External Trade), and charges that at that time General Graves "with support from Senator Borah, appeared on the witness stand and gave false evidence."

Since the outbreak of the war in Europe in September of 1939, Ataman Semeonoff says he was invited by Germany to go to Poland to command new regiments made up of Polish Slavs. This, he declares, was probably a trick instigated to get him into the clutches of Soviet Russia.

And, after all, he has bigger fish to fry in the Far East.

16.

FEELING THE PINCH

AFTER more than three and a half years of large-scale warfare against China, warfare largely and even almost uniformly successful in its technical aspects, Japan is reluctantly becoming convinced that she is committed to a profitless enterprise. And, curiously, although Japan is so far the "victor" in this bitter and sanguinary struggle, the Japanese people, proportionally and even actually, are paying a larger price for the conflict than are the people of China.

It seems like recalling ancient history to remember the flushed confidence with which Japan launched her assault upon China in July, 1937. For the Japanese, military and civilians alike, believed that China could not resist for more than from three to six months. By early in 1938, at latest, they envisioned an abject surrender of the Chinese, and after that, holding all manner of concessions and trade privileges, Japan was quickly to wax richer and greater—particularly richer—while China's uncounted millions worked for a pittance producing raw ma-

terials for Japan and spent most of that pittance buying the products of Japan's humming factories.

But now, in early January of 1941, the reality turns out to be shockingly different from the dream, and disillusionment is bitter. Triumphing on a thousand bloody battle fields has brought no victory. Japan's total casualties—killed, wounded and dead from disease in China—are believed to be nearing a total of 1,500,000. The factories that were to have been flooding the China market are closed and silent, or if their chimneys are smoking it is because they are engaged upon essential war orders.

The country's gold is gone, its credit is shaky, national debts have multiplied frighteningly. Luxuries are taboo, and necessities are rationed. The drain of the army upon the nation's man power has brought about a serious shortage of labor. Wages have risen, but prices have risen even more rapidly.

Nearly every phase of the life of every Japanese is feeling the effects of the war. Life is harder, pleasures are fewer, luxuries are banned, clothing is shoddy, food is rationed, amusements are curtailed. Such intellectual and political freedom as the Japanese once enjoyed is now a thing of the past, and even religion is feeling the baneful effects of this long struggle.

Japan, as a nation, is feeling the pinch, too. Japan has no longer any friends. She has incurred the bitter and lasting enmity of more than 400,000,000 Chinese, her neighbors. The United States has now adopted an almost openly hostile attitude, and the Britons are counting upon a day of settlement with the Japanese once Hitler and Mussolini are disposed of. Soviet Russia, always Japan's potential enemy, has not become more friendly since 1937.

Strategically, Japan is in a vulnerable and dangerous position. Her armies, the bulk of her available man power, are strung out along a front, in China alone, of more than 2,800 miles. If Japan becomes involved in a war with another power

she will have to withdraw from most of China's hinterland and from part of the hard-won coastal areas, and during this withdrawal she will be hammered and harassed every foot of the way by avenging Chinese forces.

To lull the people at home, to try and make them forget the pinch of the painfully tightening national belt, Japan's leaders are resorting mainly to phrases and promises. The phrases include two which are old and almost meaningless—"our immutable policies" and "our sacred mission." But there is a new phrase now widely popular with diplomats, military leaders, official spokesmen and the strictly controlled Japanese press: "it goes without saying."

"It goes without saying," the Japanese people are told, that American oils, machine tools and scrap iron are not necessary to the prosecution of the war.

"It goes without saying" that the puppet Wang Ching-wei regime at Nanking will soon rule all of China.

"It goes without saying" that Japan will soon bring about a "New Order in Greater East Asia."

And foreigners, and neutral Powers, when they complain of destructive bombings, of deliberate interference with trade rights, or of indignities suffered at the hands of uniformed Japanese, are blandly told that "it goes without saying" that all these matters will be adjusted—sometime.

My curiosity aroused by the increasing frequency of the use of "it goes without saying," I inquired about the phrase. My informant, a Japanese friend who is an excellent linguist, explained that this is a loose translation of two different Japanese expressions. One of these is "mochiron," the literal translation of which is "argument is unnecessary" or "no argument is called for." The second is a phrase: "mosu made ma naku." This, literally, means "it is not necessary to say."

But it soon will be necessary to say something to keep the folks at home reconciled to the hardships brought upon them

by the military gamble into which their leaders have plunged the nation. After more than three years of warfare it is all too evident that the nation's resources have been seriously depleted, and still there is no victory in sight. It goes without saying that the people of Japan are becoming restive under these depressing conditions.

Rice, the staple food of Japan, is now entirely controlled by the Government, acting through the Imperial Agricultural Societies and the Japan Rice Company, which are Government-controlled. Beginning September 10th, 1940, the collection, distribution and sale of rice became a Government prerogative, and is to be rationed early in 1941. No longer will city dwellers have any basis for complaints that the farmers eat more than their share of rice, for hereafter all land owners and tenant farmers must sell their rice to Government agencies. Heretofore, land owners living in cities have filled their store rooms with rice, while farmers have withheld from sale ample stocks for family use. This will no longer be tolerated. All rice goes into the hands of Government agencies, at fixed prices, and farmers and land owners will hereafter have to buy such quantities as the rationing system permits them to have.

Hereafter week-end "rice eating festivals" in the country are banned. None but official shipments from prefecture to prefecture are permitted, and farmers may no longer send bales of this staple food to sons and daughters in cities or in universities. "Presents" of rice are also banned, for it has been discovered that many of these so-called gifts were really illegal sales at prices higher than the Government scale.

So serious is the food shortage that the Government has now ruled that sumptuous meals are forbidden. Hotels and restaurants may never, under any condition, serve a meal that costs more than five yen. From midnight until eleven the next morning no one may buy a meal costing more than one yen; from 11 A. M. until 4 P. M. the limit per meal per person will be two

yen fifty sen, but dinners served between 4 p. m. and midnight may be as lavish as a price of five yen per plate can purchase. And this is not very much! No single dish, served à la carte, may be priced at more than one yen, and all à la carte orders must be kept within the limits prescribed for the different hours of the day and night. The immediate result has been a sharp drop in the quantity and quality of foods.

An attempt was made to encourage the use of wheat flour as a substitute for rice, but immediately prices of breads and pastries increased so fabulously that the Government ordered price reductions of from 20 to 40 per cent.

Even Buddhist monks of the powerful Zen sect have decided to break a precedent 700 years old and to accept no more rice offerings from the people. Buddhist precepts forbid monks from engaging in any activities for monetary gain, and for centuries the priests have supported themselves and their temples on free rice offerings. Hereafter they will live on vegetables and fruit.

In an effort to check the rise in prices of fruit and vegetables the Government has forbidden middlemen to handle these products, and vendors are limited to a 10 per cent profit. The result was that prices dropped sharply—but so did the supplies of these foods reaching the large cities. Now it is ordered that the twenty-second day of each month, the nation over, shall be a “fruitless day.”

It goes without saying that luxury foods are strictly controlled. No restaurant, hotel nor shop may sell more than two kinds of cake, and the price has been officially cut from twenty to eight sen per cake. So with coffee—no person may have more than one demitasse per day, and the price has been slashed from thirty to fifteen sen per cup. Result—cakes are small and unpalatable, and the coffee would be sniffed with incredulity in Java or Brazil.

For two years Japan has tried to turn her milk products into foreign exchange. Exports of canned milk rose to more than 300,000 cases a year, but now it has been found that the rations of milk permitted to wounded soldiers, undernourished school children and invalids are inadequate, and so these rations are being increased, and exports of canned milk, butter and cheese will be curtailed.

So desperate has become the food situation that the Welfare Ministry is training 150 dieticians, who will go about the country teaching people how to live on "low-cost but nourishing foods." Banks, schools, factories will employ dieticians to teach their staffs how to save, and a fund of 1,000,000 yen has been set aside by the Welfare Ministry to finance demonstration kitchens.

These dieticians work out some startling new dishes. For instance, since butter is forbidden to the people of Japan, the dieticians recommend mashing canned sardines, spreading the mash thickly on toast, and then adding jam on top. "This will permit the export of butter, which is valuable for foreign exchange, and will encourage the consumption of canned sardines, of which there is an unmarketable surplus on hand," says the official explanation.

Just try that combination on your toast at breakfast tomorrow morning and see how wholly right General Sherman was about war.

For a time the Japanese tried to put up a brave front to the foreigners living in their country. Or was it gallantry? At any rate, during July and August, 1940, when no Japanese might have more than half a pound of sugar per month, foreigners were allowed two pounds each. But beginning September 1st foreigners, too, were cut down to half a pound.

Even sake, the rice wine, which is Japan's national alcoholic drink, is suffering strange changes and prohibitions as a result

of the tightening of the national belt. The first mishap was an order that, to save rice, sake should be made from sweet potatoes. Then came a prohibition of any kind of sake drinking from dawn until after five o'clock in the evening, the authorities having decided that "daytime drinking is incompatible with the sacrifices being made by the soldiers on the China fronts."

But worse was in store. Some enterprising experimenter discovered, or so he claims, that sake can be brewed from acorns—which thereby saves sweet potatoes for consumption as food. The last quarter of 1940 saw 5,000,000 gallons of this stuff put on the market, which thus consumed 300,000 tons of acorns that otherwise would have gone to waste on Nippon's rocky mountainsides.

It is not only sake and sake drinkers that suffer. All kinds of gaiety and conviviality are frowned upon. Dancing, even in private homes, is taboo all over Japan, and Tokyo, one of the world's largest cities, is dark and quiet at ten o'clock at night.

The gasoline shortage is changing urban life to a marked degree. Private automobiles are rationed to seven gallons of gasoline a month, hire cars at call stations are permitted forty-five gallons, whereas cruising taxicabs may purchase sixty-one gallons a month. No taxicabs are allowed on the streets between midnight and dawn.

Trucks, except those owned by Army or Navy, stand idle more than half the time, for small trucks are limited to fifty-four gallons every thirty days, medium trucks to eighty-seven gallons, and large trucks may have only one hundred and one gallons.

In Osaka an economy system is being tried out whereunder taxis become in effect small buses. These taxis must wait at specified stations until they have accumulated four passengers before they can start. The system may be made nationwide.

Pro-war fanatics and super-patriots are making life miserable

for the average Japanese. The super-patriots want all dogs, cats and riding horses killed, in order to save food, and advocate having all of Japan's magnificent and picturesque golf courses plowed under and planted to crops.

So far the pets have been saved, and so have the golf courses, but golfers are being made to feel almost like guilty traitors and have voluntarily modified club and playing customs in order to take their game out of the hated "luxury" class.

For instance, the directors of the Japan Golf Association have banned the use of caddies—"an unnecessary luxury not in keeping with wartime simplicities." Hereafter Japanese golfers will not only carry their own clubs and do their own hunting in the rough for lost balls, but in order to help conserve gasoline it is forbidden to ride in private automobiles or taxis going to or from the golf links. Tournaments have been abolished, and all holders of gold or silver golf trophies are urged to surrender their cups or medals to the national treasury.

Skiing almost came under the Government ban, but finally it was decided that this winter sport, popular in Japan's mountain districts, is "good for national health," but "those many insincere skiers who ski merely for enjoyment" will be subjected to official reprimands. Manufacturers of sporting apparel are urged to make skiing outfits "in more somber colors, in keeping with the guiding spirit of the nation."

With restrictions multiplying, and with killjoys in high places of authority, it goes without saying that the Japanese people are sighing for "the good old days," and are seriously wondering whether the military gains in China are worth the price they are paying. And the public is not greatly cheered by the fact that whenever Chiang Kai-shek's forces claim a victory, the invariable official Japanese retort is: "It goes without saying that such claims are just false Chinese propaganda."

September of 1940 was a month of hasty purchases and of

busy readjustments in merchandising and in industry, for October 7th was the date set for formally inaugurating an official Government ban on a long list of luxuries.

This rush to buy articles soon to be forbidden began in August, and for that month in Tokyo alone the tax on the retail sales of luxuries was 520,000 yen larger than in any month in the city's history. Frigidaires, electric fans and imported cameras were bought to the imposing total of 10,681,300 yen in Tokyo in August alone, whereas other luxuries in great demand were embroidered sashes, all kinds of imported clothing, brass bedsteads, desks and jewelry.

Gold or platinum jewelry were not in demand, of course, for the Finance Ministry is expected soon to promulgate an edict demanding the sale to the national treasury of all gold and platinum articles still in the possession of the Japanese people. Large fines will be imposed against hoarders, for Japan wants to collect and melt down for export every gold or platinum ring, necklace, watch, and cigarette case. It is expected that by the middle of 1941 there will be no gold in Japan, literally, except that already in the fillings of teeth. And that, as everyone knows who has ever seen a toothy Japanese smile, will still constitute quite an important reserve of precious metal.

Japanese-made cigars and cigarettes have always had an evil reputation with smokers from other lands, but since September 1st of 1940 the quality has abruptly become worse. Now no cigar may be made that is to sell for more than one yen, and no pipe mixtures may be marketed at more than seventy sen an ounce. Imported brands continue prohibitive in price, for tobacco is a Government monopoly, and the import tax is 385 per cent.

It was on July 7th, 1940, that the further manufacture of luxuries was officially prohibited, and wholesalers and retailers were given until October 7th to dispose of stocks already on hand. This luxury ban had a violently dislocating effect upon

industry. More than 100,000 men and women who were expert weavers of velvets, embroidered sashes and costly brocades found themselves out of work. The number of unemployed was vastly increased when jewelers, ivory carvers, makers of cloisonné and fine porcelains found themselves jobless. On September 6th the Ministry of Commerce and Industry announced that "only some 1,000 of these people" had so far found new employment. New legislation to compel these men and women to take jobs in war industry plants was being considered.

At the end of August a census of the department stores and silk shops indicated that more than 300,000,000 yen worth of luxury silks would have to be sacrificed before October 7th, after which they would either have to be destroyed or re-woven. For after October 7th embroidered silks, gay-colored silks and silks spun with gold or silver threads were officially banned from sale. The first week of September saw frantic price slashing of silks going on all over Japan. To re-dye and re-weave these magnificent fabrics, to pluck out all the embroidery, and to extract all the gold and silver threads would be prohibitively costly, and so the stores and shops cut retail prices 30 per cent, then 40 per cent, and finally 65 per cent. But still they failed to attract many buyers, for after October 7th people who wore luxury silks were to be classed as "light-minded or traitorous."

Censorious snoopers and busy tattletales are taking much of the joy out of the lives of beauty-loving Japanese women and young girls. In Tokyo, for ten days beginning September 4th, the Municipal Social Education Bureau began a close scrutiny of female pedestrians. A preliminary check up lasting only one hour at one Tokyo street intersection reported that out of 1,172 women and girls "patriotically scrutinized" twenty-seven had their hair done in unpatriotic elaborate fashion, 192 had luxury belongings, 172 were wearing luxury silk kimonos, and 163

others wore suspiciously expensive-looking foreign style suits and dresses.

No detailed list of men who defy the war-bred puritanical spirit was given out, but it was darkly hinted that too many men wore imported gloves and gold rings, or carried walking sticks or umbrellas with gold or silver handles. Shoes of costly looking foreign leather were also regarded with suspicion.

But all of Japan's women are not submitting tamely to the drive to make them wear drab clothes and dispense with make-up or beauty aids. In Tokyo quite a scandal has developed over what the authorities term "an unbecoming frivolity toward the serious business of creating a New Order in Greater East Asia." It seems that serious-minded war widows and spinsters organized to picket Tokyo's principal streets and to hand out printed rebukes to fashionably dressed women and girls.

These printed slips informed the well-dressed offenders that "the true patriot should avoid gay colors, permanent waves, lipstick, and any details of dress which smack of foreign influence."

But the more smartly dressed girls of Tokyo refused to feel rebuked, and refused to change their style of dress. Instead, spirited competitions got under way; some girls accented the beauty and gaiety of their attire, and tried to collect as many printed admonitions as possible.

It is evident, however, that the Gloomy Gus battalions are gaining strength and prestige, and the Glamorous Gussies will have to conform. The Japanese Federation of Women's Associations, a powerful national organization, has launched a campaign to induce all women and girls to a standard inflexible style of hair dress and headgear, "more in keeping with the present serious times."

The hair dress decided upon is that which was fashionable about 800 A. D. according to old paintings. The hair is to be worn brushed straight back from the forehead, tied with tape

at the back of the neck and then tied in a knob. Those who have bobbed hair are told they may wear it "rolled inward at the back in page-boy style."

The type of hat chosen for uniform wear by the Federation is frankly ugly—a low-crowned round affair with a uniform narrow brim. The colors must be black, dark blue or gray. The women embattled in the cause of uniformity declare that they will not hesitate to stop offenders on the streets and publicly upbraid them as lacking in patriotism. Besides disapproving of permanent waves and lipstick, the puritanical ones will scorn all who use eye shadow or nail polish.

And now—shades of Madame Butterfly!—there is a new movement afoot not only to prescribe uniform kimonos for geishas and waitresses in restaurants, but even to ban geishas entirely and force them to become domestics or take up work in war industry plants.

Hotel and restaurant owners at Asama Hot Springs have already banned geishas from their establishments, and the movement is spreading. In Tokyo the Metropolitan Police Board, co-operating with the National Spiritual Mobilization Committee and the Restaurant Owners' Association, has finally banned the wearing of gay or patterned kimonos by all waitresses in the capital. Hereafter they must wear a cheap pongee produced in Nagano prefecture, and kimonos must be all of solid colors. And there are only six colors from which to choose—olive green, pale blue, chestnut, scarlet-wisteria, silver gray and gray.

The men of Japan suffer from war economies too, and in ways far more serious than having their geishas and waitresses go drab on them. Leather shoes, for instance, when they are to be had at all cost from sixty yen up a pair—more than a month's pay in many cases. During the summer of 1940 hundreds of American and European men went back to Shanghai and other cities in China after vacations in Japan owning,

literally, only the shoes on their feet. They had sold their other shoes at fabulous prices to men in Japan who begged for the privilege of buying them second hand.

Since the Army grabs nearly all the wool to be found in East Asia, the Japanese men who wear foreign-style suits have had clothing as shoddy as their fishskin or pasteboard imitation-leather shoes. For early in 1940 the authorities decreed the use of "staple fiber," which turned out to be mostly bark and wood pulp, with a very slight admixture of wool and a somewhat larger proportion of cotton. The stuff soon simply bursts at elbows, knees and shoulders. And even the Japanese men who wear cotton kimonos soon found that the one-time pure cotton cloth was half bark and wood pulp, which would not survive many washings.

Of course your kimono-clad Japanese man does not worry about buttons, but the others do. And from now on their worries will increase, for Japan's new buttons are to be made of a mixture of clay and resin. All the metal buttons in the Empire will be melted up for the use of the munitions plants, and bone buttons will be used for army and navy uniforms exclusively.

The pinch of war has brought to Japan the doubtful blessing of fully as many boards and bureaus as the New Deal brought to the United States, but in Japan they are not designated by queer alphabetical jumbles. The powerful Wartime Livelihood Consultation Bureau is never referred to as the WLCB, but it has been given entire central control over the importation of books and magazines into the Empire. Not only does this bureau censor and control imported reading matter but buys wholesale orders of books and magazines from abroad and has been granted special dispensations for the purchase of foreign exchange for such purchases.

Then there is what our New Deal might have called the NSMH, or National Spiritual Mobilization Headquarters. This

organization has issued a stern decree ordering all Japanese cartoonists to "confine attempts to amuse to subjects in accordance with the spirit of the times, and with the New Order in Greater East Asia." Cartoonists are ordered to popularize economy in rice consumption, to flay the use of luxuries, and to make the people hate war profiteers.

In Tokyo there is the majestic MPB, or Metropolitan Police Board, which by a mere order can force men or corporations out of business. Tokyo newspapers report that the MPB on September 7th, 1940, decided the paper shortage in Japan is growing acute, and therefore has decided to dissolve 143 of the 150 publishing companies that have been issuing industrial, financial and trade papers and magazines. The seven survivors will be permitted, collectively, to continue fifty publications, but they must all be of reduced size.

This same MPB has also ordered theaters to suspend morning performances and to save paper by reducing by half the size of programs and posters. Coincident with this order to the theaters was a decree forbidding pupils or students of schools or colleges from attending theaters or cinemas except on holidays, and even then they must be accompanied by teachers or professors. Moreover, students must walk and become sturdy instead of using taxis, buses or rickshas, may not patronize billiard or mah jongg houses and are forbidden to patronize cafés or bars where waitresses are employed.

Undoubtedly, wishful thinking has colored much of the speculation as to the extent to which forty-four months of hostilities have drained the resources of the Japanese treasury and to what extent this long-drawn conflict has wearied the spirit of the people. Although it is true that Japan is war weary, the people still accept with fortitude the steadily tightening blockade of what, even in peacetime, were their pitifully few comforts, their very cheap pleasures, and now even the simple necessities of their normally frugal lives.

Indirect taxation has become enormous, and now for the first time in the history of modern Japan direct taxation has become a really serious burden. Government bonds must be bought under what has actually become a system of moral blackmail. Remorselessly and without check the list of banned, rationed or diluted commodities lengthens from week to week.

The budget grows and grows, and vastly more than half of the total goes for various war purposes. Even more sinister is the fact that of the remaining portion of the budget, more than half goes for interest on outstanding loans. Practically nothing now goes for social services, and the appropriations for education continue to decline steadily. Year by year more and more "red ink" bonds are issued to fill the gap between expenditure and actual Government revenue.

Whatever the outcome of Japan's long war, chaos seems bound to occur in the Empire's finance. Long ago the late Finance Minister Takahashi issued a warning to the effect that when Japan issued "red ink" bonds to make up her deficit she was "taking the money out of an empty pocket." In other words, these bonds are not taken directly by the people but by the limited funds of banks, trust companies, savings societies and insurance companies. It is money the people have put there. And next year, to pay interest on this money, more "red ink" bonds are issued!

Commodity prices, on the average, have increased more than 30 per cent, the purchasing power of the people has weakened, and although the total sum of bank notes in circulation goes on increasing, the security for these notes has admittedly been reduced from 35 to 32 per cent. Inflation seems to be just around the corner.

Friendless, and with her back to the wall, in an international sense, Japan today is reverting to old-time ways in more respects than styles of hairdressing for its women. All foreign influences and personages in the Empire have become suspect.

Even the Christian churches in Japan have seen fit to cut all foreign ties. The National Christian Council, which includes more than thirty Protestant organizations and more than twenty foreign missions, late in August, 1940, voted to refuse all foreign financial help in future and to "create a new Christian structure to conform to the spirit of the times." This means that all American, Canadian and British missionaries in Japan must get out. American missionaries in the Empire, including Korea and Formosa, total 680 active salaried workers. Including their families, the American mission group totals 1,186 persons who will have to seek new fields of work or go home.

The Japanese Salvation Army, after being accused of carrying on espionage work for Great Britain, has decided to sever all connections with the London headquarters of that international organization. British officers of the Salvation Army in Japan will have to leave the country, and the name of the organization will be changed to The Salvation Association.

This movement against foreigners, based largely upon distrust, is even to hit Japan's educational institutions. The Christian Educational Union has decided to refuse funds from abroad hereafter, and immediately to displace, with qualified Japanese, foreigners serving as presidents and deans of colleges and universities.

Even the Rotary Club has become the victim of this anti-foreign phobia. The Japanese Federation of Rotary, which represents forty-seven thriving Rotary Clubs in Japan and Manchoukuo, has officially decided that the international character of Rotary is incompatible with Japan's "New Order in Greater East Asia," and so Rotary is disbanding in Japan and the clubs will be reorganized and called East Asia Service Clubs.

It goes without saying that the Army is delighted with this super-nationalistic trend. Or maybe the Army ordered it. In Japan one never knows.

Not only are foreign influences being squeezed out, but

there is a strong movement under way to revive and promote influences considered purely Japanese. The Shrine Bureau of the Home Ministry is organizing a vast campaign in which more than 15,000 Shinto and Buddhist priests will be mobilized in an effort to induce the people to lead more pious lives. Every family will be urged to have a household shrine and to conduct worship at that shrine every morning and evening. Religious education will also be reintroduced into the primary schools all over the Empire if the plan succeeds.

With the nation feeling the pinch of its protracted war effort so keenly that even matches are rationed (the allowance is five per day per person), Japan's Empire Builders are nevertheless urging earlier marriages and more children. In one breath they tell the world that Japan is overpopulated and therefore must expand and in the next breath they urge ever larger families, although they admit that the falling birthrate is due to "economic insecurities resulting from the hostilities."

The Welfare Ministry has gone into the poster business and has two favorite slogans emblazoned over the country: "Early marriages are a benefit for the nation" and "Children are the country's hope and treasure."

Special investigators employed by the Ministry report that couples who marry at ages between fifteen and twenty have a child every thirty months, whereas couples who marry at ages ranging from twenty-five to thirty are much less prolific and have a child on the average only once every thirty-six to thirty-eight months. Birthrate figures in 1920 stood at 36.2 per thousand of population, but when the last tally was made, in 1938, the rate had fallen to 26.7 per thousand.

This decline is so serious, to the militarists, that they now sponsor cheap weddings, with all costs, including a feast, limited to twenty yen. The Welfare Ministry is now even establishing Eugenic Matrimonial Advice Boards in Osaka, Kobe, Nagoya, Kyoto and Yokohama, following the great

success achieved within the last year by such a board experimentally established in one of Tokyo's largest department stores. This particular store now even acts as go-between and arranges marriage contracts—all as "a national service."

State interference with the personal life of the individual can scarcely go farther than the new policy announced by the Welfare Ministry at mid-August. At that time investigators were scattered over Tokyo to inquire into the financial status of more than 4,000 married couples in order to determine the *minimum* income necessary to support wives and given numbers of children.

"When this minimum income has been found," says the Ministry's announcement, "the Ministry will investigate the financial status of wage-earning potential brides and grooms, and all those whose earnings are deemed sufficient will be urged to marry at once and have as many children as they can support."

If you ask any of Japan's military or political leaders how the Japanese public takes to these dictations and deprivations—how the public responds to rationing and ever-increasing demands for sacrifices—the reaction will be an expression of shocked surprise. And then the reply will be:

"Oh, the public is enthusiastic about all these measures. It goes without saying."

But the public—

It goes without.

17.

ANTI-AMERICAN CHORUS

THE exact number of American grievances and complaints against Japan, when last officially announced at Washington, slightly exceeded six hundred. Doubtless a few minor cases have since been amicably settled, but it is certain that with the beginning of 1941 the total had risen to a new all-time high. Since the formal recognition by Japan of Mr. Wang Ching-wei's puppet regime in Nanking, which occurred late in 1940, the Japanese Government will take the attitude that all future American grievances, except those in which the Japanese military are directly involved, will be the business of the new "Government of China." Tokyo, tongue in cheek, will disavow responsibility and refer Washington to Nanking. It's an old game.

Hereafter there will be no more actual respect shown for American rights in China than before, but the violations of these rights will be carried out by the new "Central Government of China" located at Nanking and headed by Mr. Wang

Ching-wei. When or if Washington complains to Tokyo, the Japanese Government, with every show of politeness, will disclaim all responsibility and will refer Washington to Nanking. But Washington will not recognize Nanking, will not deal with Nanking and will probably not be able to produce actual proof that every move made by Nanking is dictated or approved by the Japanese military.

Disputes will grow more and more acrimonious, the Japanese people will be told by their propagandists that America is selfishly trying to obstruct the "New Order in Greater East Asia," and the Chinese people in the occupied areas—if Japan succeeds in her plans—will be stirred to a dangerous degree of anti-Americanism.

This iniquitous program of using the Wang Ching-wei regime as a cat's paw against the United States has already been effectively launched, and preposterous misrepresentations of American aims and policies in the Far East are appearing in the columns of Nanking-supported newspapers and magazines and are to be found day after day in the releases of the Shanghai news service subsidized by the new Nanking Government. They go out daily, too, in Chinese-language radio broadcasts from Nanking and from Shanghai.

The scheme is not new. Japan tried it, and with success, in Manchuria. There was no anti-American or anti-foreign agitation movement in Manchuria, but third-Power nationals were quickly and effectively stripped of all rights they had previously enjoyed under treaties, and Manchoukuo was made a Japanese monopoly. Protests sent to Tokyo were disregarded—Manchoukuo was doing the deed. Japanese advisors in Manchoukuo? Certainly, but merely as salaried employees of the Manchoukuo Empire.

This process, and these specious excuses and evasions, are to be repeated in short order in the Japanese-occupied areas of China. Wang Ching-wei's regime will announce, as did the

regime of Emperor Kang Teh in Manchuria, an intention to abide by all the treaties to which China has subscribed and to honor all the financial and contractual obligations into which China entered previous to the outbreak of the present Chino-Japanese hostilities.

Then Nanking will begin to make exceptions—will say that these pledges will hold good only in the cases of governments that have granted the Japanese puppet regime official recognition. Those governments will be Japan, Manchoukuo, and possibly later, Italy, Germany and Salvador. Thailand, too, may be reluctantly dragged onto the bandwagon. But the United States, Britain, France and other countries that continue to regard the Chungking Government, headed by General Chiang Kai-shek, as the legitimate Government of China, will get nothing but snubs from Nanking. And the United States, because of our repudiation of our 1911 trade treaty with Japan, and because we are the world's most powerful nation not now engaged in any war, will be singled out for special hymns of hate. Britain and France, having their hands full in Europe, can be plucked in East Asia with impunity, and at present they are powerless to offer effective opposition to Japan's ambitious plans.

International political machinations in the Orient have bizarre and grotesque implications these days, and when European relations with the China-Japan struggle are considered, one is apt to become not only incredulous but even a little giddy.

Tokyo, Rome and Berlin still solemnly affirm that their famous “anti-Comintern axis” is a potent affair. The new Nanking Government has pledged support to the “anti-Comintern axis,” and Tokyo and Nanking jointly proclaim that Chiang Kai-shek’s Chungking Government is allied with Russia. In fact, this fiction is offered as the main excuse for what Japan now calls her “holy war” in China.

And yet Japan not only knows that Germany continues to give Chiang Kai-shek a large measure of technical and material assistance, but even a very influential portion of the Japanese Army, while egging Nanking on against Communism, actually openly favors an alliance with Moscow in retaliation against America's pressure policy against the "New Order."

Consider this anomaly stated differently: America lends money to, sympathizes with and actively aids the pro-Russian Chiang Kai-shek Government; therefore, Japan must ally itself with Russia (which aids General Chiang) in order to avenge herself against the perfidious U. S. A.

If that isn't foolishness, then it must be hysteria.

Wang Ching-wei's new Nanking regime has three main channels for news and propaganda. First in importance comes a daily Chinese-language newspaper, the *Central China Daily News*. Mr. Wang himself wrote many of this newspaper's editorials before the new government was formally launched in Nanking. Second comes a daily news service, put on in Chinese and in English by the China News Agency. Third ranks the *People's Tribune*, a fortnightly review published in English and edited by Mr. Tang Leang-li.

Mr. Tang, it must be explained, has been one of Mr. Wang's most loyal satellites for more than a decade. He was at Wang Ching-wei's elbow when Wang was the civilian head of the government established in Peking in 1930 by Generals Feng Yu-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan when they rebelled against the then Nanking Government. He was with Wang Ching-wei when the latter switched over, became a high official at Nanking and, amazingly, supported General Chiang Kai-shek. He is with him now, of course, and has been made Vice-Minister of Publicity for the new puppet government.

It is significant that about half of the bulk of each day's releases put out by the China News Agency consists of the full text of the editorial of the day in Wang Ching-wei's *Central*

China Daily News. As a sample of the kind of anti-American agitation carried on by Mr. Wang's daily newspaper, consider three editorial pronouncements published in February of 1940. On February 17th we find:

It may be said that America's intention is to restore the *status quo* that existed between China and Japan prior to the present hostilities and to take over the leading position previously held by Britain in the Far East so as to create a new balance of power in this part of the world. . . . This has been the guiding principle of America's Far Eastern policy. Because of this policy America has strongly opposed any compromise between Japan and Britain. She has also opposed any possible compromise between Chungking and Japan. As a result, although Japan is willing, she finds it impossible to reach any understanding with America.

Then, using the word "China" to denote Mr. Wang's own Nanking regime, the editorial proceeds:

We have to tell Americans that the fundamental cause of the present abnormal relations between China, [i. e., Wang's Japanese-controlled Nanking set-up] and America is the lack of respect America holds for China. America should realize the fact that the Chinese people are paying hardly any attention to the so-called Nine-Power Treaty. In fact, they hate the one-sided Open Door policy, which they regard as an open insult to the Chinese nation. . . . If any third Power, including the United States, interferes with China's internal politics and jeopardizes China's rights, effective measures will be taken to debar such activities.

On February 25th this newspaper became even more bitter, the editorial of that date saying in part:

Compromise between Japan and America is impossible because the latter has just begun its campaign to obtain the leading position in the Far East. . . . If Britain and America stop China [i. e. Nanking] from negotiating directly and independently with Japan, effective measures will be taken against these Powers. The measures

will include the retrocession of the Concessions. It is our determination to take back the Concessions, and we believe we can do it.

Of course Mr. Wang Ching-wei's puppet regime can take the Concessions. Nothing would be more simple than to put Japanese soldiers into Chinese uniforms—if the Japanese Army dares to go so far as to consent to such a flimsy attempt at deception.

On February 28th the *Central China Daily News* declared that "it was America who took the initiative against Japan," and that Japan has been "extremely tolerant with America" because of economic reasons.

No mention is made, of course, of Americans killed by Japanese bombs and shells, of the sinking of the *Panay*, of the bombing or burning of American missions, schools and hospitals, of the illegal destruction of American trade, of the slippings and other indignities that American citizens have suffered from Japanese soldiers, of promises repeatedly made and just as repeatedly broken by the Japanese Government. No, "America took the initiative against Japan." We have the word of Mr. Wang's own newspaper for it!

The editorial of February 28th then continues to the effect that "the United States Government has repeatedly declared that American attacks against Japan are the outcome of Japan's activities of undermining the sovereign and territorial integrity of China, and her plans to oust third-Power interests from China."

No matter what Japan may reply to such diplomatic statements, the editorial declares with a pretense of sturdy independence: "China resents such unpleasant utterances."

Ho-hum!

The Chinese people realize the present situation [the editorial continues]. For years Japan considered China as her enemy, whereas America treated China as her protectorate. At present

Japan is prepared to treat China as a friend, but America still hopes to become master of the Far East. Japan, at least, respects China as a nation [sic], but America still adheres to the attitude that made the authorities of the foreign Concessions in Shanghai, years ago, ban "Chinese and dogs" from the public parks. On the one hand America demands the Open Door in China, whereas on the other she prohibits the entry of Chinese into American territory. Under these conditions it is but natural that Chinese people despise America's hypocritical statements.

But it has remained for the Tang Leang-li fortnightly review, *The People's Tribune*, to set a new high record for vituperative attacks upon America and for misrepresentation of America's policies in the Far East. Mr. Tang's own editorials have a touch of bitter invective somewhat reminiscent of the style of Eugene Chen, who was three times Foreign Minister of various Chinese regimes. But whereas Tang Leang-li's style is argumentative, Mr. Chen thought and wrote in headlines, and the Chen papers had an intellectual texture that the writings of Mr. Tang lack.

In a December issue of *The People's Tribune* appeared two astounding articles, one headed "American Aims and Policies in China," and the other "Chinese and Dogs Not Admitted." The former has the following concluding sentences:

American imperialist policy in China is now clear and definite. It is, simply and terribly, rule or ruin, or, rather, ruin and rule.

Some of the steps by which the writer reaches this amazing conclusion are as follows:

For the past year it has been direct American intervention repeated again and again that has maintained the fiction of the Chung-king Government's "sovereignty" in ports and coastal areas where such authority does not in fact exist.

These things are not matters of dispute but are facts familiar to every informed person. Another fact is that America is widely re-

garded as a special friend of China. Certainly, Chinese have always wished and tried to regard America as their friend. Dr. Sun Yat-sen, during most of his life, held America in high regard. . . .

If, therefore, today, we find America as the main financial and diplomatic support of one particular group in China, and able to oblige other Powers to follow her lead, it is necessary to inquire into the actual nature of American aims and policies toward China and the Chinese. This must not be dealt with carelessly or superficially, with stock phrases and archaic slogans such as "Open Door" and "sovereignty" and "territorial integrity of China." The use of these two phrases together is one of the most striking examples of the loose thinking in existence today, as they are directly and absolutely contradictory to one another. . . .

Referring to missionary effort, the article says:

Here again we have an example of the "good intentions" of many Americans at that period. Some of them sincerely felt that they were doing the Chinese a favor by giving them a chance to adopt Christianity and in the "glorious hereafter" to pull rickshas in the Christian heaven. . . .

American policy became the policy of securing for its merchants and missionaries any privileges extractable from China by any possible means. Americans took an active and prominent part not merely in the opium traffic but in the "convoy" racket [extortion and piracy of Chinese vessels] and in the great and profitable "coolie traffic"—the shipping of kidnaped Chinese to the American continent, where they were sold as slaves. . . .

Instead of the "partition" of China, with British or other Powers establishing direct control over particular areas, the Americans stood for the reduction of China as a whole to the status of a joint colony of all the Powers, with "equality of opportunity" to plunder. . . .

"Territorial integrity" has involved another fundamental and vital American principle—recognition and support to the weak and subservient governments in China. A strong and united China, with five hundred million people under the control of a stable and

effective government, would need no foreign guarantees of its "territorial integrity." Such a China, however, would not be subservient to foreign Powers, who could hope for nothing better than treatment on a basis of equality. Neither the American nor any other imperialistic government would favor the "territorial integrity" of a really strong and independent China, even if it could be linked with it in a friendly and equal alliance. . . .

From 1853 to the present day the United States Government has thrown its steadily increasing influence—with comparatively brief interruptions—on the side of the "territorial integrity" of a China ruled by the most corrupt subservient agents the Powers could find. . . .

American policy in China has become, in a way, defensive. It is determined to maintain all the privileges—extraterritorial exemption from Chinese laws and taxation, the privilege of participating in China's coastal trade, and even the commerce of her great internal waterways, investment and participation in great airlines flying over Chinese territory, participation in the government of the International Settlement at Shanghai, and all the advantages that foreign enterprises gain through Western treaty ports, concessions and settlements on Chinese territory—privileges obtained by force, by fraud or by the intimidation or bribery of dependent and subservient Chinese governments from the Manchus to General Chiang Kai-shek.

In the meantime, America has increased her actual domination over China—so far as the Chiang regime is concerned. General Chiang is mainly and directly dependent upon the United States Government for support, financially and diplomatically. He has plundered China of all available silver, for profitable sale to his American patrons. China has even ceased to have a national currency, her silver is gone, and the Chiang regime paper is entirely dependent upon the support given it by the American and associated governments.

American policy in China is, now, aimed at the destruction of China. The financing of a war that has devastated ever-wider areas of China for the last two and a half years has not been an extremely heavy burden upon the American treasury. Enormous American

loans and investments will be required for the reconstruction of devastated areas, and China may become an American economic colony. America's success would mean her establishment over China as a whole of even greater control than she now exercises over its agent Chiang Kai-shek.

Therefore, the writer concludes:

AMERICAN IMPERIALIST POLICY IN CHINA IS NOW CLEAR AND DEFINITE. IT IS, SIMPLY AND TERRIBLY, RULE OR RUIN, OR, RATHER, RUIN AND RULE.

But worse is yet to come. In that same December issue of *The People's Tribune* another article revives the old grievance because long ago one of the Shanghai parks displayed a set of rules, one of which forbade entrance to Chinese and another forbade taking dogs inside the gates. Then, says the anonymous author, whose style is remarkably like that of the editor of the magazine:

The American Government, however, is far more determined and thoroughgoing in its contemptuous exclusion of Chinese than the Shanghai Municipal Council ever was. Chinese are emphatically not wanted in the United States.

After conceding that the American exclusion law does not debar Chinese students, the article continues:

There is no more bitterly anti-Chinese regime in the world than the United States Government. Chinese are most ruthlessly excluded from the United States. In some of the more important cities they are confined to regular "ghettos"—America's Chinatowns.

The writer charges that students are freely admitted to the United States from China solely because America wants to school them and use them as "servants of American policy" when they return to their homeland. After digging up and distorting much of the history of America's relations with China

nearly a century ago, the article proceeds to the American decision to return the Boxer Indemnity funds to China and says:

The Government, however, did not wish to return them [the funds] to China. For America to give anything to China except fraud, murder, misery, robbery and a "Christian salvation" as fraudulent as America's treaty pledges would be a most dangerous break of precedent. The "educational fund" was a happy solution. The money was not returned to China at all. Ill gotten, that Chinese money was devoted exclusively to finance American propaganda against the Chinese. And the Washington Government made the contemptible and hypocritical flourish of "returning" the money, forming with some Chinese scholars and officials the "Boxer Indemnity Fund" for its administration.

The devotion of these funds to American propaganda, to bring up Chinese students in a silly and childish faith in America's "traditional friendship for China," was quite understandable. But the "generous" flourish with which this was done, as if the money were being "returned to China" for the "good of China" is one of the most despicable examples of hypocritical fraud on record. In this the United States Government actually "out-America'd" itself. . . .

Of course, being pro-Japanese, this magazine deeply resents the fact that it was the returned American Boxer Indemnity Funds that educated a large majority of the engineers, scientists, physicians and other men with technical training who are today so important to the continuation of Chinese resistance against Japanese aggression. Then follows this amazing paragraph:

In a century of Chinese-American treaty relations, in only *one* instance has the United States Government acted as a friend of China. This was purely a negative act, when President Wilson in 1913, at the beginning of his administration, withdrew from the International Consortium that America had previously promoted, whose predatory activities had provoked the Chinese Revolution

and which was at the time engaged in financing Yuan Shih-kai *against* the Revolution. But even this absolutely unique act of American friendship was made *under Japanese pressure*, when the threat of war with Japan was menacing American imperialism in the Far East. . . .

After making the rather fatuous point that even Chinese dogs, the well-bred ones or the crossbred "wonks," may enter the United States so long as they have no mange or rabies and are clean and healthy, the author concludes his article with these two paragraphs of diatribe:

Seventy years ago the "pigtailed" and "sub-human" creatures known as "Chinks" were considered useful as contract laborers in America, toiling at starvation wages and furnishing subjects for torture and auto-da-fé by Christian mobs. Today they are considered useful cannon fodder for the protection of "American interests" in China and as targets for American munitions profitably disposed of. Christian America still supplies the materials for the auto-da-fé, while China still supplies the victims. Otherwise, America has little use for the "Chinks." In America itself they are distinctly and emphatically not wanted. The United States Government, as noted, officially grades the "Chink" lower than the "wonk."

The old Shanghai notice-board, therefore, is not quite applicable to the United States. The notice-board on the gates of "friendly America" is far more ambiguous and contemptuous. Healthy dogs are admitted; mad dogs and mangy wonks and "Chinks" must keep out.

When the American Ambassador to Japan, Joseph Clark Grew, made his famous luncheon speech in Tokyo in October, 1939, and told the Japanese frankly the American opinion of their depredations on the Asiatic mainland, there was great rejoicing amongst all patriotic Chinese. America was acting as China's friend, and the Grew address, following upon the heels of Washington's denunciation of the trade treaty with Japan,

vastly heartened all Chinese engaged in the struggle against Japan. But the November, 1939, *People's Tribune* misrepresented the situation as follows:

Not a word, it will be noted, about China's wrongs and the sufferings of the Chinese people, not a word about Japanese aggression. All that the United States Government and people are concerned with is the threat to American privileges.

In the past we have been given to believe that America is the friend of China and the Chinese people, their champion against Western aggression and imperialism. She has set her face against any "sphere of influence" policy being adopted by the aggressive Powers; she, more than anyone, has in the past been responsible for preventing further sacrifices being demanded of China by those Powers. She has claimed no concessions for herself, avoided all territorial commitments in this country. If she has not actually denounced the unequal treaties, or offered to forego the privileges she enjoys under them, she had till now never actively championed them. This is what we are repeatedly told by the apologists and compradores of imperial America. But not a word is said as to the treatment of Chinese nationals in America, the only civilized country at present where "*Chinese and dogs are not allowed*". . .

The truth is that America's attitude has been dictated not by any regard for the principles of international fair dealing and justice, but merely by the interest of American business.

China in her war with Japan has been fighting for the United States, fighting, indeed, for all the signatories of the Nine-Power Treaty, but none of those for whom she is fighting has shown any signs of coming to her assistance, or seem likely to do so, merely for her sake alone. This is a fact which Mr. Wang Ching-wei realized long since, hence in part his decision that further prolongation of the war was useless. Why should China ruin herself for the sake of others? Today the Chungking administration is in the plight of a stray dog that has gotten into a fight and in consequence is looking for a master. All the bystanders cheer it on, but not one of them will own it, since that would involve

feeding it and caring for it. The Chungking puppet is still a stray dog without a master. . . .

It is no wonder, then, that a change is to be seen in America's policy. Mr. Grew's speech gave the first clear indication of it.

America thus comes forward as the champion of the unequal treaties, the defender of foreign privileges, of concessions, of extraterritoriality and of foreign abuse of extraterritoriality as manifested by such illegal extensions of it as the stationing of foreign troops on Chinese soil. The New Order in Asia is to be opposed because it may conflict with American privileges; that it may, through the co-operation of Japan and China as friends and equals, bring untold benefits to the people of those two countries is apparently of no matter. The new Central Government, it would seem, can expect no sympathy from America if it persists, as it assuredly will, in its demands for the Konoye terms in full, though, no doubt, it could by agreeing to a further prolongation of the unequal treaties and the system they symbolize soon obtain that sympathy. . . .

There is no hope, then, for China in Chungking or America. Both are dominated entirely by motives of self-interest, and those who look to see a free and independent China as a result of a Chungking victory with American and Russian help are nursing an illusion. What would it profit China indeed to drive out Japan by such methods only to find herself, as she would, the tool of Russia and in bondage to America, where Chinese and dogs are not allowed—further than ever from freeing herself from the bondage of the unequal treaties?

That Mr. Tang Leang-li has long been violently anti-American himself is amply established by an article in the January issue of his periodical, wherein he publishes, for the first time, a memorandum that he submitted to the Central Political Council of the then Nanking Government on June 1st, 1937. In this he says, in part:

The British are usually quite frank in admitting that their interest in China is inspired solely from the business point of view,

but the American attitude is rather like the condescending pose of a wealthy but half-educated man toward a poor neighbor. The desire to acquire dollars is camouflaged as a disinterested desire to render China friendly service, but the real sincerity of American "friendship" can be gauged by the offensive superiority assumed by that nation toward Chinese and other colored races (even those who are freeborn U. S. citizens). Chinese traveling with diplomatic passports have not escaped the humiliation of being treated by U. S. immigration officials as though they were persons of notorious bad character, and it is a curious fact that until recently the Waichiaopu [Chinese Foreign Office] allowed such incidents to pass without attempting to make the slightest protest. And America is now the only civilized country in the world where Chinese are still confined to ghettos like the Jews in the Middle Ages. China has very much more in common with Japan than she has with either Britain or the United States, and were it not for the aggressive attitude of the militarist faction in Japan, the two countries could easily live as friendly neighbors should.

Some of these arguments and charges may sound silly and preposterous to the American public, but no doubt their continued reiteration will have an effect upon a large portion of Chinese readers, particularly so in view of the fact that the vast bulk even of the literate minority in China is ill informed concerning history and understands less about international politics.

All signs point in one direction—bitter anti-Americanism to be aroused amongst the Chinese masses if possible, unless the United States Government acquiesces in all of Japan's plans for the New Order in Greater East Asia. Meanwhile, many influential persons in Japan, and not only Army men, continue to advocate an alliance with Soviet Russia. Even Mr. Toshio Shiratori, former Japanese Ambassador to Rome, is a booster for such an alliance, arguing that it is desirable, if for no other reason, because America and Britain would not relish it.

That the Japanese Government itself is anti-American in

policy is clearly shown by many recent official utterances. On February 7th, 1940, the Prime Minister informed the lower house of the Diet that:

Although we do not wish to interpret America's attitude with any malevolent intentions, should the United States, refusing to understand Japan's true intentions, bring additional pressure to bear upon our country, I can clearly state that Japan is fully prepared to meet such an attitude on the part of America.

On February 29th, 1940, the then Foreign Minister, Mr. Hachiro Arita, when asked in the Diet if Japan "would bow before the will of America," replied:

Japan has nothing to fear even if the United States should oppose, in toto, the construction of a New Order in East Asia, failing utterly to understand Japan's aims in China, or even if the United States should insist that their view on the matter should be accepted. . . .

I do not know for certain what the United States Government is thinking, but if its rock-bottom intention is that the Japanese goal and holy war shall be repudiated, that nothing shall be done to regulate Japanese-American relations unless the Japanese goal is withdrawn, Japan should show a firm attitude regarding the policy to which she is committed.

Even if pronouncements like the foregoing cease altogether at Tokyo, Japan will not be able to disavow the new Nanking puppet's anti-American policies, for this regime was organized by and is supported by the Japanese military. In fact no less a person than Lieutenant-General Heisuke Yanagawa told a budgetary committee of the Diet on February 16th, 1940, that "military authorities will exercise tutelage of the proposed new Central Government in political, economic and military affairs."

On March 19th, 1940, in an official interview reported by one of the puppet regime's own news agencies, Mr. Tang

Leang-li, in his capacity as Vice-Minister of Publicity, gave an excellent example of the lengths to which the Japanese Army's "tutelage" will go in attempting to stir up anti-American feeling and opinion. Said Mr. Tang:

A calculated campaign of slander has been and is being carried on by a large section of the American press both in America and in China—in China with the most incredible connivance of the American authorities—against Wang Ching-wei and against the cause of peace which he represents.

This antagonism has not shown itself in the press alone but also reveals itself in the extraordinary behavior of American diplomats.

If attacked, we will retaliate, not beg for mercy and offer the other cheek. That is the reason for our wrongly called anti-American campaign.

In Europe, the American envoys canvassed enmity against Wang Ching-wei's forthcoming Central Government for no other apparent reason than because it was working for the interests of China and her people and refused to imitate Chungking in subordinating those interests to the interests of the United States and other imperialistic countries, Mr. Tang asserted.

In China, the Vice-Minister continued, the American Ambassador, Mr. Nelson T. Johnson, although his residence was within the territories of the forthcoming Central Government, "habitually trotted off to Chungking," supporting that regime officially and protecting all those carrying on seditious activities in the foreign settlement in Shanghai.

The Vice-Minister went on to the effect that Wang Ching-wei was just as desirous of maintaining friendly relations with the United States as with other countries, but that friendship to be sincere and lasting had to be based upon equality, reciprocity and mutual respect.

"We shall meet friendship with friendship, hostility with

hostility," Mr. Tang concluded, "unless of course we have to bow to *force majeure*."

The Vice-Minister of Publicity, of course, contends that the new Nanking puppet regime is "the legitimate Government" of China but conveniently ignores the patent fact that its "legality" is supported solely upon Japanese bayonets and that if the Japanese Army were to withdraw tomorrow, the so-called "Central Government" at Nanking would have to retire with it or be bloodily destroyed by an enraged Chinese populace.

Mr. Wang Ching-wei himself, on March 1st, 1940, made it clear that only those nations that grant his regime recognition will be well treated insofar as their rights and interests in China are concerned. He said that his policies will be to make peace by diplomacy and to bring about equality and mutual benefit, granting the most-favored-nation treatment only to those who granted his new government such treatment.

In Peking, in February, 1941, the Japanese military began the organization of a new Chinese political movement called "The Young Man's Party of China." In the diplomatic sphere the party advocates neighborly relations with all countries and consolidation of East Asia through co-operation of East Asiatic peoples. It would abrogate all the unilateral treaties affecting China and would abolish foreign concessions and consular jurisdiction in the interests of national sovereignty.

In plain English, this means that Japan wants the concessions and settlements to come under the authority of her puppets and wants all foreigners in China to be forced to live under the laws that the Japanese "advisors" will dictate to the new puppet regime at Nanking.

18.

CITY OF FEAR

“SOME day in the far future, if the Japanese are not thrown out, someone will have the opportunity of writing the history of the evolution of Shanghai from mudbank to a great metropolis and then back to a mudbank,” said a friend of mine who had lived long in the Orient.

This may be an exaggeration, for Shanghai has made several almost miraculous recoveries from the setbacks of wars, but the winter of 1940-41 found that great Chinese seaport in truly dismal straits. It had become a city of fear and suspicions and utter recklessness. The fear is directed toward the Japanese, the suspicions are the result of the war in Europe and the recklessness is the result of the collapse of security and the flooding of the city and its tributary area with hundreds and hundreds of millions of varying currencies, any or all of which may, in the end, prove to be utterly worthless.

Shanghai, in the fourth winter of Japanese military occupation of all the city except the International Settlement and the

French Concession, was struggling to carry on business under the curse of five fluctuating and dissimilar currencies: first, the Chungking dollar, which hovered around \$18 to US \$1.00; second, the Japanese yen, which though officially, in Japan, around yen 4.20 to US \$1.00, could actually be bought in Shanghai's "Black Bourse" at between yen 12 and yen 14 to US \$1.00; third, the Hua Hsing banknotes (backed by Japanese) which were slightly cheaper than the official yen; fourth, Japanese unsecured military notes, to be had at yen exchange rates; and fifth, the new currency put out by the puppet government at Nanking. Foreign banks refused to accept this paper under any conditions.

Four million people, of more than a score of races and nationalities, crammed and crowded into a relatively small area, all uncertain of their futures; vast fortunes once considered securely invested but now precariously held; old business houses being starved to death under the new Japanese dispensation; hordes of hungry and get-rich-quick carpetbaggers; bitter political feuds, crime, assassination; a narrowing ring of ambitious and avaricious armed men—Japanese, and their Chinese puppets: SHANGHAI, WINTER OF 1940-41.

And yet, life goes on in Shanghai, although the number of white residents is steadily diminishing, what with the officially urged American evacuations and the increasing unofficial British evacuation. The amenities are observed. There is dining and dancing, seasonal sports continue, the races are run on schedule. Calls are paid; the lounges and bars of the foreign-style clubs and hotels are fairly well filled every evening from sunset until the late dinner hour that prevails in the Far East. The women's shops keep shoving higher and higher the price marks upon the dwindling supply of Paris and New York hats and dresses.

But life becomes increasingly more difficult for the foreigner, for the Chinese and for the Japanese. The outbreak of war in Europe in the autumn of 1939 brought about profound

changes. There were then about 580 Nazi Germans in Shanghai, and at once all British and French firms and individuals severed all business connections with the Germans. British and French banks confiscated German deposits. The Nazis were not actually socially ostracized as they were during the 1914-18 war, but German members of British and French clubs were advised, in writing, to absent themselves from these clubs "for the duration." At that time the Germans were friendless except for the Italians, because the Japanese were angered over the Hitler-Stalin agreement.

Then, with the collapse of France and the invasions of Holland and Belgium, the tension became more pronounced, for Shanghai has many Dutchmen and Belgians. Officials of the French Concession could no longer afford to defy the Japanese. The French people themselves were badly divided—pro-Vichy and pro-De Gaulle. The French, under duress, yielded to the Japanese on issues involving the Chinese courts, and the Chinese resented this weakening of Chungking's position in Shanghai.

Then there was the question of the German Jewish refugees, of whom Shanghai has more than eighteen thousand, mostly penniless. About half a thousand of them had been given small positions with French and British firms and would have been kept on at work except for the fact that about two hundred of such male refugees went to the German Consulate-General and asked to be sent back to Germany to fight in Hitler's armies. Regardless of whether this action was motivated by poverty, by secret plans for sabotage or by some strange admiration for the man who had driven them from their Fatherland, the result was disastrous for most of the other refugees, for the hearts and pocketbooks of a majority of the British and French are now closed against most of them.

Of all the groups of Jewish refugees scattered over the world today as a result of Nazi persecution, those in Shanghai are

probably enduring the most difficult immediate present and are facing the most uncertain and perilous future.

Shanghai's Jewish refugee population continues to increase month by month. For a time nearly every ship from Italy or from France brought from four hundred to nine hundred of these dispossessed people. Since the blockade of the Mediterranean, they continue to arrive, but in much smaller numbers, by way of Siberia.

Why so many thousands of these hapless refugees chose Shanghai as their destination it is difficult to conceive. Perhaps they dreamed of quick fortunes to be derived from "war profits"; perhaps they thought that the hostilities in China would soon come to an end and that they could quickly regain economic independence during a period of reconstruction.

Instead, they have come to a city that is a prison. Few of them have money to take them on to other countries; few have passports under which they could travel. And those in Shanghai are virtual prisoners under Japanese military regulations that forbid travel in the interior of China except by those who have Army passes. Commercially Shanghai is still suffering from the effects of the three months of warfare in and around the city in 1937, and trade with the city's vast hinterland is virtually impossible for any except Japanese.

In Shanghai the Jewish refugees find the utmost difficulty in obtaining any kind of employment. Even before they began arriving in such dismaying large numbers as to constitute a serious civic problem, Shanghai already faced a serious situation of unemployed foreigners. American, British, French and all other foreign firms had suffered losses and curtailed business activity and had been forced to reduce their staffs. The number of Chinese unemployed and beggars and war refugees totaled more than a quarter of a million, and Japanese civilians were (and still are) arriving in droves. They, of course, are given preferential treatment in connection with Japan's expanding

monopoly business ventures in Central China. And then there were already more than thirty thousand White Russian refugees in Shanghai, people willing to work for and able to live on less than the other white unemployed.

For these Jewish refugees to compete with Chinese, either as employees or as owners of small shops, is almost impossible. The Chinese can thrive, according to their own standards, on wages or incomes that for a European would not buy tooth paste and soap in adequate quantities.

The refugees are further handicapped by language difficulties. They came from Germany, from Austria, from Czechoslovakia and from Poland, and few of them know any English or French, which are the foreign tongues most in use in Shanghai.

Shanghai itself already had a relatively large Jewish population before the influx of refugees began, and some of them are almost fabulously wealthy. But the roots of most of the well-established Jewish families in Shanghai were not in Europe but in the Near East, and language, national and social traditions are different from those of the refugees from Central Europe. The Shanghai Jews have been generous with their unfortunate co-religionists, but after all they themselves, like all other foreigners in China, have suffered enormous losses from the Chino-Japanese hostilities, and from Japanese restrictions imposed upon business in the Yangtsze Valley. And the Shanghai Jews, too, had already given generously to help Chinese war refugees, war widows and war orphans, and have been unable to help the refugees from Nazidom as greatly as they would have helped them in normal times.

There is a Refugee Committee in Shanghai, which is operating efficiently, administering camps and barracks, hospitals for the sick, schools for the children, reading rooms and sewing rooms. Soup kitchens are also maintained for the entirely destitute.

This committee estimates that today in Shanghai there are about four hundred unemployed Jewish refugee attorneys, about seven hundred physicians, surgeons and dentists, about three hundred electrical, mining and civil engineers, and about eight hundred trained technical workers. All of these people are out of employment, and in addition the refugee jobseekers include about two thousand men who before they fled to China were factory hands or specialized wage earners. The rest of the hapless eighteen thousand is made up of men formerly engaged in business or trade, women without professions, children and very old men and women no longer able to work.

Nearly six thousand of these refugees now live in large camps or barracks and are entirely dependent upon charity. Another five thousand live north of Soochow Creek, in Hongkew, which was largely ruined during the fighting in 1937 and is still under Japanese control. Those in Hongkew have a little money left, are able to pay the cheap rents of that quarter and draw most of their food from soup kitchens. Another five thousand are scattered over the International Settlement and French Concession, mostly in tenements in which only Chinese have lived heretofore, and only about a thousand, the committee estimates, have so far been able to establish themselves and become entirely self-supporting.

A majority of the refugees arrived in Shanghai from central Europe practically penniless. Most of them had been stripped of all personal belongings of any value, but a small minority had been able to smuggle out of German-controlled areas some jewels, furs, household silver, small but costly ornaments, cameras, field glasses and, in a very few cases, considerable amounts of hoarded foreign currencies.

For a time the fortunate owners of smuggled valuables made house-to-house canvasses among the foreigners, trying to dispose of their belongings a piece at a time. Now, however, the refugees have several small co-operative stores, which handle

the sale of personal belongings on a small commission. These stores sell everything from diamond rings and fur coats to jeweled clocks, paintings, vases and crystal chandeliers.

Most refugee families with saleable valuables have chosen to try to get a start in small business ventures instead of just eating up their assets while they sought employment. Shanghai's streets suddenly boasted innumerable delicatessen stores, small bakeries, sausage shops and small cafés specializing in Viennese dishes, Hungarian food or other culinary novelties. Most of these places exist for only a few weeks or a few months and then fail pathetically. A few, however, have survived and are beginning to prosper, especially those where the whole large family pitches in and does all the work. This writer's favorite café in Shanghai was operated by such a family—mother and father in the kitchen, with two Chinese helpers; two comely daughters wait on the tables; two brothers and an uncle furnish good music with a rented piano and two violins; and an aunt acts as cashier.

"We have come to the wrong place," one of the leading refugees said to me in the autumn of 1940. "We cannot compete with the Chinese unless we have capital, for a Chinese man can support a family of five on a wage in Chinese dollars equal to only three or four American dollars a month. Fifty per cent of our number will go down and die—hunger, malnutrition, filth, suicide. Another 25 per cent will live in poverty, at about the level of the poor White Russian refugees. At most 25 per cent of us will prosper enough to lead self-respecting lives, and maybe 1 or 2 per cent will finally become rich."

The position of these refugees now is simply that they must swim or sink. All the fine plans for helping them, of which much was heard at different times, have come to nothing. At one time the Government at Chungking announced that a hundred thousand Jewish refugees would be admitted to Yunnan

Province, in China's far Southwest. But Yunnan is being bombed almost daily from Japanese airplanes, and even if the refugees could find the money for the long and costly journey, via Hongkong and Burma, they would be unable to get any kind of start in Yunnan unless they arrived there with plentiful capital.

Another fine-sounding scheme was to accommodate about ten thousand of the refugees in the Philippines and let them found their own community, much as the Japanese have developed the little city of Davao, in the heart of the hemp-producing area. But it costs considerable money to get from Shanghai to Manila, and how could the refugees achieve self-support in the Philippines unless they arrived there with money? Living in the Philippines is much more costly than in China, and the competition of low-waged Filipinos is terribly keen.

Already in Shanghai there are evidences in plenty that the pessimistic Jewish refugee, who predicts that 50 per cent of his fellow sufferers there will perish, is correct. The terrible early chronicles of the White Russian refugees in Shanghai are being repeated. Comely Jewish girls have gone to work in bars, cafés and dance halls of dubious character. There they compete not only with the more experienced White Russians but also with Chinese, Japanese and Korean girls. Graft is high, and the scale of living and of decency is low.

The foreign brothels of Shanghai are now nearly half occupied by Jewish girls from Central Europe, and there is a brisk "white slave" traffic, for white slavers have come to Shanghai from Buenos Aires, Panama, Havana and other cities in the Western Hemisphere. There is more and more crime in which the refugees are implicated. Most of them came with passports branded with a large J and with the notation "without nationality." As a result when they become offenders they appear before the Chinese courts, and if convicted go to

Chinese jails, for they lack the protection of extraterritoriality. They figure in cases where the charges are blackmail, pickpocketing, petty thievery and the writing of bad checks.

Curiously enough the White Russians, who themselves have suffered mass expulsion and persecution, and who have more to fear from the Jewish competition than have other races in Shanghai, have been more kind and generous to the refugees than have most other foreigners in the city.

Russian pharmacies have engaged many Jewish chemists; many Russians with capital have gone into partnership with Jewish refugees who have little to contribute except experience; the Russian Opera and the Russian Light Opera companies have employed many refugee musicians. The White Russian Club and the Russian Jewish Club have engaged German-Jewish orchestra conductors, and many German-Jewish musicians. Russian architects and building firms are now employing many Jewish refugee engineers.

The Japanese, in some cases, are making use of the abilities of trained Jewish refugee scientists and engineers, for Japan is undersupplied with expert technicians. But the men who work for the Japanese are paid a bare subsistence wage, and except in rare cases they have no chance for advancement. Instead, when they have taught their employers all they know they will be curtly dismissed.

There are few Soviet Russians in Shanghai, aside from Consular and Embassy officials, so that Russia's assault upon Poland made little difference in the life of the city. The White Russians, about thirty thousand in number, do not count. They run small shops, furnish most of the girls for the night clubs and cabarets, and live their own life of perpetual self-delusion. When bread and meat and vodka run short they seem to live on the devout hope that Stalin will soon die, the Communist regime collapse and the Romanoff rule be restored. A strange dream world this, in a city of harsh realities.

Chinese, of course, make up nearly 98 per cent of Shanghai's total population, and it is safe to estimate that fully 90 per cent of them are anti-Japanese. They hate the alien invaders, and with an even greater hatred they hate and despise those of their number who nurse secret ambitions of achieving high office or great wealth under the protection of Japanese bayonets. They hope that America, Britain and France will keep Japanese authority and the Japanese military out of the International Settlement and French Concession. But they will be among the first to want to throw out Americans, Britons and Frenchmen if, by some miracle, China wins the war.

The Japanese civilians are rather a pathetic lot. Before the present hostilities broke out in Shanghai in August, 1937, there were about thirty-eight thousand Japanese men, women and children in Shanghai. Today the total exceeds eighty thousand, and more and more come by every ship arriving from Japan. In the main they keep to themselves in the Hongkew and Yangtszepoo districts north of Soochow Creek. The handful of the upper crust, who belong to some of the exclusive clubs by virtue of official position or financial standing, stay away from those clubs now. They know that Britons, Americans and Frenchmen all resent Japan's attempts to drive the white man out of East Asia.

The Japanese civilians come to Shanghai expecting quick profits—and don't get them. Many have lost the savings of a lifetime. Little Japanese shops, restaurants and bars open hopefully, and some close. They have a couple of streets, blazing with gaudy neon sights, where cabarets, restaurants and geisha houses thrive on the patronage of the military, but for the most part life is as drab and profitless for civilian Japanese in Shanghai as it is for them at home.

Shanghai is accustomed to war, and to its embarrassments and complications. It is accustomed to turning its back upon its own ruins, and today ignores Chapei, Pootung, Nantao and

other vast adjoining areas that were laid waste and made dark and desolate by the fighting in 1937.

From 1914 to 1918 Shanghai experienced repercussions of the European war in plenty. The Germans and Austrians were shamefully treated, shiploads of royalist but mostly penniless White Russians arrived from Vladivostok. Japan rode high, then, too. She had captured Tsingtao from the Germans and destroyed most of the German Asiatic fleet.

Then, in 1927 and 1928, when the Nationalists were sweeping northward from Canton, and sweeping the white man before them, the United States, Britain and France collectively sent more than thirty thousand soldiers and marines to protect the foreign areas. There was fighting, looting and burning all around the borders of the Settlement and French Concession.

In 1932 Shanghai experienced another terrific period of hostilities. For nearly six weeks Chinese and Japanese armies fought for the possession of Chapei, and for the first time the city experienced the horrors of indiscriminate aerial bombardments. Again Britain, America and France were forced to augment their landed defense forces in Shanghai.

My little Chinese tailor is a sound prophet. His shop, his stock and his home were destroyed during the 1932 hostilities. In the summer of that year he came to me soliciting orders. I asked him how his business prospered, and he made the surprising reply:

“Business very bad, but I very busy just now.”

Pressed for an explanation, he said:

“My savvy—five year more Japanese own Shanghai. Every day I take one lesson, two hour, learn talk Japanese.”

That was in 1932. On August 13th, 1937, the Chino-Japanese hostilities broke out on the outskirts of Shanghai. And in early November of that year the Chinese were driven inland beyond contact with the city.

But my little tailor's gift for prophecy profited him nothing. In December of 1937 he came to me, crestfallen.

"I think," he said, "I no very smart man. My savvy Japanese own Shanghai. I learn talk Japanese. Just now I take order make three suits one very rich Japanese man. Next day one Chinese—what you call patriot—throw brick in my window. New glass my show case cost me eighty dollars. How fashion can make money that fashion?"

That is the great question in Shanghai today—how can make money any fashion?

In 1937, when the Chino-Japanese war began, the ratio of Chinese money was \$3.35 to \$1.00 in American money, and there was a corresponding rate to the pound. Incomes meant something then, whether in Shanghai or in foreign currencies.

In the winter of 1940-41, after wild fluctuations, the Chinese dollar was down to less than 6 cents American money. In other words, US \$1.00 bought about \$18 in Chinese currency.

Price variations and vagaries are amazing and amusing. Take shirts, for instance. One well-known American brand, which retails all over the United States for \$2.00, may be bought in Shanghai for \$22.50 in Chinese currency. That, in late September, was exactly US \$1.50. Specially tailored shirts, of the finest Chinese or Japanese silk, cost about the same. And shoes—just tear an illustrated shoe advertisement from any American magazine, take it to a Chinese shoemaker, and he will furnish an exact copy for about \$30 a pair—or US \$1.65 at average exchange.

Liquor prices are amazing, too. A fair brand of Scotch whisky, which sold for \$54 a case Shanghai currency in May, 1939, cost \$160 for a dozen quarts in September, 1940—but even that is only a trifle more than \$8.00 in American money. Sound champagnes run about US \$2.33 a quart. And stout or beer—good brands made locally in British-owned breweries—costs about three cents a pint, American money.

Chinese-made wares have advanced very little, or not at all. To people with US dollar incomes they are cheaper. In May, 1939, I priced some jades—ring, earrings, bracelet and necklace made up to match. The dealer asked \$310 in Shanghai money, which then was equal to a little more than US \$50. In late September, 1940, that same set was still on sale at \$310, but then \$310 was equal to only about US \$16.65. The same is true of fine old silks and brocades which in May, 1939, cost \$6.00 a yard Shanghai money—then about US \$1.00. In late September, 1940, still priced at \$6.00, the cost to anyone with an American income was around 30 cents a yard.

This is all very fine for people with incomes or salaries in American or stable European monies. But for the foreigners, and there are thousands of them, who work for salaries paid in Chinese currency, and for Chinese who had become accustomed to the use of imported articles, foods and drinks, the pinch is terrible. For the basic costs of living are rising sky high. Rice costs more—so servants have had to be given a 100 per cent or more increase in pay. The price of gasoline has jumped to \$3.20 a gallon, and an automobile is a luxury.

People who have large savings in Chinese money are in a panic to get rid of it. They buy things—things not needed but which may have a re-sale value at a later date. Closets and attics are being crammed. And then the buyers, obsessed with the fear that pervades all Shanghai, that the Japanese military may take over the foreign areas by force, become panicky at the thought of possible looting.

This fear of looting and disorder brings up a story of Sir Victor Sassoon and a dinner party given in his honor by Japanese military and diplomatic leaders. Sir Victor, by the way, is that member of the fabulously wealthy Sassoon family who argued the Sassoon interests into investing about \$160,000,000 in Shanghai real estate, when exchange was about \$3.35 to US \$1.00, on the theory that an international area was the safest

spot in the world, and that, besides, British capital invested in Shanghai paid no British income tax.

At this dinner party, now famed in local song and story, one of his Japanese hosts asked Sir Victor if he was not afraid of the total collapse of Chinese currency.

"It does not concern me," he said, "for I have a very, very large overdraft."

"An overdraft? The Sassoons? Ha!" exclaimed the astounded Japanese.

"Of course, under these conditions," Sir Victor replied, his eyes smiling, but his monocle glinting wickedly. "No one with any sense keeps money around when robbers are ravaging the neighborhood."

Shanghai's landed foreign defense forces share the fears, suspicions and recklessness of the rest of the population. Since the collapse of France, and the British military withdrawal, there are only about twelve hundred American Marines, and the police force, left to the defense of the International Settlement. There are Italians, but they are Japan's allies.

If the Japanese decide to take the foreign areas by force, if some unpremeditated clash along the borders of the International Settlement leads to a general engagement, these foreign defense forces would probably be wiped out. For the Japanese outnumber them incalculably, the Japanese have control of the air, and available Japanese artillery could make quick work of the less than a score of light field pieces and the dozen tanks in the Settlement and French Concession.

The case of the American Marine private may be taken as typical. His pay is US \$30 a month. That comes to about \$540 with exchange at 18 to 1. But the price of everything has gone up. A suit of civilian clothes that cost him \$70 early in 1939 now costs more than \$150. Whisky sodas, in the cabarets, have jumped from \$1.20 to \$1.80 to \$2.40, and now cost \$3.00 each in the more attractive places.

And then there are his dancing partners—Natasha, Olga, Shura and Luba. The girls drink more beer and less cherry brandy and whisky soda than before. But the service man shares Shanghai's fears and recklessness and is broke before each pay day.

And, among the other horrors of war, the price of perfume has become almost prohibitive. Even the lavish-handed Marines balk at buying perfume at the new high prices. So Olga and Shura, Luba and Natasha, poor girls, are being forced to learn to use soap instead.

But the real problems of Shanghai are far more serious than those having to do with the costs of silks and shirts, the movements of money up and down the scale and the deprivations of the cabaret girls.

All too frequently there are street assassinations, or attempts at political killings in which innocent bystanders are usually the victims. Some misguided Chinese patriot or some hired gunman throws a hand grenade at a motor car in which a Japanese puppet official is riding, or fires a revolver at a political enemy. The police guns then blaze out, but as a rule the intended victim escapes unhurt, and the assailant disappears into the crowd, while the pavements are strewn with half a dozen or more innocent people.

The French take stringent precautions against such disorders in their Concession. They do not want to give the Japanese military any excuse for "coming in" on the pretext that the French cannot maintain law and order. Thus, the borders of the French Concession are carefully patrolled. Annamites with rifles, French soldiers, police or gendarmes, with revolvers in their hands, finger on trigger, guard the entrances. At most important thoroughfares tanks are posted day and night, and blockhouses of concrete, with loopholes for machine guns, are always fully manned and equipped. Barbed wire barricades are at hand, ready to be thrown across the streets.

The Japanese Army wants the foreign areas of Shanghai. Chinese banks and Chinese properties belonging to adherents of Chiang Kai-shek would net them half a billion dollars in quick profits. The Japanese Navy would like to take Shanghai—the Army has monopolized most of the headlines in the newspapers in their homeland.

So the great city, dominated by fears of hearing machine guns crackling in its streets once more, while bombers drone overhead, lives in fear, nurses its dark suspicions, gambles and plays with unexampled recklessness and finds its sleep neither restful nor refreshing.

19.

“FROM THE HORSE’S MOUTH”

Not since Commodore Perry bombarded Japanese forts, more than three quarters of a century ago, have Japanese relations with the United States been so strained as they are today. “Japanese relations with the United States” is a phrasing chosen deliberately, instead of “American relations with Japan,” for it is the Japanese who are most conscious of the strain and of the dangers involved.

In Japan, responsible statesmen, important military leaders and influential newspapers talk of the probability of war between our country and theirs. In Japan the Government is openly and admittedly preparing for what Japanese leaders choose to call “the worst eventualities.”

As an interested observer who was in the United States on vacation until late in August of 1939, and who has since resided and traveled in the Orient, it is amazing to analyze the different ways in which public opinions and official attitudes have been solidified in the two countries.

Except for the wave of shocked fury that swept the country when the *U.S.S. Panay* was bombed and sunk in December, 1937, American public opinion was more aroused on China’s behalf than upon behalf of what was being done to Americans and American rights and interests in China. The Japanese bombing of undefended Chinese cities, the rape of Nanking, the barbarous manner in which the Japanese military behaved toward Chinese civilians—these were the things that stirred American feelings and sympathies, and which aroused American antipathies.

Public opinion against the continued sale of airplanes and war supplies to Japan, the aggressor, continued to spread and deepen. And then, in June of 1939 began the stupid and vengeful Japanese blockade of the British and French Concessions at Tientsin. White men and women were subjected to unspeakable indignities. Forced to disrobe in tents or in flimsy structures of matting and bamboo, they were frequently slapped in the face, occasionally kicked about. And then the Japanese sentries often flung the clothing of their victims outside into the dust or mud, and foreigners had to dress under the grinning observation of crowds of hundreds of Chinese coolies and ruffians.

Under the orders of General Homma, the Japanese martinet who carried on these activities in defiance of orders from his government at Tokyo, milk was held at the borders of the Concessions until it soured under the heat of the summer sun. Foreign babies had no milk—General Homma pretended that each quart and pint bottle must be carefully examined lest it contain a bomb!

This spectacle of militarism drunk to the point of madness with its own power did Japan more harm than any half dozen other “incidents” combined. The American people and other non-Asiatics began to feel: “Well, it will probably be our turn next.”

And then, in the United States, there was a sudden awaking to a vivid realization of the fact that American airplanes and other American supplies were being used to bomb Americans and American rights and interests out of the Far East. Self-interest awoke with a jerk, and self-interest, as nearly always in history, brought an abrupt change in our national policy toward Japan. With startling abruptness notice was served on July 26th, 1939, that at the expiration of six months our trade treaty with Japan would be terminated.

This abrupt abrogation of a treaty that had been in existence since 1911 did not awaken Japan with a jerk. Far from it. Japan was dazed and dizzied by the blow, and as the dizziness gradually wore off it was followed first by dismay, then by apprehension, and finally by indignation and a sense of having been deeply wronged.

This Japanese reaction to America's counterblow had varying causes. The Japanese Army was dismayed, apprehensive and then furious, because it had firmly believed it could continue indefinitely pulling Uncle Sam's whiskers. In fact, the Japanese militarists, after two years of non-retaliation on our part, did not believe that notoriously long-legged Uncle Sam had enough vigor left for a long-range kick.

The Japanese Government was astonished and indignant, because it thought our Government was too taken up with domestic and European problems to adopt a decisive policy in the Orient. At first the civilian wing of the Government was indignant with the Army wing for having landed it in such an uncomfortable position, but soon the ranks closed and the indignation was turned toward the United States.

Most shocked of all, and later most indignant, was the Japanese public. This was because for two years that public had not only been deprived of complete and authentic news of the careering of its Army in China, but because it had been repeatedly assured that the United States was a patient friend

to Japan and that the Japanese Army was “taking all precautions consistent with military necessities” to respect all American rights, nationals and properties in China.” Believing that their armed forces in China had behaved impeccably, believing that the United States was adopting a “legalistic and critical attitude” toward Japan, of course the Japanese public was ready to listen to the anti-American tub thumpers.

But a few of the more thoughtful became curious. There were references to more than six hundred unsettled American claims and protests against Japan in connection with the China hostilities. A small percentage of intelligent Japanese began to realize that the United States Government had shown extraordinary patience and forbearance. Six hundred cases in two years—they would have afforded an average of about five sensational headlines every week in the American newspapers if Washington had chosen to give them out to the press. But Washington had deliberately chosen not to inflame public opinion in the United States. Here was evidence of latent good will, if Japan would only recognize it as such. But forbearance had been misinterpreted as a sign of weakness; so the tension worsened.

Then the American Ambassador to Japan, Mr. Joseph C. Grew, delivered in Tokyo what was probably the most remarkable public utterance any diplomat ever made within the borders of the country to which he was accredited.

It was in Tokyo on October 19th, 1939, at a meeting of the American-Japan Society, that Mr. Grew slowly and gracefully unfolded his impressive length, planted his feet firmly upon a Japanese floor, and shocked the Japanese nation. “Joe” Grew, as he is affectionately called by those who know him well, is the ideal man for such a job. His manners are impeccable, his good humor is proverbial, his good looks arouse comment, he had then been stationed for seven years in Japan and likes the country and the Japanese, and, moreover, he has the advantage

of that slightly aloof detachment enjoyed by people who are slightly deaf and who therefore are not continually harassed by the small noises made by small people.

Mr. Grew began in a friendly manner. He had just returned from furlough in the United States, he said. The Japanese exhibits at the New York and San Francisco fairs were magnificent. He had been three times to Washington. He had talked often with the President and with Secretary Hull. He recounted that when he landed at Yokohama a Japanese reporter asked him whether he carried concealed in his bosom a dove or a dagger, and that his reply was that he carried nothing concealed, but that in his heart he nourished a hope for continued American-Japanese friendship and understanding.

Then, changing his tone and his manner, this daring diplomat used a phrase that caused a furor of speculation in the Japanese press for days thereafter. He said he was talking "straight from the horse's mouth," and added the information that while he was in Washington he had conferred repeatedly with the President and with the Secretary of State.

Well, the Washington horse, more vocal than the one that also made history at Troy, had evidently told Mr. Grew a large mouthful. This excellent equine had said, among other pertinent and impertinent things, that "when the structure of international good faith, when the reliance of mankind and government upon the inviolability of the pledged word becomes undermined and collapses, when might makes right and force becomes an instrument of national policy rather than discussion and settlement of disputes by peaceful means, then civilization crumbles also, and chaos intervenes."

At this point many of the Japanese present probably wished they wore foreign clothes instead of the comfortable kimono. However, lacking vests to pull down, and cravats to adjust, they pulled in their chins and listened with glittering eyes veiled by drooping Oriental eyelids.

Mr. Grew, smiling in friendly fashion, continued:

I suppose there is not a person here who does not know that American public opinion strongly resents some of the things that Japan’s armed forces are doing in China today, including actions against American rights and interests in China. . . .

Another common fallacy which I am constrained to mention is the charge that the American Government and people do not understand “the New Order in East Asia.” Forgive me if I very respectfully take issue with that conception. The American Government and people understand what is meant by the “New Order in East Asia” precisely as clearly as it is understood in Japan. . . . The “New Order in East Asia” has appeared to include, among other things, depriving Americans of their long-established rights in China, and to this the American people are opposed. . . .

American rights and interests in China are being impaired or destroyed by the policies and actions of the Japanese authorities in China. American property is being damaged or destroyed; American nationals are being endangered and subjected to indignities. If I felt in a position to set forth all the facts in detail today, you would, without question, appreciate the soundness and full justification of the American attitude. . . .

In short, the American people, from all the thoroughly reliable evidence that comes to them, have good reason to believe that an effort is being made to establish control in Japan’s own interest, of large areas on the continent of Asia and to impose upon those areas a system of closed economy.

So far the American public is but ill-informed about the methods by which Japan is systematically attempting to impose upon the occupied areas of China what Mr. Grew calls a “closed economy.” But Americans who live in Shanghai know all about that system. It confronts them at every turn.

Suppose you are in the fish business—a business established in Shanghai by your grandfather half a century ago. Here is what you would be facing today:

In August, 1939, at the dictation of the Japanese Army Special Service Section, the puppet government at Nanking, through the Japanese-dominated Ministry of Industry, decided to compel all fish dealers in Shanghai to deal through the new Fish Market, where they established a dummy company known as the Ta Tung Fish Trade Company. This organization operates on a commission basis and takes 9 cents out of every dollar that Shanghai markets and shops pay for fish at the wharves.

Mr. Grew spoke of plans for a "closed economy." Well, consider livestock. Without the mock formality of orders from the puppet Nanking regime, the Japanese on April 10th, 1939, established the Shanghai Livestock Market and announced that all matters pertaining to the transportation, slaughtering and sale of livestock in Shanghai would be supervised by this organization. Even boatmen and junkmen engaged in bringing livestock to Shanghai must register with the market.

Today the livestock "closed economy" is complete, with the Japanese controlling even the slaughterhouses for this city of nearly four million people. Every pig brought to Shanghai brings \$2.00 into the monopoly's coffers; cattle are assessed at \$2.00 per head and sheep at 50 cents each. Chickens and ducks and other fowl pay a tribute estimated at 2 per cent of the value of every 100 *catties*—which is about 133 pounds.

Eggs, rice, silk cocoons, wheat, fresh vegetables and matches are similarly controlled. Gangster rule in the United States must retreat into amateur ranks in comparison with the strangling methods the Japanese use in Shanghai.

But that is not all—far from all. At the slaughterhouses the owners of cattle, pigs and sheep are forced to sell the hides of their animals to the Japanese Army at prices arbitrarily fixed by the latter, and moreover, livestock and other products from the surrounding countryside may be brought to Shanghai only in Japanese-owned ships and barges, and these Japanese shipping companies charge 50 per cent more than their foreign

competitors. If other than Japanese bottoms are used, the “permits” are found faulty and the cargo is confiscated. Those “permits,” by the way, are issued only after the payment of various fat fees. Moreover purchasing agents of Chinese or foreign firms are not permitted to proceed to the interior until they have first registered with the Asia Development Board, a Japanese governmental organization that busies itself solely with the development of Japanese business monopolies.

With conditions of this kind already firmly established, and with enormous Japanese vested interests at stake, there is little hope in Shanghai that the proposed reopening of the Yangtsze River from there to Nanking will benefit foreign trade in any appreciable degree. This reopening plan, announced at Shanghai and at Tokyo December 18th, 1939, will be so hedged around with restrictions, permit systems, military and naval supervision and interference that Japan will continue to control the trade. And it is an important trade, too. The smallish province in which Shanghai and Nanking are located had a population of 36,469,000 before the hostilities began in August, 1937. Despite civilian casualties, deaths from disease and starvation, and despite the exodus of enormous numbers of refugees, there must still be nearly thirty million people in the province.

Fifteen months after the promise to reopen the river had been made, no definite steps toward carrying out the promise had been taken.

The Japanese are not neglecting the importance of the control of labor, either, particularly labor employed by the foreign-owned factories in Shanghai, Tientsin or other occupied cities of industrial importance.

The action taken in Shanghai by the so-called China Laborers' Association in respect to truck drivers is typical. One fine morning more than seven hundred trucks were stopped by Japanese sentries, were forced to detour to the Association's headquarters, and each Chinese truck driver was compelled to

pay \$1.00 to join the Association, to sign a pledge to pay 25 cents a month as dues and to abide by the Association's rules. They hastened to comply when they were told that a Japanese Army colonel was directing the Association's activities. This organization has since then ordered many strikes in American- or European-owned plants.

While the Foreign Office of the Japanese Government continues to reiterate that Japan has no wish to monopolize the trade and development of China, and has no intention to debar third powers from their rights under existing treaties pertaining to China, the activities and announcements of many official Japanese organizations reveal the Foreign Office as either unbelievably ignorant or as stupidly mendacious.

On December 11th, 1939, for instance, at Japanese dictation, the puppet Peking Provisional Government, the Nanking Reformed Government and the Federated Autonomous Government of Inner Mongolia approved a charter for a monopoly corporation called the China Airways Company, of which 51 per cent is to be Japanese owned. The capital stock is 50,000,000 yen, and debentures up to 25,000,000 yen are authorized. This company is to have a monopoly of commercial and mail air transportation linking the cities of Canton, Shanghai, Hankow, Tsingtao, Tientsin, Peking, Dairen, Taiyuan, Hangchow and Nanking. A "closed economy"? My word, yes!

In Tokyo, on October 23rd, 1939, the Japan-Manchoukuo-China Economic Council, after sessions lasting a fortnight, decided "to establish a unified economic region covering Japan, Manchoukuo, North China and Inner Mongolia, with Central and South China as auxiliary districts." All economic projects in East Asia will be carried out under this plan.

The Japanese Government cannot disassociate itself from this grandiose monopolistic scheme, for before the plan was formally adopted, high officials of Japan's Asia Development Board, the Tokyo Cabinet Planning Board and representatives

of the Manchoukuo, Peking and Nanking puppet governments carefully canvassed all details.

Two days later the National Planning Board announced at Tokyo the summoning of a Japan-Manchoukuo-China War-time Provisions Conference. Officials representing the Japanese Ministry of Oversea Affairs, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, the Asia Development Board, the Manchoukuo Government and the Board of Manchurian Affairs are understood to have pledged co-operation. The Conference dealt with such matters as adjusting the rice supply, increasing all farm production, devising production and distribution plans and stabilizing the supplies of foods and fertilizers for Japan, Manchoukuo and China.

Meanwhile the whole of East Asia under Japanese military occupation or political domination is being flooded with what Tokyo calls “yen bloc currency.” Official figures given out at Tokyo on December 12th, 1939, estimated the bank notes issued by “yen bloc countries, including Inner Mongolia,” at 4,044,000,000 yen. Of this total the Bank of Japan alone had issued more than 2,900,000,000 yen of banknotes by the end of November. Other issues included Manchoukuo currency, Federal Reserve notes issued at Peking by the puppet government there to a total exceeding \$350,000,000, Inner Mongolian unbacked currency, and Hua Shing notes issued at Shanghai. This colossal total of paper money, which official Tokyo reports expected to exceed five billion yen by the end of 1939 alone, takes no account of the tens of millions of unsecured “military notes” that the Japanese Army has forced upon the population of the Yangtsze Valley. No comprehensive official statistics on the total of these issues have been put out since the beginning of 1940.

The nefarious feature of this flood of “yen bloc” currency is the fact that while it can be bought in the open market at about 12 or 14 to 1 to the American dollar, Japan forces for-

eign firms, by exchange control, to accept a value of about 4.20 to 1. At the end of November, 1939, the currency issues of the "yen bloc countries," Tokyo officially admits, were 2,200,000,000 in excess of such banknotes outstanding when the Chino-Japanese hostilities began in the summer of 1937. On top of this, Japan's 1940-41 budget estimates exceeded ten billion yen more. No wonder Japan is making frantic efforts to recoup by enforcing a "closed economy" in the conquered areas of China. And no wonder Japan resents American objections to and retaliations against these "closed economy" plans.

And resent it she does. The Japanese press, always rigidly censored, complains day after day of "America's legalistic and unsympathetic attitude," "America's arrogant and self-complacent attitude," "America's prejudiced attitude of remaining intentionally blind to the actual state of affairs in East Asia."

The real trouble, of course, is that America refuses to be blind concerning developments in East Asia.

20.

AND SO—?

BEFORE the American public can properly understand the reasons for Japan's insistence upon expansion, there will have to be a complete reversal of the geographical outlook.

We, in the United States, see Japan as a conquering Power, spreading itself over much of the Far East and crowding out other Powers at the same time that Japanese arms conquer other and weaker peoples.

But Japan sees the whole process from the inside of what, to her, seems to be a vicious and choking circle of present and potential enemies. From Tokyo the view is like this:

To the northeast and east Alaska, which we are fortifying, and Canada, which is hostile toward Japanese aspirations. Then comes our own West Coast, where the anti-Japanese attitude is particularly strong, and where the Exclusion Act is vehemently upheld and defended. Then there's Hawaii, with our naval base at Pearl Harbor; Midway Island, which we are fortifying; Wake Island, a stopover station for our trans-Pacific

Clipper service, which Japanese consider a weapon of our "economic imperialism." Far to the south we are expanding and fortifying our base at Samoa.

Guam we wish to fortify, although it lies close to Japan's north-south string of owned and mandated islands. At Manila we base a fleet and have airfields, something of an army and strong harbor fortifications. Japan charges us with fomenting anti-Japanese feeling and distrust of Japanese policies among the 16,000,000 people of the Philippine Islands.

The "hostile ring" continues into the south, with the Netherlands East Indies stubbornly refusing what Japan calls "friendly co-operation," and then comes Singapore, with its fortifications, its growing land forces and its great naval base, the very creation of which Japan has always resented as a "loaded cannon pointed at a one-time loyal friend and ally." The British in Burma are hostile toward Japan, as are the French in Indo-China, although the latter are momentarily practically helpless.

Then comes China—China, which since midsummer of 1937 has been waging a bitter campaign of resistance against Japan, and which for years before that used the boycott and other weapons against its next-door neighbor; China, which has been aided by Britain's reopening of the Burma Road, and which receives periodical and enormous cash credits from the United States Government.

Northward of China lies Soviet Russia with Vladivostok heavily armed and harboring upward of seven hundred bombing airplanes that might be used against Japan's great cities. Eastern Siberia completes this "hostile circle," as Japan sees it, where it nearly joins the extreme western reach of America's Alaskan peninsula and islands.

In all this gigantic circle Japan sees no friend except weak and ineffective Thailand. Even her own puppet allies, the "governments" of Manchoukuo and Nanking, are able to survive and keep a hostile populace in submission only with

the aid of Japanese bullets and bayonets. And in the very territories of the Empire itself, in Korea and in Formosa, are restive and semimutinous peoples of alien blood who have never become really reconciled to Japanese rule even though they were annexed decades ago.

Forgetting entirely that it is solely because of her career of conquest and monopoly, openly embarked upon when she started grabbing Manchuria in 1931, that the circle surrounding her is inclined to be hostile, Japan has now embarked upon a ten-year plan which her extremists hope and believe will make her the impregnable mistress of a self-sufficient empire.

Simultaneously with this movement for expansion and aggrandizement the Japanese Government itself is to be made over. The Emperor (or AN Emperor, if Hirohito will not do the Army's bidding), will remain as titular head of the state, upheld in reverence as a descendant of the Sun Goddess. The Cabinet, as before, will run the Government, but the Army will stand behind and largely dominate the Cabinet and dictate domestic and foreign policies.

By persuasion or by intimidation, if necessary, the Army will have its way. And by "Army," in this connection, I mean that small minority within the service itself which will not hesitate to use violence if necessary for the attainment of its ends. A mere whispered threat of a repetition of the Tokyo mutiny of February, 1936, brings immediate acquiescence from reluctant politicians or financiers. Or, if the opposition is less than formidable, the Army can upset any Cabinet simply by withdrawing the War Minister, who must always be an officer on active service.

Capitalistic and liberal elements are to be driven to earth. Individual companies are being forced into mergers, all initiative is being stifled, and government control is being ruthlessly extended into every branch of industry. Exchange control, production limitations, restrictions on the purchasing and ship-

ment of supplies, rationing of raw materials—these are among the means being employed to enforce the Army's decisions and to gear the whole nation into one vast war-making machine.

Germany says she is fighting for "Lebensraum." Japan says she is fighting for a "co-prosperity sphere." The thing is the same, regardless of the name; what Japan plans is a continuation of her expansionist program, by use of the Army and Navy if necessary, while at the same time the whole of the Far East is to be made into a Japanese-dominated economic bloc.

Japan itself is to be the major industrial and financial base. Manchoukuo will supply mineral and agricultural products and be the seat of heavy industries. Already two of the largest power projects in the world are being constructed there.

China will play the double role of consuming vast quantities of Japanese merchandise, and in return is to furnish Japan farm products and raw materials. China's enormous reserves of cheap labor are also to operate Japanese controlled textile industries.

Indo-China, Thailand and Malaya, and the tropical islands of the East Indies, are also to play a double role—first, to furnish Japan raw materials unobtainable from the temperate zone lands of East Asia, and second to consume products of Japan's factories, which will be so cheaply produced that domestic production in the south will be almost impossible, for all customs barriers are to be removed, insofar as they operate against Japan, and the trade will be conducted entirely upon a barter basis.

While the Army dictators of the Empire dream these dizzying dreams, the internal economy of Japan itself becomes more and more unstable. So far behind schedule is the national production of munitions and goods designed for export that hundreds of millions of money appropriated for the Army and Navy in 1939 had not yet been expended at the close of 1940. Japanese factories could not produce what was wanted, the

war in Europe cut off most European sources of supply, and the gradual extension of American embargoes and economic pressure have done the rest.

A dangerous lot of men are in control of the Japanese Empire these days. They are trying to impose an imitation Hitlerite regime upon the country, but hotly deny attempting an imitation and declare that they are only "reviving" a semi-totalitarian plan developed in Japan itself centuries before the Meiji restoration. The countless German advisors now in Japan are, however, frankly and severely critical. They say the two systems—the German and the Japanese—differ radically and say that the basic differences cannot be overcome, since Hitlerism grew up gradually from the German people, whereas the Japanese imitation is being forced upon an apathetic or discontented population by pressure from above.

The present Japanese leaders are bold gamblers, however, and just now are almost in a panic over the pressure of time and events. They are staking the entire manpower, prestige and wealth of the Empire upon the ultimate success of their scheme, and will either achieve an army-dominated form of state socialism, coupled with Asiatic hegemony, or ruin the country in their attempt.

General Araki and Baron Hiranuma, the Minister of Home Affairs, are widely known ultra-nationalists. Naoki Hoshino is president of the powerful Planning Board, and he it was who first gave tangible form to the Japanese ten-year-plan for the economic domination of East Asia. Foreign Minister Matsuoka remains something of an enigma, but it is probably significant that he selected as Vice-Ministers such men as Toshio Shiratori and Chuichi Ohashi. The former was once Ambassador to Rome, and the latter was once Manchoukuo's Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs. Both are violently chauvinistic, anti-American and anti-British. Then there is the sinister Colonel Kingoro Hashimoto, so powerful that he could not be punished

for his participation and leadership in the Tokyo mutiny of 1936. He it was who ordered the bombing of the *U.S.S. Panay*, and he it is who now heads the growingly powerful Imperial Rule Assistance Association. Hashimoto is not only anti-American, he is violently anti-foreign and particularly anti-white man. The War Minister, Lieutenant-General Tojo, is one of the leading men in the "rule or ruin" clique in the army.

Indicative of the dire domestic straits that the totalitarian leaders have brought to Japan is the fact that late in January, 1941, Prince Fumimaro Konoye, the Premier, admitted in an open session of the Diet that "the planned economy program has thus far proved a failure." He then excused the failure by adding that: "The situation confronting the country demands a high degree of economic control, which is absolutely necessary to stabilize the national life at a time when there is a general shortage of materials."

Then, in the most remarkable speech that even the Japanese Diet has ever listened to, the Premier, his voice shaking and choking with emotion, and tears wet upon his cheeks, said:

"This is the fifth year since the outbreak of the China conflict, and yet there is no sign of a solution of the incident. This is beyond the responsibility of the fighting services or that of any other person. It is entirely my own responsibility. Billions of yen have been spent from the state treasury and thousands of officers and men have been sacrificed on the continent in the China incident, for which I must apologize to the Emperor and to the people at large."

At these words tears welled up in the eyes of all Cabinet members present, including the Ministers of Commerce and Industry, Justice, Navy, Overseas Affairs, Railways and War.

Those Americans who rashly believe that Japan could be beaten in war swiftly and with ease should ponder upon Japanese national psychology and upon the quality and temperament of Japan's leadership.

The Japanese leaders have often announced, and the Japanese Army and civilian population now firmly believe, that the United States is the sworn enemy of the Empire, that we assist China with the sole idea and aim of ruining Japan, and that we meddle without justification in the Far East solely to prevent Japan's attaining economic self-sufficiency.

By late February of 1941 tension between the United States and Japan had reached such a point that many squadrons of American bombing and fighting planes were being flown from California to Hawaii and even on to Midway Island, to Guam and to Manila. The Japanese Diet, in turn, was rushing passage of a series of bills, dictated by their fighting forces, which in the words of a leading Japanese statesman "clear the decks for action in any emergency."

Revision of the National Mobilization Law provides legal foundation for Government control of the whole economic structure of the Empire. Under the revised law goods, lands, houses, mines, patent rights and funds may be requisitioned at will, labor disputes may be forcibly suppressed, and complete control is provided for exports and imports, for the restriction of news and for control of wages, hours, salaries and profits. The executive power may, at will, supersede all existing laws regulating commerce and industry.

The new National Security Defense Bill, supplementing all existing anti-espionage laws, is so severe that even a member of Parliament may be imprisoned for as much as ten years for talking to a foreign correspondent.

Another bill gives the Minister of Navy complete control of the nation's whole merchant fleet, empowers the establishment of convoy systems, authorizes the naval routing of all privately owned vessels and gives the Admiralty first and undisputed call on every ton of Japanese shipping afloat.

In Tokyo, in the second month of the new year, Admiral Nobumasa Suetsugu, former Commander-in-chief of the Japa-

nese Navy, was warning the Japanese public that there were three, and only three, routes for the possible approach of an American fleet. The development of air power, he said, had made Japan's 2,500 islands and islets scattered about the Pacific "into a fleet of anchored aircraft carriers," wherefore a direct attack upon Japan from the east, he held, is impossible. The best route for the United States Navy, from Hawaii to Guam and thus to the Philippines, the Admiral held, "has been so strongly armed by Japan that any fleet using it would thrust its head into a trap."

The northern route, by way of Alaska and the Aleutian Islands, the Admiral told his public, is not likely to be used on a large scale because of fogs and storms.

Therefore, in his opinion, the route to be followed will be the southern one—from Hawaii to Australia, and then through one of the straits of the East Indies to Singapore. The Admiral called Singapore, which is as far from Japan as Gibraltar is from New York, "a menace to the Japanese homeland," and a "serious military obstacle to Japanese hegemony of the South Seas."

Other Japanese naval writers and speakers call Singapore "the greatest and virtually the only obstacle remaining to Japan's rapid completion of her Greater East Asia sphere," "a grave menace to Japan's foreign trade" and a place "where Uncle Sam is waiting to step into John Bull's shoes." Still others point out that if Japan boldly seizes Singapore, the Burma Road will be of absolutely no use to the Chungking Government, while some naval men urge Japan to declare a formal state of war against China and to seize or torpedo all American merchant vessels taking supplies to Rangoon for shipment to Chungking.

The increasing acrimony of the disputes indicates a steady drift toward war—a war which neither side wants and which the masses of the people of both countries dread. The gravest

part of the whole situation is that neither Washington nor Tokyo is bluffing. Japan does not dare to call a halt to her expansion plans; the country is geared to war, and the domestic economic results of peace would be disastrous. Moreover, the Japanese people have been so far misled and so gravely fooled by their military leaders that for those leaders to admit mistakes of plans or policies would be suicidal.

The situation has now seemingly gone beyond the hope of a diplomatic solution. Peace could probably be indefinitely prolonged only by an ignominious surrender by either Washington or Tokyo, and each side is now so deeply committed that such surrender or compromise is unthinkable. Japan is thoroughly alarmed over our Far East policies and is "taking measures for defense." The United States is thoroughly alarmed over Japan's expansionist and aggressive policies and is also "taking measures for self-defense."

The early spring of 1941 finds the tension so serious that it will not require an open attack upon Singapore or another "*Panay incident*" to precipitate the crisis. A dispute at Shanghai, Peking or Tientsin between hot-headed sentries may start the trouble—a rowdy fight in a cabaret between Americans in uniform and Japanese soldiers may easily result in reprisals by one side or the other.

If war comes, it will be a long struggle, in spite of the optimism of those persons who say we could destroy the Japanese Navy in short order. We'd have to get at that navy first, and there is no reason to suppose that the Japanese high command will order the Imperial Fleet to come out into the mid-Pacific to do battle. If our fleet tries to thread its way through the string of Japanese islands that flanks the eastern entrances to the China Seas, then the Japanese will have an enormous initial advantage.

A war of blockade would probably so starve and throttle Japan that eventually she might try to break the blockade by

crippling our fleet in open contest, but such a direction of the conflict would mean a long, long struggle.

If we had a large proportion of our fleet at Singapore, our position would be vastly enhanced. But once Japan makes an assault upon that key position it will be too late for us to get there. If the Japanese blockade Singapore, our ships could not get to the Singapore naval base without battling the Japanese fleet in its chosen waters.

We did not send our fleet westward to or toward Singapore because we feared such an action might anger Japan to the point of a declaration of war and precipitate the very attack we sought to avoid. But Japan probably intended an attack upon Singapore all along. Our refraining from action may go down in history as another blunder of the democracies—trying to avert an inevitable conflict and thereby giving the aggressor the initial advantage. This sort of thing has happened repeatedly since September 3rd, 1939.

If Japan's fleet can be destroyed or seriously crippled, she will be in a tragic plight. American submarines operating in the China Seas could torpedo her transports almost at will, and then the enormous Japanese Army in China would be cut off from supplies and reinforcements from the homeland. If such a situation arises, then General Chiang Kai-shek's armies will have their chance for the long awaited comeback, and the fate of unsupported Japanese armies in China will be frightful to contemplate.

Looked at from any vantage point except Tokyo, with its vision of a hostile encirclement, or from Berlin or Rome, where American involvement with Japan would seem a blessing because it would lessen our aid to England, the project of a Japanese challenge to the United States would seem to be an enormous folly.

If Japan attacks Singapore, she will find herself surrounded by enemies, all, with one exception, vigorous. Already she is

at war with China and unable to achieve a victory. An attack upon Singapore would inevitably involve her in war with the Netherlands East Indies. Australia and New Zealand would, of course, join in the fray, and Australia's independent fighting strength is now vastly greater than it was during the 1914-18 conflict. The French in Indo-China would probably then stiffen their resistance, or at least enhance their non-co-operation policies. And if, besides these enemies, the United States were also to accept the Japanese challenge, Japan would be sorely beset.

Foreign Minister Matsuoka has well said that such a conflict would be a tragedy for mankind. The end might be a beaten and bankrupt Japan—a sullen and resentful people who would seek to arm for revenge. A Japan victorious, however, would also be a tragedy for that portion of mankind fated to live under the Japanese yoke and submit to arrogant exploitation by a greedy and unscrupulous military-dominated regime. A Japanese victory would also mean a ruined China, with the Chinese sullenly resentful and plotting and planning for an eventual revenge. A smashing victory for the United States would probably usher in a new era of "imperialism" for this country, with economic and political consequences and future foreign involvements that might cost us more than they would be worth. The mere existence of an empire seems to bring challenge after challenge, and it must always be alert and on the defensive. Consider the England of 1914-18, and look at the England of today.

This is not a plea for appeasement or for isolationism, but is meant as an indictment of the policy of aggression, which has brought about a situation in which we will probably have no other decent choice than to fight to the finish. We are already irrevocably and properly, it seems to me, committed to give England, Greece and China every possible assistance "short of war." But why only "short of war"? If Japan attacks Singa-

pore with a chance of succeeding in cutting the sea lanes between Australia and New Zealand and North Africa, such a success might be the turning point in the Axis struggle against England.

What then?

Obviously it would not be to our own self-interest to remain quiet, for inevitably after an Axis victory we would find existence intolerable with a vindictive, powerful and still greedy Japan dominating the Far East and the Nazis and Fascists riding high in Europe and Africa.

Such an outcome of the war might force an eventual alliance between Washington and Moscow against the aggressor nations. This would mean either eventual defeat and destruction of the American way of life, or, in case of a victory, it might mean a Europe and a China dominated by the Soviet. This, too, is not a possibility that bears complacent contemplation.

Assuming American involvement and an eventual triumph of the democracies, Russia might again be the only nation to profit by the war—if she stays out of it to the end. For the termination of such a struggle, even though the United States, England, China and the other so-called democracies should win a clean cut victory, would probably find victors as well as vanquished exhausted and impoverished.

Does this sound like pessimism? Yes, it is pessimism. When war broke out in Europe in August of 1914, the nations of the world were entering a period of deepening twilight.

The problem of Europe and the problem of the Far East are not problems for today only; it may be years or decades before the world fights its way to another period of composure and security. The year 1941 may be midnight of the long darkness; assuredly the twilight begun in 1914 has now deepened into dark. How long the night will be no prophet can know, but it may safely be said that as yet there is no first hint of dawn.

This is pessimism and realism, but it does not justify defeatism or despair. The things supremely worth having are surely worth fighting to retain. And when the distant dawn finally comes, the first flush of light will not illumine the faces of Americans ashamed to look at one another, for Americans in the days to come will not shirk what they may have to do to preserve their challenged heritage.

INDEX

Amoy, 64
Amery, L. S., 105
Ando, Gen., 79
Anti-Comintern axis (see Tokyo-Rome-Berlin axis)
Araki, Gen., 309
Arita, Hachiro, 32, 275
Axis (see Tokyo-Rome-Berlin axis)

Bali, 134
Balik Papan, 135
Bee, H M.S., 21
Berlin-Rome-Tokyo axis (see Tokyo-Rome-Berlin axis)
Borneo, 133, 134
Boxer indemnity funds, 270
Brooke-Popham, Sir Robert, 106-108
Burma Road, 43, 77-78, 306, 312

Canton, 64
Celebes, 133, 134
Chiang Kai-shek, 22, 37, 38, 40, 44-46
China
 Aims and policies, 36-48
 Antiforeignism, 231, 234
 Anti-Americanism of Wang Ching-wei government, 260-277
 Communism, 46-47

Communists, 40
Education, 226-227, 229-234
Finance, 42, 55-56, 303-304
Food, 51, 300-301
Foreign exchange, 279, 289-290
Guerrilla warfare, 51, 52, 53
Japanese occupation, 9-11, 21-25, 36-48, 49-66, 73-75, 202-221, 222-234, 242, 278-293
Missionaries, 42-43, 206, 222-229, 267
Puppet government, 17 (see also Wang Ching-wei)
Relations with U.S., 42-43, 47-48, 260-277
Transportation, 37, 41, 51-53, 77-79

Dutch East Indies (see Netherlands East Indies)

England (see Great Britain)
Extraterritoriality, 23, 24

Federated Malay States, 92, 94
Foreign exchange, 122-127, 279, 289-290

France, 86
 Relations with Japan, 78-79
 French citizens in China, 58-59, 280,
 292
 French Indo-China, 85-87, 308
 Japanese invasion, 19, 36, 76-87
 Relations with Thailand, 80-81,
 82-83

German activity in China, 60-61
 German relations with Japan, 18-20,
 22-23, 30, 60-61, 84, 189
 Graves, Gen. William S., 235, 240-
 241
 Great Britain, 18-19
 Air force, 106-108
 Army, 104-105
 Navy, 101
 Relations with Japan, 67-69, 71,
 75, 77-78
 Rubber imports, 121-122
 Situation in Hongkong, 67-75
 Situation in Singapore, 91-127
 Tin imports, 117
 Grew, Ambassador Joseph C., 28-29,
 223, 271, 297-300
 Guinea, 133

Hainan, 71, 76, 148
 Haiphong, 79, 80
 Hankow, 54
 Hart, Admiral T. C., 150
 Hashimoto, Col. Kingoro, 21, 309-
 310
 Hawaii, 157-173
 Defense, 158-162, 164-169
 Hickam Field army air base, 166-
 167
 Pearl Harbor naval base, 158-159,
 160-161, 166, 172
 Pearl Harbor naval air base, 162
 Hiranuma, Baron, 309

Holland, Rev. W. L., 228
 Homma, Gen., 295
 Hongkong, 67-75
 Defense, 68-71
 Honolulu, 157, 162, 163

Japan
 Activities in Hawaii, 171-172
 Activities in Netherlands East Indies, 145-146
 Activities in Singapore, 110
 Aims and policies, 17-18, 25-26,
 31-33, 34-35, 62, 67, 80-84, 145-
 146, 229-234, 235-241, 294-304,
 307-317
 Army, 20-21, 62, 65-66, 79, 208,
 213, 235, 293, 300, 307, 308
 Control in China, 260-277, 300-304
 Finance, 65, 243, 250, 256
 Food, 245-248
 Internal unrest, 242
 Invasion of China, 9-11, 21-25, 36-
 48, 49-66, 73-75, 202-221, 222-
 234, 242, 278-293
 Invasion of French Indo-China,
 19, 36, 76-87
 Navy, 54, 62-63, 208, 314
 Recognition of Wang Ching-wei
 government, 17, 21-24, 37, 38,
 260
 Relations with France, 78-79
 Relations with Germany, 18-20, 22-
 23, 30, 60-61, 84, 189
 Relations with Great Britain, 67-
 69, 71, 75, 77-78
 Relations with Netherlands East
 Indies, 128-129, 131-132, 140-
 143, 144, 145-146
 Relations with Thailand (Siam),
 80-87
 Relations with U.S., 19-20, 25-26,
 28-31, 32, 34-35, 45, 47-48, 55,
 147, 157-158, 169-172, 208, 223-

229, 243, 260-277, 294-304, 305-317
 Trade in China, 51-52, 64
 Trade with Thailand (Siam), 81
 Japan Young Men's Federation, 21
 Japanese aggression, 9, 17
 Java, 133, 134
 Jewish refugees in Shanghai, 280-285
 Johore, 92
 Jones, S. W., 184, 186
 Kang Teh (see Pu-yi, Henry)
 Kellogg Pact, 47
 Konoye, Prince Fumimaro, 30, 31, 44, 145, 189, 310
 Kuomintang, 40, 46
Ladybird, H.M.S., 21, 208
 Liu, Dr. Herman C., 233
 Lytton Commission, 231, 234
 MacArthur, Maj. Gen. Douglas, 151-152
 Malaya, 308
 Exports, 111-127
 Foreign exchange, 122-127
 Products, 93 (*map*)
 Rubber, 118-122
 Tin, 111-118
 Manchoukuo, 22, 32, 49-50, 232, 235-238, 261-262, 306
 Manila, 147, 148-149, 157
 Matsuoka, Yosuke, 25-29, 145, 309, 315
 Mongolia, Outer, 39, 235-239
 Monroe Doctrine, 33-34
 Nanking, 54
 Nanning, 65
 Netherlands East Indies, 76, 128-146
 Defense, 129-133, 135-137
 Naval base, 136
 Oil, 131, 141
 Products, 93 (*map*), 130
 Relations with Holland, 137-140
 Relations with Japan, 128-129, 131-132, 140-143, 144, 145-146
 Relations with U.S., 132-133
 Trade, 130
 "New Order in Greater East Asia," 23, 31, 32, 34, 44, 45, 48, 57, 66, 77, 154, 203, 227, 244, 255, 263
 Nine-Power Treaty, 47, 48
 Nyieh Hai-fang, Dr., 233
 Ohashi, Chuichi, 309
 Opium, 43, 62, 63
 Panay, U.S.S., 10, 21, 208, 295, 310
 Peking, 50-51, 52
 Philippine Islands, 76, 147-156, 285
 Defense, 148-153
 Exports, 155
 Independence, 148, 154-155
 Pickett, Col. H. K., 161
 Pu-yi, Henry (Kang Teh), 50, 262
 Quezon, President, 148
 Richardson, Admiral James O., 159
 Rome-Berlin axis (see Tokyo-Rome-Berlin axis)
 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 9
 Rubber, 118-122
 Russia, 20, 46-47, 235, 236, 306, 316
 Scott, Robert H., 176, 181-183, 184, 185-186, 198-200
 Semeonoff, Ataman, 235-241
 Shanghai, 56-63, 278-293
 Shiratori, Toshio, 309
 Siam (see Thailand)
 Singapore, 68, 70, 80, 88-127, 134, 174-201, 312, 314
 Censorship, 109, 174-201
 Exports, 111-127

Singapore (*continued*)
 Foreign exchange, 122-127
 Naval base, 100-110, 188
 Products, 93 (*map*), 94
 Trade, 94, 111-127

Songgram, Luang Bipul, 82, 85

Spratley Islands, 71, 76, 148

Suetsugu, Admiral Nobumasa, 311-312

Sumatra, 133, 134

Swatow, 64

Tang Leang-li, 263, 266, 273

Thailand (Siam), 76, 262, 306, 308
 Anti-Chinese activity, 83-84
 Navy, 84
 Oil reserves, 84
 Relations with Indo-China, 80-81, 82-83
 Relations with Japan, 80-87
 Relations with U.S., 81-82
 Trade with Japan, 81

Thomas, Sir Shenton, 106

Tientsin, 50-51, 52

Tin, 111-118

Tojo, Lieut.-Gen., 310

Tokyo-Rome-Berlin axis, 17, 18, 19-20, 25, 30-31, 32, 67, 129, 145, 188, 262-263

Tripartite Pact (see Tokyo-Rome-Berlin axis)

United States
 Army, 151, 153, 163, 164, 165, 166, 168

Evacuation of citizens in Orient, 202-221

Frontier in Asia, 9-10

Navy, 67-68, 100-101, 144-150, 159-160, 162, 163, 168, 169, 312

Negotiations for Pacific naval bases, 188

Relations with China, 42-43, 47-48, 260-277

Relations with Japan, 19-20, 25-26, 28-31, 32, 34-35, 45, 47-48, 55, 147, 157-158, 169-172, 208, 223-229, 243, 260-277, 294-304, 305-317

Relations with Netherlands East Indies, 132-133

Relations with Thailand (Siam), 81-82

Rubber imports, 118, 119-120, 122

Situation in Hawaii, 157-173

Situation in Philippine Islands, 147-156

Tin imports, 113

Trade in China, 75

Van Mook, H. J., 142

Wang Ching-wei, 17, 21-24, 37, 38, 54, 233, 244, 260-261, 263-277

World War, Second, 9, 11-12, 18, 19-20, 25, 32, 76, 86, 105, 128, 138, 144, 279-280

Wu Chih-chieh, Dr., 233

Yonai, Admiral, 21, 145

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